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ABSTRACT
This study chronicles a story of civil rights that has been left untold until now.
Recent scholarship contributing to the history of the “long civil rights movement” has
reframed our understanding of civil rights beyond the years of the late 1950s and early
1960s.1 In addition, it has also demonstrated that civil rights activity occurred in regions
other than the South. However, most work on the long civil rights movement
demonstrates that activism among blacks began much earlier than the Brown v. Board
Supreme Court case and instead, was a part of a longer freedom struggle that, in many
ways, makes up the African American experience. By focusing on Denver, this work will
demonstrate that civil rights activity, just as it began before 1954, extends past significant
legislative milestones, and tragic historical moments, like the death of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. in 1968. By turning our attention westward, this work proves that 1968 was not
an end point in civil rights history. Denver’s story had regional and national impact, as
two contemporary educational equality movements took shape and youth activism
became more formalized and visible. Similarly, Denver’s Chicano Movement had
significant influence on activism in Denver and the nation, and this history demonstrates
the multicultural makeup of civil rights.

1

Jacqueline Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past”
Journal of American History 91, 4. (March, 2005): 1233-1623.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In the Image of Progress: Denver, 1947-1994
Manual High School Turns 100: 1994
On September 27th 1994, 16-year old Glenn Taylor was shot in the chest outside
his home in the Five Points neighborhood of Denver, Colorado. Taylor was a junior at
Manual High School. An outstanding student, member of the JROTC, and participant in
the college preparatory program Upward Bound, Taylor seemed the least likely student to
be involved in what locals assumed was “gang-related violence.” Taylor, a black student
with dreams of becoming a civil rights lawyer and advocate for African American youths,
got involved in school activities in order to avoid the trouble that he believed distracted
his friends and neighbors in the tumultuous district where he lived. Glenn Taylor’s
sixteen years spanned a short part of a longer era when Denver’s black and Chicano
residents oscillated between periods of celebration and others of internal and external
conflict and violence. Taylor’s death marked the end of nearly twenty years of extreme
highs and lows for Manual High School and Five Points.2
Four months prior, Taylor and his fellow Manual Thunderbolts attended an
assembly hosting Denver’s first black mayor and Manual alum, Wellington Webb. Webb
kicked off a week-long celebration for the school and city as Denverites rejoiced in 100
years of Manual’s history.3 Parades, lectures, and events engaged blacks, Chicanos,
Asians, Native Americans, and whites who lived in the community and reflected the
multicultural makeup of the school itself. The events were meant to honor the school,
which over the course of its 100 years had met its share of challenges. Originally located
2

Marilyn Robinson, “Manual Student slain in Drive-by,” Denver Post, 28 September 1994.

3

Christopher Lopez, “Webb- Manual built a distinguished legacy,” Denver Post, 16 April 1994.
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on East 27th and Franklin Street, Manual Training High School was part of a nation-wide
experiment promoted at the 1876 Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia by Russian
educators and scientists. This innovative approach to education taught boys and girls in
manual arts, and centered on learning through hand-eye coordination and use of the body,
as well as books. On April 3rd 1894, Denver’s Manual Training High School opened in
this tradition, but the school quickly established an identity all its own.4 Most manual arts
schools were only open to boys, but the first class at Manual included both male and
female students. Denver, a widely promoted progressive western city, was home to
schools that embraced this tradition by admitting girls along with boys, and accepting
African American students before many other public schools in the region did.5
In 1994, newspaper accounts celebrating the school’s trials and triumphs included
quotes from tearful alumni as they recalled the devastating fire in 1953 that claimed “Old
Manual” just months after construction for a new location was completed across the
street. In 1950, overcrowding and the need for improved amenities made a new location
for Manual the topic of discussion for parents and teachers in Five Points. Yet the
conversation about increased space and better facilities overshadowed the larger and
deeper conflict facing Manual students and Denver residents in the 1950s. Once the
crown jewel in Denver’s public education system, the high school began to fall out of
favor as the neighborhood of Five Points became increasingly black and Chicano and
Manual’s student population reflected these changes. Since Denver’s public education
system did not operate under a state de jure segregation law, black, white, and Chicano
4

George Lane, “Manual at 100: School Inspiration for Many” Denver Post, 10 April 1994.

5

Ibid., Patricia Ann Shikes, “Three Denver Public School Superintendents: A Historical Study of
Educational Leadership” (Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, 1987).
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students attended schools together, though they hardly shared identical experiences.6 As
early as 1930, black students made up a distinct but isolated portion of the student body,
and this number increased significantly throughout the 1950s and 1960s.7
Wellington Webb and his wife Wilma graduated from Manual in 1958 and 1961,
respectively. Wellington and Wilma, along with their black peers sat in desegregated
classrooms, but their social experiences at lunchtime, school functions, and passing
periods were marked by segregation. When “New Manual” opened in 1953, students
identified spaces within the high school that were allocated to whites only, and blacks
only, though no formal segregation rules existed. This was part of a history that carried
over from “Old Manual.” In the 1930s, a major gathering space in the school was “the
well,” a railing in the central hallway that divided the first and second floors of the
school. The well was the epicenter for socializing, particularly for upper classmen. Black
students, however, were treated as uninvited observers at the well. Frankie Harriette
Caldwell, a long-time Denver educator and graduate from Manual in 1934 remembered
that black students could “sit anywhere you wanted in class, but we stood at one end of
the well. The whites stood at the other.”8
When the new Manual opened in 1953 at 28th and Williams, the word “training”
was dropped from the name, and the school’s racial makeup had shifted from a few black
students to nearly fifty percent of the student body. Hispanics and whites made up the
majority of the remaining fifty percent. Examples of racial segregation now stretched
6

Lane, Denver Post, 10 April 1994.

7

Photo, “1930 Manual High School Home Economics Teacher and Student,” Denver Public
Library Digital Collections.
8

Lane, Denver Post, 10 April 1994.
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beyond black and white students at either sides of a popular hallway. Instead, the entire
high school became the victim of discrimination, and it was continually held back by the
Denver Public School district (DPS). “Manual was a stepchild in the Denver school
system,” recalled Charles Cousins, a black businessman who became Manual’s greatest
advocate and benefactor after he graduated from the school in 1936.9
Noticeably absent from the celebrations honoring Manual’s centennial was civil
rights leader and Chicano Crusader, Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales. On April 10th 1994, the
same day as Webb’s address to Manual students, Corky Gonzales attended one of his
final public functions. Nearly two-hundred and fifty fans from Colorado, Arizona,
California, and New Mexico lined up to have brief conversations, obtain autographs, and
snap photos of the impassioned hero of the national Chicano movement. Gonzales, who
was born in Denver in 1928 and attended Manual High School, was a contemporary of
Webb’s, and perhaps Denver’s best known political leader of the twentieth century.
Having proudly graduated from “Old Manual” in 1944, Gonzales’ time in Denver’s
public schools formed many of his political opinions, however controversial.
Blacks and Chicanos had been sharing Manual since the school opened. By 1994,
these two groups were poised to dominate the demographics at Manual, and though they
did not always collaborate, they sometimes found common ground. Only four months
before the centennial, black and Chicano students organized a protest. More than seventyfive teenagers walked out of school carrying “Boycott Manual High School” signs as
they marched to the nearby state capitol. The protestors stated that blacks and Chicanos
were treated unfairly in Denver’s second oldest high school. At Manual, teachers and

9

Lane, Denver Post, 10 April 1994.
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administrators assumed they were “gang members,” and enforced attendance and
tardiness more harshly when it came to students of color. Black students, regardless of
ability, believed they were counseled out of accelerated classes. Alfred Sayers, a black
parent remembered that when his daughter attempted to sign up for college-preparatory
classes, “They said, ‘Don’t do that honey, you can’t do this work.’ The teachers told her
she wasn’t eligible.”10 Amin Suliaman, a seventeen-year-old Manual student who “served
as sort of a master of ceremonies” shouted to the crowd that problems in their high school
were representative of “institutionalized racism.”11 Suliaman was on to something.
Throughout the spring semester, students and parents complained individually and
collectively that Manual’s graduation statistics were disappointing. Black and Chicano
students disproportionately disappeared from the halls, as students dropped out or were
forced out of a school that had once been a pillar of opportunity.12
As the 1994 school year came to a close, six black males were slated to graduate
in a class of 119. When the class of 1994 enrolled as freshmen, 115 were black, 58 were
black males. Yet, only six made it to graduation.13 One of six slated to graduate was
Kinshasa Sayers, the son of Manual High alum Alfred Sayers. Inspired by the recent
protests and his father’s encouragement, Kinshasa tried out in the spring to speak at the
annual commencement ceremony. He thought himself the perfect candidate; he
10

Mark Stevens, “Black Struggle at Manual: Few Males Will Graduate,” Denver Post 1 May

1994.
11

Fred Brown and Steve Lipsher,”Black, Hispanic Students Treated Unfairly, Teens Say at
Capitol Rally,” Denver Post 25 January 1994.
12

Michael Booth, “Protest Upends Graduation Service: Racial Tensions Fuel Manual Disruption,”
Denver Post 30 May 1994.
13

Ibid. A later article claims that nine black males graduated. Bill Briggs, “Manual Student Tried
to Work in the System,” Denver Post 9 June 1994. An earlier article about parent protests regarding this
figure assumed that ten black males would graduate. Stevens, Denver Post 1 May 1994.
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represented the few black men who made it to graduation, and the only one to try out for
a speaking role; he was a member of the Manual Parent Teacher Association; he was a
volunteer tutor at Columbine Elementary; he was a regular panelist at Manual’s
Collaborative-Making Decision meetings. He believed he had been working within the
system to create positive change for black youths.14 However, when Principal Linda
Transou announced the five students who would speak at graduation, Kinshasa did not
make the list. Frustrated, Kinshasa began recruiting other students to protest with him. On
May 30th, graduation day, only 31 of the original 115 black students collected diplomas,
and many of them wore black X’s on their caps to commemorate their 84 missing
classmates. Parents and spectators looked quizzically at one another while family and
friends of the graduating black students suddenly hoisted signs reading “Black young
men denied a voice at Manual” and began circulating through the crowd. As one of the
chosen speakers thanked the administrators and supportive parents, Kinshasa strode to the
microphone and shouted, “I have a right to speak at my own graduation! Why are no
black males speaking?” Almost instantly, a school administrator switched the
microphone off, but the damage was done. Students, in red and blue caps and gowns
booed Kinshasa, some of the angry seniors “stormed” the podium to shove Kinshasa, and
one student was “pushed from the stage” when she tried to “oppose Sayers.”15
Such controversies were not new to Manual High School. As early as 1918, youth
protest became a part of the school’s tradition. Barely twenty years after first opening,
student “progressives” decided to voice their support for World War I. Against the

14

Briggs, Denver Post 9 June 1994.

15

Booth, Denver Post 30 May 1994.
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wishes of the administration, students suspended production on Manual’s school year
book, in order to collect funds for an ambulance that could be used “in World War I.”
Likely, the ambulance was housed at Denver’s Fitzsimons Army Hospital, a recent
construction and point of pride for Denverites. The students raised nearly $1,000.16 Thus,
a legacy of activism began at Manual High. Decades later, Chicanos and blacks would
use this proud history as a springboard for their own radical processes. Both Wellington
Webb and Corky Gonzales, two figure-heads of Denver’s civil rights era graduated from
Manual, and many more students, parents, teachers, and politicians learned about
equality, identity, and civil rights through their affiliations with Manual High and the
Denver Public Schools (DPS).
By the time Manual celebrated its 100th birthday, the DPS system governed ten
public high schools, all of which were involved in the educational equality movement.
Manual, however, was one five specific schools that made up the epicenter of civil rights
activism in Denver. Due to its longevity, as well as its central placement in a historically
black neighborhood, Manual and its “feeder” Cole Junior High and the nearby Barrett
Elementary were all a significant part of the civil rights tradition. Denver parents and
locals were invested in Manual’s reputation, at different times during this school’s
history. They were equally concerned about the well-being of East High School,
Denver’s first public high school, distinguished on the national register of historic places,
came under scrutiny as well. Finally, the alternative high school, La Escuela Tlatelolco,
represented yet another aspect of Denver’s civil rights story when it opened in 1970.

16

Lane, Denver Post, 10 April 1994.
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Progressivism and the Roots of Managerial Racism
Denver, Colorado sits on the front range of the Rocky Mountains with three
hundred days of sunshine a year and a bustling infrastructure built on mining, tourism,
finance, and enhanced by federal spending. Steadily, the city’s population grew over the
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and as a result of the Second Great
Migration, the G.I. Bill, and fair housing laws passed in the 1950s. The city’s
demographic makeup shifted dramatically after the World War II. City officials and
boosters promoted Denver as a welcoming place for blacks and Chicanos, but politicians
and residents nonetheless maintained racial segregation in the city through a variety of
methods throughout the end of the twentieth century. By the time the United States
Supreme Court ruled on Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas in 1954, Denver
had made improvements for the benefit of black and Chicano residents. Once home to a
racist regime and politics dominated by the Ku Klux Klan, Denver managed to reverse
their public image by 1950, but a racist undercurrent remained.
Carl Abbott writes that the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 “transformed
Colorado more profoundly than any single event except the Gold Rush of 1859.”17
Western cities in general benefited from wartime production, and Denver exemplified
this trend. The Mile High City was already expanding the Fitzsimons Army Hospital by
the time the U.S. entered World War II, the Lowry Air Base was conducting specialized
training as early as 1938, and the Remington Arms Plant began producing ammunition
and prefabricated destroyer ships in the early months of 1941.18 Once a “backwater”
17

Carl Abbott, Stephen J. Leonard, and Thomas J. Noel, Colorado: A History of the Centennial
State (Boulder, Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 2005): 297.
18

Ibid. 299.

8

state, Colorado was now leading the country's war economy production, with Denver at
the helm. In the years following World War II, the population in Denver surged with
college students, farmers, job seekers, and retired servicemen from across the country.
The 1940s and 1950s saw increased federal defense spending in the state, as well as new
manufacturing and information industries. Denver continued to grow in population, and
the postwar suburban housing boom began to affect the Mile High City. Between the
years of 1950 and 1970, the city of Denver increased by fewer than 100,000 people, but
the population of the suburbs grew by more than 560,000.19 White residents in the
surrounding suburbs like Wheatridge, Lakewood and Sunnyside feared annexation both
by the city and its public schools district. The threat of integrated education that had, a
decade earlier, motivated these parents to move to a new suburban development, once
again became a possibility as the city’s limits continued to stretch.
Noticeable black migration to Denver began as early as 1860, when Colorado was
still a territory. At this time, the census recorded forty-six “slaves from the South.” This
number grew consistently for the next few decades. By 1884, the city’s black population
increased to 1,083, and the white population reached 35,629.20 In the late 19th century,
black settlement was dispersed in the older sections of Denver, as blacks made their
homes nearest to their potential work sources, but also clustered based on available
housing options. Most black workers found employment in domestic service, which
required them to live in close proximity to the white families who employed them.21
19

Ibid., 323.

20

Lionel Dean Lyles, “An Historical-Urban Geographical Analysis of Black Neighborhood
Development in Denver, 1860-1970” (PhD. diss.,, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1977): 72.
21

Ibid., 50, 52, 58-61.
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By the 1880s, “there appeared to be a growing concentration of black households
in the Five Points district…”, though this neighborhood was not yet the nucleus of black
culture that it would later become.22 Black homeownership increased from 1885 to 1914,
as a few Denverites worked to build a small tract of low-cost housing, among them a very
small number of black homeowners were able to purchase single-family detached units.
Local politicians and residents took menial attempts to provide housing opportunities for
black migrants. In the 1890s, Denver officials closed old buildings in downtown that
were no longer suitable for human use. Despite this, blacks were nonetheless forced to
rent these unsuitable units; in many ways because this was the only choice they were
given.23 Whether they lived in Park Hill, Five Points, the barrio, or another neighborhood,
Denver residents took pride in their city. Since the railroad boom of the1800s, Denver has
been the center of western transportation, mining, commerce, agriculture, finance, and
retail. In the twentieth century, Denver’s information and military production joined the
already prestigious list of the city’s industries. From as early as 1906, Denver became
known as the “capital of the Rocky Mountain Empire.” These industries demanded
workers, and increased production brought with it prosperity for these workers. As the
nineteenth century came to a close, newcomers were flocking to Denver by the
thousands. In 1890, the city’s population reached 106,713. By 1910, there were more
than 213,000. Yet, despite this growth, Denver remained a significant city in a ruggedly
western state, hesitant when it came to political change, committed to moralism and
whitewashed tradition, and conflicted about its place in a changing world.

22

Ibid., 64.

23

Ibid., 75.
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However, it wasn’t until the 1920s and 1930s that black settlement was
concentrated into specific “enclaves.”24 From 1923 to 1925, Denver experienced a
“building boom” as larger numbers of white residents demanded housing opportunities
immediately east of the city. One of these new neighborhoods was called Park Hill.
Located directly east of Five Points, Park Hill was designed to portray posh
sophistication. The lots were bigger, each home was designed to look custom, and the
neighborhood was within proximity to downtown, but removed from the perceived crime
that came with city living. Equally attractive to aspirational whites was the placement of
Park Hill. The neighborhood, however close to Five Points, was built on the other side of
Colorado Boulevard, a two-lane highway that thus created a barrier between Five Points
and this new Park Hill oasis. The Five Points District, a neighborhood just east of
downtown and named for the intersection where five major roads meet, experienced a
significantly high turn-over rate during this brief period. Because of this, larger numbers
of black migrants were able to settle in Five Points and by 1930, more than three-fourths
of all black Denverites were living in this neighborhood.25 While white homeowners
24

For more on black communities and “enclaves,” see Kenneth Kusmer, The Origins of the Urban
Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, 2005).
25

Scholars identify that during the “Second Great Migration,” over five million black men,
women, and children relocated to urban centers in the South, North, Midwest, and Denver. This movement
of blacks occurred during the interwar years and continued into the late 1960s or early 1970s. See Kusmer,
“African Americans in the City since World War II: From the Industrial to the Post-industrial Era,” Journal
of Urban History 21, No. 4 (May 1995): 458-504.; \ Kusmer ed., The Ghetto Crisis of the 1960s: Causes
and Consequences (New York: Garland, 1991).; Joe W. Trotter with Earl Lewis and Tera W. Hunter, eds.,
The African American Urban Experience: Perspectives from the Colonial Period to the Present (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).; Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in
Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).; Nicholas Lemann, The Promised
Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America (New York: Knopf, 1991).; James N.
Gregory, The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migration of Black and White Southerners Transformed
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).; James R. Grossman, Land of Hope:
Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).;
Regarding Denver’s migration statistics, see; Lyles: iv., Census data shows that most of these migrants
were originally from Mississippi or Louisiana, and had lived briefly in Kansas before relocating to
Colorado. About half of these black newcomers lived in Denver, with the rest dispersed throughout the
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were purchasing new homes, black tenants were forced to rent older buildings for a lower
cost. The Denver Star, the city’s black newspaper, noted “no negro” was employed in
Denver’s professional or political sector.26 Employment discrimination ultimately
channeled blacks into unskilled and lower paying jobs, thus blocking blacks from the
upward mobility that whites seemed to have when they purchased homes.
As black newcomers settled in Denver, they met many Coloradans who
considered this state home long before black migration began. Mexicanos have been a
part of Colorado’s history from the beginning. Many of Denver’s Chicanos could trace
their Colorado ancestry to original migration and creation histories. The political history
of Mexican-Americans in southern Colorado began with a population boom of the
Spanish-speaking population from 16,000 in the 1790s to over 60,000 in 1850. Over the
course of the 1830s and 1840s, the New Mexican government parceled “much of
northern New Mexico, including thousands of square miles that would become part of
Colorado Territory” in a series of land grants.27 Included in these agreements were the
Spanish-speaking farmers who had been cultivating the land for generations. Then, with
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States claimed more than a million square
miles from Mexico’s territory, including the southern half of Colorado and all who lived
there.28

state. Most were young to middle-aged men; however a few women made the journey and immediately
began working in Denver’s domestic trades.
26

“Waking the Sleeping Lion,” The Denver Star, 20 March 1915: 78.

27

Abbott, Leonard, and Noel, 35.

28

Matt S. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, The Chicanos: A History of Mexican Americans (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1972): 70.
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Hispanic farmers and shepherds were attracted to Colorado’s grasses and plains,
and by 1870, “ninety percent of the 6,400 residents of Las Animas and Huerfano
counties” in the southern part of the state were either New Mexican natives or their
children.29 Mexican-Americans also found work with the railroad. Many made Denver
their home base while traveling throughout the western region of the United States with
different railroad companies.30 The state’s famed sugar beet farms provided Mexicanos
many opportunities for employment and movement to the capital city. Colorado’s
agricultural economy expanded in the late nineteenth century. The Dingley Tariff in
1897, and the expansion of irrigation through the Reclamation Act in 1902, inspired
Colorado farmers to rapidly increase their sugar beet production. Corporate farmers
recruited Mexican Americans to serve as their labor force, and demand only increased in
wartime throughout the twentieth century.31 Regardless of the need for workers,
Mexican-Americans faced hostility when white newcomers outnumbered them. In 1914,
Hispanics in the southern part of the state were told they “had no rights” when it came to
public access to education. Similarly, in 1936, Governor Ed Johnson dispatched the
National Guard to keep Mexican migrants from crossing the southern border of Colorado.
Johnson was responding to anxiety among white Denverites who worried that an increase
in migration meant Mexican nationals threatened “local jobs.”32

29

Abbott, Leonard, and Noel, 39.

30

Juan Haro, The Ultimate Betrayal: An Autobiography by Juan Haro (Pittsburgh, Dorrance,

1998)): 4.
31

Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos,125-126.; Rodolfo Acuna, Occupied America: A History of
Chicanos (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998): 178
32

Abbott, Leonard, and Noel, 357.
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Until World War II, black residents were primarily concentrated in Five Points,
but some were dispersed in other downtown areas. Yet, in the postwar period, black
migrants grew in population, and the neighborhoods began to change. Due to high
birthrates as well as a spike in interstate migration, Denver’s black population reached
15,059 by 1950.33 Migrants were increasingly attracted to Denver’s employment
opportunities. During World War II, wartime economy production went into overdrive.
Shipbuilder Eaton Metal Products and the Remington Arms Plant increased production
and recruited women, Chicanos, and African Americans for the first time. New
opportunities in the professional sector also became available and black women in
particular were able to move into clerical positions that were not available to them
before.34 Increasing in numbers and general economic status, some blacks began to look
for housing opportunities outside of Five Points. Black women initiated this shift, mostly
because they had more opportunities for professional advancement than men, and thus
carried the “bulk of income responsibility based on their frequency of employment when
compared to black males” in Denver.35 These professional black women provided the
economic impetus to “move up,” since their increased wages and long-term employment
allowed them to consider purchasing, instead of renting.
Despite its proximity to Five Points and its appeal to the upwardly mobile, Park
Hill remained racially exclusive. Even professional black families, with dual incomes and
renowned reputations were shut out of Park Hill in the 1940s and 1950s. Combus
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“Cubby” Chapman was among the first blacks to break the barrier and purchase a home
in Park Hill. Cubby was born in 1924 in Newton, Mississippi. He attended Alcorn
Agricultural and Mechanical College in the 1940s, where he met his wife, Margaret Alice
Brown. Margaret and Cubby moved to Colorado after college, when Cubby was hired as
a waiter with the Union Pacific Railroad (UP). He held the position for twenty-five years
until he retired. Before he retired from UP, Cubby opened a landscaping business in
1950. Margaret and Cubby had their sights set on Park Hill. They saved every dime they
could from Cubby’s tips and wages, and in the early 1950s decided it was time to buy a
new home. With the help of a “straw buyer,” the Chapmans became arguably the first b
first black family to purchase a home in Park Hill.36 Cubby’s son, Gil remembered that
they were not greeted with open arms. The family “received death constant death
threats.”37 Despite his initial frosty welcome to Park Hill, Cubby went on to great
prominence in the Mile High City. His landscaping business, Chapman Landscape and
Irrigation evolved to become one of Denver’s most prominent design companies, winning
bids to landscape Invesco Field, the Blair-Caldwell African American Research Library,
the Colorado Convention Center, and other landmarks. Cubby and Margaret stayed put in
Park Hill, eventually earning great respect from their black and white neighbors.38
Mexican-Americans were also increasingly visible in Denver. They became urban
residents during the Great Depression and World War II. By 1940, Denver’s permanent
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Mexicano population had grown from 2,500 twenty years prior to 12,000. These
Chicanos shared the Five Points neighborhood with blacks, and many also lived in the
Elyria neighborhood. Elyria, located north of downtown, was sometimes also referred to
as “the Coliseum,” nicknamed for the historic building which anchors the community.
Mexicanos also created enclaves in the Swansea neighborhood, on the eastern side of the
Coliseum. Others still moved into the historic Auraria section, sometimes called “West
Denver.” Chicanos, however, tended to generalize these many neighborhoods under the
umbrella title, “the barrio.” Scholars of Mexican-American history have argued that
barrios were “de facto segregated” neighborhoods where Chicanos lived in “dilapidated”
“multi-family” homes.39 Mexicanos in Denver did not share the same desire to move into
Park Hill. Nonetheless angered by segregation and discrimination, Chicanos focused their
energies on community service programs and self-help agencies.40
Denver’s reputation as a racially progressive and welcoming city was a product of
both chance and design. As an urban center in the American West, a progressive
mystique defined Denver, as it did Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Americans
across the country assumed that “things were better out west.” Furthermore, Denver like
San Francisco and Seattle, lacked black ghetto, prior to the Second World War.41 More
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economic opportunities existed for blacks and whites both, and the West seemed free of
longstanding race restrictions that ran deep throughout the American South. Moreover,
Denver—like its sister cities in the West—established its own progressive image by
taking calculated measures to promote opportunity as a means to increase migration.
By 1960, many Denver residents enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle. The average
median income for Denver County and city residents was $6,361 per household.42
Colorado was a thriving state with many of its counties recording high income. At the
same time, a distinction between Denver’s middle class and lower class blacks was
becoming evident. Beginning in the 1920s, blacks gravitated toward the neighborhood of
Five Points, on the northeast side of Denver. When Colorado’s Fair Housing Policy was
passed in 1959, upwardly mobile blacks like Cubby and Margaret began looking for
homes in the nearby Park Hill neighborhood, to the east of Five Points. At the time, black
and white Denverites feared the potential ghettoization of their neighborhoods. Members
of Five Points artistic community, who believed their neighborhood was special, urged
the middle class to stay and defend their historic district. The Denver Blade published a
call in 1959 urging blacks to retain the unique neighborhood and its identity. “The
original Negro settlers of this district and their heirs created an environment and
atmosphere of refinement and intelligence.” Blade writer John Wallace believed that the
earlier period of Five Points history was special because the neighborhood was
dominated by home owners instead of renters. These “pillars of the community,” as he
called them, created a cosmopolitan community, and as they began moving into new
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areas, “Negroes of the lower income groups flocked to Denver…” and took over the
empty spaces left behind by those in search of something better. Wallace lamented that
these newcomers were “parasites, pimps, con-men, gamblers, and girls… doing night
work.”43 Blacks continued to dominate the Five Points area, but class distinctions began
to form between new residents and the Park Hill middle class. As a result, Park Hill
Elementary was cautiously and deliberately integrated with the slow and steady inclusion
of a few black students every year. On the other hand, Five Points elementary schools
like Gilpin and Whittier lost white students every year, as more and more black and
Chicano students made up the population.44 While neighborhood, religion, and likemindedness played a part in these distinctions, Denver’s political system also served to
create boundaries encasing poor, black and Hispanic citizens, in order to prioritize the
middle class, and whites in particular.
Though segregation remained a fact of life, opportunities for racial mixing existed
on many fronts in Denver. The Five Points nightlife and cuisine most significantly
provided occasion for races to intermix. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Five Points
was home to some of the country’s outstanding jazz musicians and artists. Local Denver
whites found opportunities to head to the neighborhood for a good night of food and
entertainment. Black and white children in the 1930s played together during the many
Five Points daytime festivals.45 In the 1950s, this trend continued as Five Points’
reputation improved, encouraging once fearful whites to try out some of the clubs and
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restaurants. “At one time or another,” wrote J. Brown for The Denver Blade in 1961,
“many of the cities [sic] most respected families have visited this star-shaped vicinity and
enjoyed every minute of the community’s finest entertainment.” Whites, blacks and
Chicanos could be found wandering out on the sidewalks at all hours of the nights, and
“anyone’s mother could have walked through Five Points…”46 The Epworth United
Methodist Church, which opened prior to 1920, was once an all-white congregation, but
as Five Points became increasingly black, it became the only publicly interracial church
in town. Before 1950, the church advertised its mission as, “A unique experiment in
Christian Brotherhood, in which whites, blacks, browns, and yellows worshiped
together.”47 However, as the 1950s came to a close, white businessmen and middle class
blacks began to complain that Five Points had lost its luster. The neighborhood’s safety
was questioned, and racial mixing became a point of control, in part because of the
growing prominence of black residents and Mexicanos.
The demographics shifted in Denver because blacks and Chicanos continued to
move into the city, and they created strong ties to each other, local organizations, and
national associations. These communities were built on self-help, community control,
religious and spiritual organizations, neighborhood associations, and the promise of
change. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had a presence
in Denver, but, remembered one Denverite, “The NAACP was doing things nationally,
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but in Denver they really weren’t.”48 The Urban League trained blacks for jobs, and
helped seek out employment opportunities, but the most actively involved national
organization was the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). In the early 1960s, CORE
helped to train Denver activists for protests and boycotts that would change the fabric of
Denver’s racial makeup. More notably, local associations were valued over national
organizations among Denver’s black and Mexicano. The Shorter African Methodist
Episcopal (AME) church in particular provided a space for blacks to create community
connections, learn resistance strategies, and forge safe friendships among middle class
blacks.
Whites had access to some of the city’s best cultural and social amenities, while
blacks were segregated outside of Five Points, despite the city’s reputation of progressive
race relations. Movie theaters, grocers, restaurants, and the city’s taxi services all had
special rules for black patrons. Blacks were either forced into “blacks only” sections, or
denied service altogether. King Soopers, the city’s largest grocery chain, refused to hire
blacks, so in 1963 community members organized a boycott. Similarly, the Zone Cab
Company hired only white drivers. Black customers faced a dilemma: “There was
nowhere to picket,” since the company operated by phone only. In 1963, CORE and
Denver locals organized a phone picket. Agitators left their phones off the hook, which
eventually tied up all the phone lines in the city. They also picketed at the airport,
encouraging travelers to use another cab company, and within days the Zone Cab
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leadership released a public statement, promising to hire black drivers.49 Movie theaters,
like those in the South, had a “crow’s nest” reserved for black patrons, and the city’s
swimming pool had “blacks only” and “Hispanics only” days each week during the
summer.50
Some citizens remember these years in Denver fondly, but African Americans and
Chicanos were apprehensive. Lurking under the surface of these western progressive
images that presented Denver as a happy, welcoming city was a complex series of racist
and oppressive practices that defined life for blacks and Mexican Americans. Promises of
employment opportunities drew blacks to the Mile High City throughout the 1950s, but
they made a percentage of their white neighbors’ incomes. Housing was restricted despite
the passage of Colorado’s Fair Housing Act in 1959, as realtors and bankers worked
together to sequester black homeowners in the Five Points and Capitol Hill
neighborhood. White homeowners used their privilege of mobility to create distance from
blacks. In 1959, when more black families purchased homes in the upscale neighborhood
of Park Hill, white families began looking elsewhere to live.

Educational Equality in Denver
When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Brown v. Board, the Denver Public
School Board disregarded the decision as inconsequential to their district. On May 17,
1954, the country’s highest court determined that the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson
was unconstitutional. After the Brown decision, state laws that segregated public schools
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on the basis of race were found in violation and school boards were instructed to
desegregate their schools with “all deliberate speed.” Since a clause defining their district
as operating a “separate but equal” dual system did not exist on record, Denver whites
assumed that their de facto segregation system was free from legal interference.
Until 1967, Denver’s public school system was under the operation of isolated,
corporate-minded boards. From 1947-1967 Dr. Kenneth Oberholtzer served as
Superintendent over DPS. Oberholtzer was an autocratic leader, who made decisions
without consultation, and was known as “The Czar” of Denver’s schools.51 During his
time as Superintendent, Oberholtzer saw a rise in parental and community involvement
on the behalf of the city’s schools. Beginning in 1950, when Old Manual High was
closed, parents complained school boundaries were “drawn to keep minority children in
predominately minority schools.”52 Subsequent boundary changes in 1953 and 1957
sparked additional protest, and in 1959, Oberholtzer could no longer ignore the
community’s demands.53
Throughout the twentieth century, blacks and Chicanos viewed the education
system as the most important vehicle to attain civil rights, liberties, and full citizenship in
Denver. They saw education as one the best means to change discrimination in
employment and housing, and sought to improve the public school system through a
variety of methods. Denver middle class blacks in particular, championed efforts against
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inequality and for desegregation in the public schools. Throughout the 1960s, black
parents and educators fought against racism in the schools, which had fostered under the
guise of de facto desegregation. They worked with the NAACP to bring suit against the
Denver Public School Board for purposefully segregating black children.
Chicano parents and working class blacks were less convinced that desegregation
would provide the answer. Violent and agitated resistance from white parents and
students, the cost of desegregation incurred by their children and their finances, as well as
the continued demise of their local neighborhood schools dismantled the promise of
desegregation. By 1970, Chicano parents, black parents, and white parents had all made
local attempts for community control in Denver. With boycotts, walk-outs, and
sometimes violent shows of anger, black and white parents demonstrated their concern
regarding school desegregation. Chicano parents on the other hand, succeeded in creating
a model for community control of education when they founded La Escuela Tlatelolco
which served Chicano students with Chicanocentric education, an emphasis on Mexicano
history and culture, and Spanish instruction. Despite these local attempts to derail
desegregation, however, the wheels on the bus were already in motion. In 1974, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Denver School Board was guilty of operating a dual system
and ordered the board to create a comprehensive plan for desegregation by the start of the
1974 school year.
Denver’s demographic makeup, its progressive reputation, and the various
attempts for educational equality make the Mile High City a model of school and
neighborhood politics and activism throughout the West. Boycotts, walk outs, legislation,
and multiple competing priorities in Denver occurred contemporaneously with other such
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activity across the nation, but within the western region. Denver’s history, therefore, can
provide insight to questions still lingering about the legacy of Brown v. Board. How did
different ethnic, racial, gender and socio-economic paradigms shape the view educational
equality? What role did desegregation play in the benefit or decline of predominately
black and Chicano schools? Who controlled the plans for school desegregation and/or
community control, and how did they use their power? How did black and Chicano
activists communicate, clash, or collaborate on issues of community control and
desegregation? How did students experience desegregation or community control, and
what are their lasting impressions? Finally, how did activists’ opinions on educational
equality evolve over the course of the movement?

National Movement for Educational Equality
Scholars continue to probe Brown’s legacy and how school desegregation
impacted black communities. Historians began by researching black activism for
desegregation and violent white resistance in southern urban and rural communities.54
This body of scholarship also problematizes the legacy of Brown and the unintended,
negative consequences of school desegregation on black and Chicano communities.55 In
his study of postwar civil rights activism in Phoenix, Matthew Whitaker describes a
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predominately middle-class struggle for education equality. Using traditional organizing
techniques and the court system, professional blacks in Arizona contested western de jure
segregation in the Phoenix public school system. In the 1953 landmark ruling, the
Maricopa County Superior Court declared school segregation laws unconstitutional,
thanks to a case brought on by local blacks and financed by the NAACP. Whitaker
provides a brief discussion of the aftermath of this decision, explaining that black
students shouldered the burden. They were placed in uncertain environments at their new
schools, and they lost a connection to their community felt once only through their
associations to predominately black schools. The city’s historically black elementary and
high schools, like so many in the seemingly foreign American South, faced financial
decline after the court ruling and city-wide desegregation took effect.56 More
substantially, Quintard Taylor provides an account of the impact felt among blacks in
Seattle during the decades-long battle for educational equality. Taylor rightly examines
education within the broader context of western black communities. Schools in Seattle
were defined by residential or de facto segregation, and black parents contested the
employment, housing, and education trifecta as they moved from “Freedom Now”
campaigns to black power ideology throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In cases like
Denver’s and Seattle’s, urban West calls for equality tended to have many voices. Some
advocated for busing, transfer programs, and open enrollment. Others demanded
community control, freedom schools, and decentralization. Both attempts made lasting
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contributions to the way educational equality is defined today.57 Taylor labels Seattle’s
school system de facto, and examines civil rights activity in the Pacific Northwest
accordingly. However, western school segregation, as demonstrated by the case in
Denver, was ultimately created by a series of legislative mandates and policies, thus
rendering the distinctions between de facto and de jure segregation a matter of semantics.
This history of Denver’s battle for school reform, the era of court control from 19731994, and the events leading up to the need for such a lawsuit will demonstrate that de
facto segregation was merely a guise for decades of political fiats.
More recently, historians have considered the other sides of education equality.
New studies, like this one, question the impacts of Brown and other school desegregation
legislation in multiracial communities. The urban West, where blacks generally made up
the smallest minority population, provides us with a useful setting to study such
questions. In his study on multiracial California, Mark Brilliant explains that local and
national politicians exploited the differences among blacks and Mexican Americans when
it came to education equality. By the time black westerners were pursuing court-ordered
desegregation in the West; many Chicanos had altered their view of assimilation and
integration as an attack on their heritage. Knowing this, conservative politicians,
including Ronald Reagan used an anti-busing platform to court the Chicano vote in the
late 1970s and 1980s.58
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Very few historians of western urban blacks have considered multiracial
communities and their experiences with desegregation. When Chicano or Asian students
are discussed, they are often portrayed either as a part of the overall story, or an outlier.59
However, scholars of the Chicano movement provide us with extensive research on the
importance of education, and the complicated relationship between the demand for equal
access, and the fight for cultural nationalism within the public education system. At
different moments in the struggle for Mexicano equality, the public education system has
been an important symbol of freedom and citizenship. Over the course of a century-long
struggle, Chicanos have demanded equality in education by way of access, bilingual
education, community control, and representation. In his groundbreaking publication on
Chicano politics, identity, and organizing, Mario Garcia explains that Chicanos first
viewed integration as a symbol of first-class citizenship, but as the movement progressed,
many demanded separate control of educational resources in order to best serve their
children and the future of Mexican American cultural identity.60
Even fewer studies incorporate an analysis of student experiences and youth
activism regarding school desegregation. Of course, student unrest in the 1960s has been
a favored topic among historians of American Cold War culture and counter-culture, but
the role of black and Chicano students within education equality movements has been
largely ignored. Gael Graham provided one of the first accounts of black student
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activism, demonstrating that African American teenagers participated in a national
movement for youth activism, which challenges the widespread notion that student civil
rights activism generally took place on college campuses.61 Instead, in Young Activists:
American High School Students in the Age of Protests, Graham demonstrates that high
schools provided a critical stage for teens to contest their notions of freedom, interact
with each other and the emerging ideas of the era, and demand their own versions of
equality.62 Historian Todd Robinson considers the role of youth protest in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, and uncovers activism “behind the veil,” as black teenagers experimented with
clothing styles, facial hair, and challenges to their school dress codes in order to contest
inequalities within their public high schools.63 These controversies among students and
administrators often made impact beyond school walls, as parents and community
members debated issues of discipline, juvenile delinquency, identity, and personal
freedoms. Like the teenagers in Grand Rapids, students in Denver often found that any
demonstration of defiance had the potential to create community-wide impact. Scholars
of Mexican American history provide similar context by explaining the unique role
played by teenagers during the Chicano movement. Chicanos of what some call the
“Second Generation” in the 1930s and 1940s participated in new forms of resistance and
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rebellion that laid the groundwork for future Chicano activism in the 1960s and 1970s.64
Denver was the home of Chicano civil rights organization the Crusade for Justice and its
visionary leader, Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales, who embraced youth activism, recruiting
young people from throughout the community and public school system to embrace
Chicano activism.
These histories provide the foundation for this study, which seeks to create a
narrative of black schools, Chicano and black experiences of desegregation, and court
managed integration, while considering the competing notions of educational equality in
an urban, multiracial western setting. Much of our current knowledge relies upon the
seminal scholarship on blacks in the urban North and Midwest, and Chicanos in the
Southwest. Historians must continue to expand accordingly.65 Denver’s story forces us to
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reconsider some of the tropes that exist and permeate our understanding of civil rights,
school desegregation, and community control.

Racism and Activism in Denver
How did Denver come to represent a progressive, tolerant city in the American
West, even though blacks and Chicanos lived, worked, and sent their children to school
in an obviously segregated city? Cities like Denver thrived on these contradictions.
Business leaders and politicians relied on the assumptions of de facto segregation,
explaining that school segregation “just happened” because neighborhoods were naturally
separated by race.66 Todd Robinson explains that for every political and social success
experienced by blacks, “whites seemed to engineer a more potent responsive form of
racism”67 Like Robinson’s Michigan, Colorado blacks and Chicanos faced daily what
William Chafe called the “progressive mystique,” constant reminders that their social and
economic reality “contradicted the state’s reputation”68 Denver’s blacks and Chicanos
were up against a systematic process that “downplayed the importance of race” and
created a limit on black progress that all the while promoted certain agreeable blacks as
images of success, but ghettoized the majority of the black and Chicano community in
the city’s poorest neighborhoods, lowest paying jobs, and oldest, least desirable
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schools.69 Denver was operating in a system of “managerial racism,” which promoted
these contradictions and the paternalistic, progressive system of few rewards, in the
image of progress without actual payoffs.70
This is the story of a multifaceted struggle for educational equality in the urban
West. It is also about the fate of historically black and Chicano schools in the West, and
the efforts of individuals and groups to preserve the heritage of these schools. The result
of these stories is a new paradigm about how black and Chicano westerners defined
educational equality, resisted assimilation in the face of desegregation, and how
community controlled education in its many forms benefited and challenged the legacy of
integrated education. Therefore, this is a book ultimately about community investment in
education, and how groups competed, collaborated, or appeased each other in order to
define their expectations of equality in Denver, Colorado.
The fervor that accompanied integrationists as they sought to desegregate the
schools was only part of a broader picture of racism, oppression, and a struggle for
community control throughout the urban West. After the 1954 Brown v. Board decision,
state and local policy makers were charged with implementing a ruling by the Supreme
Court to abolish separate but equal educational systems. Two national trends resulted.
School boards first attempted to defy the system by clinging to de jure segregation as the
only definition for racial imbalance. This occurred commonly in the West and the North,
where Jim Crow laws were rarely state-implemented legal statutes. The second trend-which held destructive implications for black-based education-- occurred when school
69
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boards were forced to bus students in order to desegregate, and they selected black
students to travel great distances to all-white schools. School desegregation became a
nation-wide phenomenon throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as white and black parents
attempted to define educational equality through racial balance in public schools. As a
result, white policy makers often viewed the predominately and historically black and
Chicano schools as the problem, disregarding the role these schools played in the black
and Chicano communities. Yet, discrimination and racism in the American West took a
variety of forms that serve to complicate our definitions of de facto and de jure
segregation. Whereas we might have previously defined the two terms as by practice or
by law respectively, the history of blacks in the urban West causes us to rethink these
simple binaries.
Blacks who moved west found a delicate reality that contradicted the region’s
progressive image and the “surprisingly few racial barriers” with the employment
restrictions that faced them when they arrived in their new hometown. This was common
in the West, where white male politicians established “western outpost[s] for white
supremacy and racial inequality,” to use Whitaker’s description.71 Western segregation
was both de facto and de jure. Blacks were restricted from patronizing many local
restaurants, hospitals, buses, pools, and other white establishments. Indeed blacks, Native
Americans, and Mexicanos faced de jure segregation since Colorado boasted anti
miscegenation laws, restrictive housing covenants, and laws promoting segregation in
public accommodations.72
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Colorado, like other western states, had longstanding legal measures for
segregation, but it was also home to some of the country’s first elected black officials.
Progressives sought to add Human Rights clauses to the Colorado constitution, while
lawyers, politicians, and individuals spent time and money to make changes to
Colorado’s laws to make the state appear more progressive. However welcoming Denver
might have seemed, though, blacks nonetheless faced white supremacy and
discrimination. Minorities were continually reminded of their inferior status in the
predominately white city, by the small but significant actions of their white neighbors.
While the West might have appeared practically devoid of institutionalized segregation,
some white business owners in Denver, for example, were widely known for prohibiting
blacks. In a similar fashion, children and parents faced racist comments and practices in
the public school system, though administrators boasted that their schools were not
segregated.73

Project description
This study chronicles a story of civil rights that has been left untold until now.
Recent scholarship contributing to the history of the “long civil rights movement” has
reframed our understanding of civil rights beyond the years of the late 1950s and early
1960s.74 In addition, it has also demonstrated that civil rights activity occurred in regions
other than the South. However, most work on the long civil rights movement
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demonstrates that activism among blacks began much earlier than the Brown v. Board
Supreme Court case and instead, was a part of a longer freedom struggle that, in many
ways, makes up the African American experience. By focusing on Denver, this work will
demonstrate that civil rights activity, just as it began before 1954, extends past significant
legislative milestones, and tragic historical moments, like the death of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. in 1968. By turning our attention westward, this work proves that 1968 was not
an end point in civil rights history. Denver’s story had regional and national impact, as
two contemporary educational equality movements took shape and youth activism
became more formalized and visible. Similarly, Denver’s Chicano Movement had
significant influence on activism in Denver and the nation, and this history demonstrates
the multicultural makeup of civil rights.
The first chapter describes the events, legislation, and people who contributed to
the making of Denver’s reputation as a racially tolerant and welcoming city from 19471960. However, in the histories of these ground-breaking individuals and paramount
laws, this chapter uncovers the contradictions and racist intentions that continually held
blacks and Mexicanos back from accomplishing true equality at every turn. Chapter two
analyzes early activism during the same twenty-year period. As blacks and Hispanics
confronted managerial racism, they sowed the seeds of an early movement that
eventually came to a head over education equality, the focus of Chapter 3. The fourth
chapter provides an overview of the landmark Keyes v. Denver Public School District
No.1 Supreme Court case, but also describes the tactics taken by the school board to
avoid implementing court-ordered desegregation, and the parallel activism of the black
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and Chicano communities. Lastly, Chapter 5 demonstrates the drawn-out attempts made
by the school board to reclaim control of DPS from court control.
If the struggles for educational equality and civil rights in Denver are only briefly
discussed among historians, it is not because historical materials are invisible or hard to
find. It has often been noted that some of the best materials might be in an unlabeled box
in some unknown garage, basement, or attic and the historian’s quest for such sources can
be a goose chase, at best. Currently, however, a wealth of first-hand testimonies exist and
are waiting to be collected from those who lived the stories we tell. This project relies
heavily on oral histories conducted by the author, interviews, and documentary sources.
Oral histories in this case have proven to be essential to this study, as interviewees have
included black, white, and Chicano parents, educators, and students who participated in
various movements for educational equality in Denver. Textual sources include many
local newspapers covering the various movements, public meeting minutes, court
records, local school histories and materials, and school board election and meeting
records.
In addition, this study makes use of some sources that deserve specific mention.
First, the black newspaper The Denver Blade provided insight to how black Denverites
felt about their Five Points neighborhood, segregation, and the city’s progressive
mystique. The Denver Blade was in circulation from 1961 until sometime in the early
1960s.75 Second, the newsletter Un Nuevo Dia, published by the Chicano Education
Project in Lakewood, Colorado provided indelible insight into how Chicano leaders,
politicians, and educators viewed desegregation and Chicanocentric education at odds
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with each other. Un Nuevo Dia also elucidated the crucial role that women parents and
educators played in the movement for community control of Chicano education, which
contests the widely-held assumption relegates Chicanas to the background of the national
Chicano activist movement. Finally, personal assistance offered by members of the
Colorado High School Coaches Association (CHSCA) and Colorado High School
Activities Association (CHSAA) proved to be essential to the success of this project.
Long-standing administrators and leaders of these two organizations provided
institutional and organizational records, and served as crucial conduits for helping to
secure individual interviews and oral histories with former students, coaches, and
administrators in Denver. Without their help, finding interested parties who would agree
to participate in this project might have been a more tenuous quest.

A Struggle for 100 Years: Manual Strives for Educational Equality
Over the course of its first hundred years, Manual High School meant many
things to many people. Like the public school system that governed it and the Five Points
neighborhood where it was anchored, Manual High School went through many
transformations. When it was built in 1894, it was an experiment in “progressive”
education. Following WWII, it symbolized a fresh start, hope, and a community
touchstone for hometown Hispanics and recent black migrants. In the 1960s and 1970s, it
became a stain on the DPS and School board reputation, as white and black parents
fought over what the school really represented. In the 1990s, it came to epitomize the
failures of the public school system, and ineffectual court-mandated desegregation.
Throughout all of these manifestations, Manual was a training ground for youth activism
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and future civil rights leadership. Manual High School and the Denver Public Schools
were a burden and a blessing for the city’s black, white, and Chicano communities over
the course of the late twentieth century. This is their story.
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CHAPTER 2
“Just for the Record”: Jim Crow at a Mile High 1947-1962
Denver Dry Goods Boycott, 1962
On July 14th, 1962 the fight for racial equality in Denver took a new turn. Denver
Dry Goods, a local department store centrally located in the Sixteenth Street Shopping
district and near the Five Points neighborhood, was a favorite among black patrons.76
However, despite the high number of black shoppers who frequented Denver Dry Goods,
the management refused to hire black workers for non-janitorial positions, despite the
black clientele request for more black cashiers and service professionals. African
Americans waged a selective patronage campaign to end employment discrimination at
Denver Dry Goods when they chose that day in July to boycott the store.
The boycott in Denver was part of a nationwide “don’t buy where you can’t
work” political struggle for equal rights. In New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Denver,
Los Angeles, Detroit, and a number of smaller communities, African Americans initiated
a coordinated effort to challenge the racialized hiring practices of dairies, bakeries, and
food stores. James Farmer, founder of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), began
focusing on Denver’s needs as early as 1948. He said, “Exposure is the best cure for
discrimination,” noting that Denver seemed uninformed about its own racist history.77
Farmer later compared Denver to other cities stating, “More progress, more rapid

76

“CORE pickets Denver Dry Goods Store for drive against discriminatory employment,” Denver
Post 14 July 2014: 3; Colleen O’Connor, “50 Years ago, Freedom Riders blazed a trail for civil rights.” The
Denver Post
77

“Congress of Racial Equality: Exposure best cure for discrimination,” Denver Post 3 January

1948: p3.

38

progress, is being made in the South. Of course, their problems are more obvious…”78
Farmer’s observation indicates that he and national leaders were beginning to label the
deep currents of racism that coursed through western and northern cities, despite
assumptions and promises for better opportunity and racial equality in these more
progressive places. Western cities like Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Las Vegas boasted progressive race relations, politeness, and tolerance when it came to
the opportunities afforded to black people in the postwar period. An emphasis on
consensus and paternalism shrouded the complexities of white supremacy, oppression,
and discrimination that made up daily life for all blacks, whites, and Chicanos living in
the Mile High City.79 Knowing this, Farmer worked with Denver local Ruth Cousins
Denny to open a Denver CORE chapter, and to organize the Denver Dry Goods Picket in
1962.
Boycotts produced mixed results. Indeed, in Los Angeles African Americans
picketed an auto dealer to force him to hire a black salesman; however, the dealer refused
and two months later pickets were withdrawn. Notwithstanding the outcome in Los
Angeles, Farmer and Denny planned and coordinated a successful five-week picket on
Sixteenth Street.80 For more than a month, Denver blacks refused to shop at Dry Goods,
cut up their credit cards in front of the store, and joined groups throughout the workday to
hold signs and encourage other patrons to boycott. White Denverites joined the protest,
which demonstrated the Denver CORE chapter’s commitment to integration. “We were
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integrated from the beginning,” remembered Farmer of the Denver branch.81 The
organization attracted middle class whites like Denver dentist Max Hartwell Raabe, who
joined the Dry Goods picket on his daily lunch breaks.82 In the end, the collaborative
efforts of CORE, who was joined by the Denver Urban League, resulted in Denver Dry
Goods hiring more African American employees. Moreover, it opened the door for blacks
to negotiate more jobs with two additional supermarket chains, Furrs and Safeway.
The push for racial equality took many forms in Denver. Though it took cues
from the national movement, the Denver freedom fight took on a particularly local
arrangement. The efforts of CORE and the Urban League represented a modification in
the local strategy for racial justice and it underwent a number of different alterations in
the post-World War II era. Groups such as CORE, the Urban League, and even the Black
Panther Party (BPP) proved pivotal in the battle as issues about public education became
increasingly relevant to the freedom fight. Their tactics and platforms differed and
reflected the diversity within the black community as well as the changing nature of black
protest nationally. CORE organizers recognized that the BPP’s formation in Denver in
the mid-1960s signaled a change in attitude and tactic. Helen Wolcott, a Dry Goods
organizer and CORE member said that CORE had originally been the radical group, until
the BPP gained in prominence. She added, “Some of us were uncomfortable, but we
remained friends. The torch had been passed. How could you help but be idealistic?”83 Be
that as it may, these tactical adjustments were a direct response to the changing nature of
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racism in Denver. But unlike the success of the outcome of the Dry Goods boycott, the
fight for educational equality would not be resolved in six weeks; instead the struggle
spanned over a quarter-century and took several iterations. Therefore, this chapter
outlines the deep tradition of managerial racism and begins to uncover the seeds of black
resistance in Denver and educational reform in the Mile High City.

The Myth of Western Progressivism
Optimism defined the postwar period in Denver and across the urban West.
Colorado seemed the quintessential state, representing all the affluence, beauty, and
patriotism of the early Cold War. The federal government spent millions in Colorado,
middle-class families traveled to the Rocky Mountains to ski and enjoy the fresh air,
retired servicemen bought homes in the suburbs, there was constant construction and
highway development, and even atomic power found a home in Colorado. From 1948 to
1958, towns like Durango, Grand Junction, and the appropriately named Uravan boomed
with individual uranium prospectors, corporate giants, engineers, and geologists in search
of uranium and “the high salaries and sophisticated tastes of the postwar middle class.”84
The city of Denver struggled to establish a central foothold, as former farmlands
transformed into powerful suburbs seemingly overnight. These suburbs included spaces
as close as Aurora and Littleton, as well as towns as far as Loveland and Colorado
Springs. Science and education were among the two most powerful industries building
and pulling Coloradans away from the capital city. However, many of the closer suburbs
like Thornton and Northglenn continued to draw upon the core city’s resources, even
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though the city itself was not growing at the same rate as its surrounding metropolitan
area.85 Because of this, politicians like Mayor James Quigg Newton (who called himself
“Quigg”) and businessmen like Palmer Hoyt of The Denver Post worked to promote the
Mile High City as a town that embraced change, reform, and progressive politics. During
Newton’s eight years in office, beginning in 1947, he implemented new programs and
studies, sales taxes, reorganized the Denver General Hospital, and expanded Stapleton
Airport, which cemented Denver as the transportation hub of the western United States.86
When Newton ran for Mayor in 1947, Denverites were ready to evolve politically.
For nearly twenty years, their previous mayor, Ben Stapleton had promoted status quo
over progressive improvements. As city was growing, he was not, and by the end of his
mayoral service, Stapleton and his policies seemed outdated and out-of-touch. Of
overcrowding and the threat of poverty in the city, he once said, “If all those people
would only go back where they came from, we wouldn’t have a housing shortage.” At a
time when it seemed Colorado and its capital city were poised to become a shining
example of postwar America, Stapleton thumbed his nose at progress. After serving for
almost two decades, Stapleton (or “The Interminable Ben,” as he was called) assumed he
would win reelection in 1947. Instead, Stapleton lost to newcomer Quigg Newton by a
landslide.87 Immediately upon taking office, Newton embraced development and
improvement for the Mile High City. Newton and his political and professional allies
made up a “revolt of the second generation,” a young group of change makers who
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sought to liberalize Denver in the second half of the twentieth century. Historian Tom
Romero writes that with the 1947 election, “ideological changes in postwar Denver”
dominated the political landscape, as racial progressives in general and blacks in
particular pressured the new mayor to “undermine ideas, attitudes, and ideologies of
difference” throughout his career.88 While Romero gives Newton a lot of credit, even
italicizing particular fragments of the former mayor’s speeches to demonstrate an implied
and early embrace of affirmative action, Newton’s postwar liberalism nonetheless kept
hidden the still very pervasive lifeblood of racism that coursed through the city’s arteries.
Blacks in Denver were among the most optimistic, and actively so. They
considered their city to be racially tolerant, potentially radical, and they pointed to Earl
Mann and Elvin Caldwell as examples of this political progressivism. Earl Mann, born in
1886 in Iowa, was an early military migrant to Denver. When he was injured in France
while fighting as a First Lieutenant in the Infantry, Mann was sent to Denver’s
Fitzsimons Army Hospital to recover in 1918. He remained in Denver until his death in
1969. In his early career, Mann worked as a clerk for the Water Commission. He then
became a writer for the Colorado Statesman, Denver’s early black newspaper, as well as
the Denver Post, the latter he continued to write for throughout his working life. In 1942,
Earl Mann became the second black man elected to Colorado state office when he won a
position in the Colorado state house of representatives.89
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Elvin Caldwell was born in Denver in 1919 in Denver Colorado. He graduated
from East High School and went to the University of Colorado on a track scholarship.
During World War II, Caldwell benefited from increased wartime production in Denver,
and landed a job as chief statistician for the Remington Arms Company, a plant that
moved into increased production in 1942. Caldwell then became a state representative,
and in 1955, he was elected to the Denver City Council. He was the first black
councilman, and the first African American elected to any city council in the west. He
served in this position for twenty-eight years, overseeing as president for five of his seven
terms.90
Together, Mann and Caldwell did more than symbolize the potential for black-led
change in the Mile High City. Caldwell, a Denver native and active in the community
throughout his life, established a sterling reputation for himself. He is credited with many
success stories in Denver’s black community, having served on “…boards of numerous
organizations…” Caldwell’s reputation has been made immortal, since he was so revered
in the Five Points neighborhood, he was later chosen as one of two honorees who would
share the title of the city’s black history library.91 Mann, though not the hometown hero
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like Caldwell, had his own level of notoriety in the city. Mann was respected widely for
his leadership in World War I. Upon moving to Denver, he became a part of the
community at a time when black migrants were carving out a space of their own in
neighborhoods like Five Points and Capitol Hill. Mann represented upward mobility, and
his publications in The Colorado Statesman and The Denver Post helped to keep the
black experience in Denver from being ignored.
They were public symbols, and Caldwell and Mann were also active agents of
change, particularly when they used the political process. Both championed for improved
housing conditions and job opportunities for African Americans. In 1950, both agreed to
sponsor what would become the state’s first fair employment bill. Mann and Caldwell
had previously collaborated and worked individually on contemporary measures before
this bill, written and lobbied for by the Colorado Committee for Equal Employment
Opportunities (CCEEO). Caldwell dropped his own employment bill, which brought with
it specific “measures for enforcement,” because he believed it alienated some voters.
Mann, on the other hand, had refused to support an earlier and similar bill written by the
CCEEO, because he claimed it was too weak. The new bill was approved in 1951, with a
majority vote 47-18.92
Over the course of the 1950s, Mann and Caldwell saw their share of legislative
developments in Colorado, though they sometimes surprised their black supporters. In
1953, Mann refused to co-sponsor a repeal of Colorado’s ban on interracial marriage. He
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claimed that white constituents were not ready for such a reversal, despite how necessary
it might be. Without his support, the bill moved forward, backed by Republican and
Democratic co-sponsors, and the Colorado Bar Association. By 1957, the Colorado
legislature had approved the repeal, which ended a nearly 100-year old law that
prohibited interracial marriage.93
Also in 1957, the state legislature banned discrimination in public
accommodations following decade-long fight against the city’s segregated swimming
pools. Both Caldwell and Mann were involved throughout different stages of the attempts
to desegregate the pools. Beginning in 1950, African American George Brown began
reporting on Jim Crow practices for the Denver Post. Brown uncovered segregation in
public venues like movie theaters, restaurants, Lakeside and Sportland (operated by the
YMCA) swimming pools, and Washington Park’s Smith Lake.94 After Brown exposed
the YMCA for denying blacks admittance to the pools, Earl Mann publicly admonished
the pools for racist practices.95 Councilman Caldwell also joined the debate, and both,
alongwith the Denver Post exposing Jim Crow practices in Denver, it became harder to
pretend that segregation was another city’s problem. By 1957, the state legislature
repealed a 62-year-old law governing public accommodations, and placed the jurisdiction
of such practices in the hands of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission (CADC).
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The legislative session and the decisions made seemed to come and go with little
retaliation from Colorado voters.96
The next year, Colorado Representative Bob Allen and newly elected Senator
George Brown introduced the state’s first fair housing bill. The bill, which proposed
outlawing racial and religious discrimination in the sale or rental of a home, was
immediately opposed by Republican and Democratic senators. Over the next two years,
white, black, Jewish, Chicano, and Asian residents joined various campaigns regarding
Colorado’s housing legislation. Brown, whose articles in the Denver Post educated
readers on the realities of racism, attempted to explain that housing was more than a
“Negro problem.”97 Despite Allen and Brown’s best efforts, the 1958 bid was
unsuccessful. However, in 1959, the Colorado Committee to Oppose Discrimination
(CCOD) rallied and altered their campaign. Using Cold War rhetoric that had been so
successful for liberals in years prior, the committee, led by members of the Tri-State
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) helped to convince lawmakers that a fair housing policy
would protect human rights, veterans, and democracy. When the bill passed, 24-11 in
1959, Colorado became “the first state to pass comprehensive fair housing law.” The
state was, in effect, the first in the nation to ban discrimination in public and private
housing, cementing its image as progressive place centered on racial tolerance.98
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Farces and Contradictions: Court Cases, Fair Employment, and Housing Loopholes
Denver saw its fair share of changes, human rights organizing, and liberal
legislation in the postwar period. Despite enjoying a reputation for progressivism and
tolerance, discriminatory practices laid the foundation for housing, employment, and
education in the Mile High City. With every legislative achievement, it seemed that
Coloradans also had an exit strategy. They were able to congratulate themselves on
passing early comprehensive laws, while also escaping individual action through
manipulated expectations and cautiously created loopholes. Furthermore, politicians and
the press proudly touted Denver’s implied tolerance, while all the while working behind
the scenes to avoid the true consequences of a truly open haven for diversity.
Managerial racism had deep but hidden roots in Denver. The “Interminable Ben”
Stapleton, during his first election in 1923 publicly campaigned for religious tolerance.
At the same time, he privately welcomed the support of John Galen Locke, the grand
dragon of Colorado’s rapidly growing Ku Klux Klan (KKK). In the early 1920s, the
Klan’s power was mounting across the country. Threatened by immigration, postwar
inflation, and the perceived decline of white supremacy, the Ku Klux Klan revived itself
in 1915 in the image of a post- Civil War nationalist organization. Over the course of the
next five years, membership ballooned, and the Klan spread its influence to western
cities, like Denver. After his election, Stapleton no longer hid his relationship with the
KKK. He allowed the Klan to use Denver city resources; he appointed Klansmen to
important cabinet positions, and even hired one to serve as chief of police. In 1924,
Stapleton announced, “I will work with the Klan and for the Klan in the coming election,
heart and soul. And if I am reelected, I will give the Klan the kind of administration it
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wants.”99 While the Klan maintained a presence in Denver throughout the 1920s,
Stapleton ultimately disassociated from the organization. Instead, he formed the
Minutemen of America, a strikingly similar organization, to draw Klansmen away from
Denver’s “invisible empire.”100 The Klan remained actively involved in private affairs,
as well as Denver’s political operations. With Stapleton’s support and a Klansman
William Candlish serving as chief of police, the Denver KKK enjoyed undisputed power
until its decline in 1926. They invaded Coloradans’ private matters, harassing blacks,
Jews, and Chicanos at their homes. The Klan prioritized prohibiting racial mixing in
public accommodations, as well as interpersonal and sexual relationships.101 The result
was longstanding. Until 1942, long after the Klan’s prominence had faded, Denver’s laws
regarding interracial marriage remained a fact of life. In the eyes of the law, Denver’s
blacks and whites, despite their proximity to each other in some neighborhoods, were
nonetheless discouraged from mixing.
Resistant Coloradans looked to the courts for results. In the 1940s and 1950s, a
series of lawsuits served to cement the legality of discrimination and segregation. Prior to
the 1942 marriage case, Jackson v. City and County of Denver, the state happily claimed
that it was not segregated. The Denver Star stated that Colorado had only “one ‘black
law’ upon its statue books,” but that “one” law was the 1864 ban on interracial
99
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marriages.102 When James and Lydia Jackson were convicted of vagrancy for “attempting
to marry in violation of the law,” they were up against a unique ban, as Colorado was one
of only two states that prohibited, specifically, only black and white interracial
marriage.103 Yet, the statute did not define the terms of “Negro,” “mulatto,” or “white.”
Instead, it left the matter of defining a suspect’s race in the hands of governing officials.
When the court ruled in Jackson v. City and County of Denver, they determined that
while the law might be “vaguely unconstitutional,” the convicted were nonetheless guilty
because they had in fact identified themselves as an interracial couple – James had
testified that he was black, Lydia that she was white – thus the couple could not contest
the neutrality of the law.104
In 1946, the Denver Police Department (DPD) faced two grand jury
investigations. Both included a large and impressive body of evidence to prove that the
DPD had a pattern of abuse and mistreatment among “Spanish American” Denver locals.
Reverend Eutimio Duran, the pastor of el Salvador Baptist church requested the first
hearing. He provided many witnesses who could attest to mistreatment at the hands of the
DPD. The grand jury discounted nearly every witness, stating, “We hear complaints like
this all the time.” In the second case, the local Spanish-speaking newspaper, PanAmerican News provided countless examples brought to them by members of Denver’s
Mexican American community. Pan-American News also criticized the grand jury,
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arguing that the process itself was discriminatory. Despite evidence and a multitude of
complaints, the grand jury did not indict any police officer of any harassment or
brutality.105
The 1951 Fair Employment Practice law, helped along by Mann and Caldwell had
some loopholes as well. Prior to 1951, liberals had already made three attempts to
successfully promote a fair employment law, and when it did pass, it retained little of the
original goal. In 1951, one senator smirked, “They’d better accept this one or they won’t
get anything.” The Denver Unity Council (DUC) originated the campaign in 1945. Their
bill – cast in the New Deal mold – would have established an independent state agency to
govern fair employment in the state of Colorado. Senate bill 202, as it was called, had the
support of many black Denverites, but state policy makers recoiled at the notion of
another bureaucratic entity.106 After another failed attempt at a similar bill, the DUC
formed a statewide network of nearly 200 agencies, called the Colorado Committee for
Civil Rights Legislation (CCCRL). However, the coalition was labeled “extremist” by the
Denver press, since it once again sought to create a state entity to enforce fair education
and employment.107 Once the law did pass in 1951, it did so because it was a weaker
version of previous bills. Accountability would be governed by an already existing state
committee. Moreover, the bill, when it passed, banned discrimination in employment
based on race, ethnicity, and ancestry within public agencies that had more than six
employees. However, private businesses were allowed to hire based on personal
105
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preference.108 Earl Mann, who begrudgingly supported the bill, originally called it
“weak.” Mann’s dispute with the bill had to do with the exemptions that were specifically
included, in order to win the support of lawmakers, and to accomplish the end goal,
which he thought was to get the bill passed “just for the record.”109
Finally, though Colorado was the first state to pass a comprehensive fair housing
law, it was not exactly an admirable example of liberal legislation. The original attempt
didn’t pass in 1958 because it was too focused on confronting racism. The language in
the first attempt prohibited discrimination based on ethnicity, race, and origin. In 1959,
lobbyists and legislators reworked the language, and the successful bill said little about
race. Then, only a few months after it passed, the staff director of the CADC made a
shocking admission to the Denver press. Roy Chapman, who was involved in the process
of the law from the beginning, announced that the law provided an overlooked loophole.
The 1959 policy did not govern private property owners. Those selling “by owner” were
exempt, as were realtors acting on behalf of their client’s wishes. His late admission of
this exception demonstrated fractures in the system.110 Chapman and the loopholes within
the real estate market in Denver reflected a national fair housing trend. Despite the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in 1948 that restrictive covenants were unconstitutional,
“Informal practices by real estate agents continued to keep most blacks, Mexicans, and
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Asians from buying or renting property in all-white communities and neighborhoods.”111
Across the country, white homeowners and realtors worked together to maintain
segregated neighborhoods, using informal strategies, dissuasion, and prejudice as their
means.

The Gentleman Dictator: Managerial Racism in Denver’s schools
Four years before the Supreme Court ruled in the landmark Brown v. Board of
Education case, Dr. Kenneth E. Oberholtzer was featured on the cover of Time Magazine.
He was an unusual choice. It was 1950, and Oberholtzer was the superintendent of the
Denver Public Schools (DPS), in the third year of what would become his twenty-year
tenure. While he had a fairly impressive professional reputation among education leaders,
Oberholtzer was hardly the intellectual giant that he would later become. At the time of
publication in February 1950, Time called Oberholtzer the “protypical superintendent of a
school system beset with the myriad of problems of the era.”112 A native of Indiana,
Kenneth E. Oberholtzer moved to Denver following a prestigious record of educational
leadership. He was a teacher, a principal, a coach, and later a superintendent in Texas and
California. He also served as a lieutenant colonel in the Army from 1942 to 1946. Before
that, Oberhotlzer earned his Ph.D. at Columbia University Teacher’s College, where he
studied under a former DPS superintendent, Jesse Newlon. After he was discharged from
the army in 1947, Oberholtzer joined the thousands of war veterans who moved to
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Denver when he was selected as the superintendent of schools. Before he earned his
nickname “The Czar,” Oberholtzer was referred to as “The Professor” because he was
serious, quiet, intellectual, and demanding.113
Managerial racism, the covert strategies of segregation, and the consequences of a
progressive mystique were no more evident anywhere than in the administration of DPS
during and immediately following Oberholtzer’s rule. On May 17, 1954, the country’s
highest court determined that the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson was in violation of
the constitution. After the Brown decision, state laws that segregated public schools on
the basis of race were found in violation and school boards were instructed to desegregate
their schools with “all deliberate speed.” Since a clause defining their district as operating
“separate but equal” dual systems did not exist on record, Denver whites assumed that
their de facto segregation system was free from legal interference. Thus, when the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled on Brown v. Board, the Denver School Board and Oberholtzer
disregarded the decision as inconsequential to their district. The media joined school
officials in boasting that their schools were free of racism. Quickly after the ruling, the
Rocky Mountain News published an article heralding integration in DPS. The article
featured a photo of an “interracial and interethnic group” of Manual High students and
the headline read, “No Segregation in Denver schools.” Another article claimed “There
are no Prejudices Here.”114 Over the course of the next two decades, however, the unique
forms of discrimination which were alive and well in DPS became increasingly public
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and Oberholtzer, the school board, parents, teachers, and students were forced to
reconcile these contradictions in image and practice.
Since Owen J. Goldrick, Denver’s first schoolmaster arrived in 1859; Denver’s
public school system was under the operation of isolated, corporate-minded boards.115
Throughout the twentieth century, politics and corruption seemed more common among
school board members than a consensual commitment to education.116 Board members,
since the 1920s, openly advocated for gentlemanly agreements in the best interest of the
superintendent.117 This tradition continued and increased during Oberholtzer’s tenure. In
the first ten years of his leadership, Oberholtzer actively courted school board members’
admiration and respect. He considered many of them personal friends. Board President
Isador Samuels likened Oberholtzer to a successful coach, and the board to a winning
team stating, “You’re not going to let others break up the combination by taking the
coach away.”118 While critics groaned that the school board was an exclusive clique,
apolitical, and elitist, members of the board claimed that they were civic-minded. They
operated like a well-oiled machine, with Oberholtzer directing progress. He was an
autocratic leader, and he considered himself the chief executive officer of the school
board, earning him the prestigious nickname, “The Czar” in the Denver press and among
teachers.119 From 1947 to 1967, The Czar reigned over public schools in Denver. For two
decades he masterminded Denver’s response Brown v. Board, negotiated with an
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increasingly vocal constituency of teachers, and attempted to respond to the changing
nature of education as the city became increasingly diverse.
During these twenty years, Oberholtzer saw a rise in parental and community
involvement on the behalf of the city’s schools. Beginning in 1950, parents in Denver
complained that school boundaries were “drawn to keep minority children in
predominately minority schools.”120 Because they believed they could argue that
prejudice was not a problem, The DPS board refused to act within the terms of Brown.
With the lack of de jure segregation laws and a history of relying on de facto and
residential segregation, they seemed protected from court interference throughout the
1950s and 1960s. While some black parents voiced demands for integration following the
Brown case, the school board chose not to respond, preferring instead to ignore any
previous racist decisions once made to isolate black and Chicano students in the past,
which ultimately created a segregated system. Though their version of segregated
education looked, from the outside, very different from the formal dual system operating
in the South, Denver’s schools were nonetheless defined by segregation.
In the years before the Brown v. Board of Education decision, the Denver school
board’s disregard of black and Chicano student needs became apparent. First, the new
Manual High School opened in the heart of Five Points. The original Manual Training
school was closed in 1950 due to overcrowding and poor conditions. Three years later
when the school reopened, enrollment was predominately black and Chicano. That same
year Robbie Bean, a black woman with a Master’s Degree in Education was turned down
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for a teaching job and told she was under-qualified. At the time, there were no openings
for teachers in the disproportionately black schools, but some positions in the
predominately white schools were left vacant and Mrs. Bean went home without a job.
Additionally, the school board doctored neighborhood boundaries to separate whites from
black and Chicano students. In 1955, just a year after Brown, the school board announced
an expansion plan that stretched the district’s boundary across Colorado Boulevard, the
state highway that ran through the city and separated Five Points from Park Hill. A year
later, the board shifted new boundaries in order to maintain a black majority at Cole
Junior High school and approved construction for a new elementary school on the east
side of Colorado Boulevard. Boundary changes and pupil reassignment were common
techniques employed by western school boards hoping to avoid reprimand from the U.S.
Supreme Court. In L.A., Phoenix, and Denver alike, segregation prevailed as local
governments exploited the lack of de jure segregation, and fooled themselves into
believing they did not enforce isolation and oppression. Instead, a complicated system of
policies, gerrymandering and covert racism remained the unspoken reality for western
urbanites, and de facto segregation prevailed as the coined phrase excusing away
policymakers’ direct involvement in a system of oppression.
School boards across the country focused on Brown but local efforts for
educational equality provided a foundation for this landmark case. While Brown v. Board
remains the watershed moment in the history of segregation, it was not the first or only
court order that influenced movements for educational equality. Foundationally, Plessy v.
Ferguson, which in 1896 established the constitutionality of “separate but equal,” set the
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standard for segregated education.121 This language was misappropriated and applied to
schools at all levels throughout the nation.122 Three of the earliest cases challenging
“separate but equal” education heard by the U.S. Supreme Court had to do with graduate
education, but set a precedent that would reverberate for decades.123 In the years
following, Brown I and Brown II established segregation was unconstitutional and
demanded desegregation be carried out as soon as possible. Americans used this
watershed as cases regarding just how to create educational equality based on local
circumstances made their way to the country’s highest court. From 1955 until Keyes v.
Denver School District No. 1 was heard in 1974, the Supreme Court ended freedom of
choice plans, established busing as a useful technique for desegregation, and placed the
burden of integration on the shoulders of black students.124 All of these verdicts had two
important things in common. First, each of the lawsuits challenged de jure segregation.
Secondly, all of these cases focused on issues in southern states. Colorado’s school
system simply did not fit this bill.
Western school boards took full advantage of the nation’s preoccupation with
school desegregation in the southern states. From 1954 to 1966, the Denver school board
and others in the West drew boundaries around black neighborhoods to prevent racial
mixing. They shut down schools to continue the permanence of segregation when they
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could no longer influence housing policies. They implemented hiring practices that
isolated black and Chicano teachers in the lowest income neighborhoods, while
compensating them at fractions of white teachers’ salaries. A small select few middle
class black students were strategically placed in white schools in an attempt to fool the
public into thinking that desegregation happened naturally in the Mile High City. For all
of these reasons, segregation perpetuated as an educational reality in Denver until nearly
two decades after Brown.125

Neighborhood Schools: Manual High, Cole Junior, and Elementary Schools
For blacks and Chicanos in Denver, Manual High was the center of their historical
connection to Denver. For more than half a century, the Five Points neighborhood and
Manual High school represented community, tradition, and racial-uplift. From its
inception in 1894, Manual sought to prepare all students for “the active duties of life,
those who could not go to college, as well as prepare the more fortunate for a college
course.”126 Because Manual was originally a DPS experiment, it was an open campus for
any Denver residents wanting to attend; no racial restrictions prohibiting blacks or other
minorities existed. This legacy continued throughout district consolidation and boundary
assignments in 1906, and black students began to view Manual as their own.127 The
earliest documented black social club organized in 1942, minority students established
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the “Hi Lite Club,” a social organization that sponsored dances and assumed
responsibility for the “interests of the colored population of Manual.”128
Community, home, and school life, “naturally intertwined” in Denver’s minority
schools, as relationships among parents and teachers influenced curriculum and
behavioral standards. Manual, Cole Junior High, and their feeder elementary schools,
Traylor, Whittier, Gilpin, and later Park Hill, were a significant part of Denver’s black
community, particularly in the Five Points neighborhood. The Denver Blade explained
the connection to school and community was eminent in Five Points. In an editorial,
writer John Wallace remembered about leaving his community school, “When my
contact with the school was broken, so was my contact with the community I had
known.”129 Though Wallace described his experiences as a university student, his
observations nonetheless applied to high school students, schools, and communities in
Denver. He argued that the community relied upon students to thrive, and that when
students “graduated, quit school,” or moved on to other endeavors, they created a
neighborhood made up of strangers instead of a community of neighbors. Wallace
applauded those who stayed in Denver generally, and Five Points specifically to “give
rebirth to the area.”130
Scholars of African American history often argue that churches and schools are
the two most central pillars of the black community, and the two are intertwined. David
Cecelski, in his history of Hyde County, North Carolina, explains the process. Black
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students attended Sunday school classes that regularly complimented the course work
assigned at school. Teachers, administrators, parents, and students often attended the
same churches, thus lessons taught in church and in the classroom were frequently
reinforced. Educators were “conscious of their roles as mentors,” in and out of the
classroom, and they provided assistance to parents who required additional childcare
outside of regular school hours. The church and schoolhouse were the two aspects of
community dominated by black leadership and community involvement, which created a
sense of pride for these two institutions within black communities across the country.131
Both black and Chicano communities in Denver placed Manual High at the center
of their communal experience, though each group laid claim to it for different reasons.
For the most part, the school remained segregated, since its location in Five Points
effectively guaranteed that it would be a “black high school with some Hispanic
enrollment” by 1960.132 Because of this, the school board considered Manual a black
school, and attempted to manipulate neighborhood boundaries to maintain this
distribution. Manual was a beacon in the community for achievement and cultural pride.
Alumni from the Five Points school reinforced a “special mystique” that both parents and
students celebrated as something unique about Manual.133 Mayor Wellington Webb, a
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renowned Manual 1958 alumnus, remarked that Manual built a “distinguished legacy of
scholars, sports teams, and community leaders” throughout its tumultuous history.134
Webb was referring to Denver locals who graduated from Manual and went on to make
notable historic contributions in Denver and throughout the West. Over the course of its
history, Five Points community members and Denver politicians alike attempted to
rebrand Manual as, “Something of a school of government.” Along with Wellington
Webb, Norman Rice, who graduated from Manual in 1961, went on to lead a major city’s
government. He became Seattle’s first and only black mayor in 1989.135 Manual
graduates who made local impact included former athletes who went on to be state and
local police officers, locals who graduated and returned to their alma maters to teach at
Manual, politicians, activists, and organizers. In fact, part of Manual’s connection to the
black community and its development of future leaders involved a commitment to
athletic achievement. Through organized sports and various after-school athletic
opportunities, Manual earned a reputation of success that “outlasted disaster and
segregation” in the black community.136
Manual’s centrality in Five Points created a culture of respect for education that
spanned to include other black schools like Cole Junior High, Whittier, Newton, Wyatt,
Harrington, and Mitchell Elementary. These schools provided unique opportunities for
blacks to become local leaders, respected by the general Denver community, and
examples of achievement for black children. Though parents found problems with the
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disproportionate distribution of black teachers to minority schools, these teachers tended
to improve the quality of education for their students, and they exemplified leadership in
action. Many Five Points parents found that as the number and percentage of black
teachers in predominately black schools was a benefit to their children, despite the
realities of segregation.137 Marie Greenwood, who became Denver’s first black teacher in
1935, spent sixty years as a DPS instructor, teaching at segregated and integrated schools
until she retired in 1974.138 Greenwood never called herself an activist, but she spent her
adult life breaking barriers and encouraging black children to invest in their community.
She recalled of her first assignment at Whittier Elementary, “It’s like building a house.
You lay a good foundation and you can build anything.”139 Greenwood took time off to
raise children, and returned to DPS in 1953, seeking a job at Newton school on West 4th
Avenue and Vrain. At the time, Newton was widely recognized as Denver’s “black
school,” and Greenwood helped to organize the pre-school and PTA, in order to
encourage black familial and community involvement. During her brief time as a
substitute before being permanently hired at Newton, Greenwood was only assigned to
northeast schools, which were predominately black and Hispanic. This pleased
Greenwood, who believed, “Good teachers come in all colors and are dedicated to
teaching children.”140

137

“Negro Teacher Jobs Explained,” Denver Post, 22 July 1969: 3.

138

Marie Anderson, Notice of Probational Appointment, Denver Public schools: Office of the
Board of Education, June 12, 1935: Marie Anderson papers, BCAARL.
139

Alan Dumas, “Public School Pioneer,” Rocky Mountain News, 21 February 1999: 13D.

140

Marie Louise Greenwood, handwritten biography, 1993. Located at the DPL, BCAARL, Marie
Greenwood Papers.

63

Long before the Keyes v. Denver Schools trial, which reached the U.S. Supreme
Court by 1974, desegregation overpowered the conversation about educational equality.
Parents made a great show of promising that busing would desegregate the schools and
create equal access for black, Chicano, and white students. However, community control
remained a viable option among blacks and Chicanos alike. Manual High, with its
prominence in Five Points remained a center of pride and community engagement
throughout the school desegregation controversy. While some white parents feared that
their children might be ultimately sent to attend Manual if desegregation ultimately meant
a a busing program, black and Chicano parents remained proud of their neighborhood
school.
Cole Junior High and Manual High were parts of a larger history connecting
historically black schools and their surrounding community exists throughout the United
States. In the rural south, historically black schools, segregated throughout their entire
existence, were closed en masse as desegregation swept the region after the 1954 Brown
v. Board of Education decision. The Supreme Court made a widespread federal decision
that impacted the entire country, but left the implementation of educational equality to the
local school boards and administrations. David Cecelski wrote, “Instead of reconciling
black and white schools on equal terms, white leaders made school desegregation a oneway street.”141 Thus the legacy of school desegregation became one of new failure, as
black communities lost opportunities for leadership, middle class advancement, and
symbols of heritage and leadership. Denver blacks were reluctant to allow Manual to
141
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meet this same fate. Drawing instead on Manual’s distinction in the city, black parents
advocated for preserving the high school’s legacy as a pillar in the black community.142
Despite the historical relevance these schools represented to the citizens of
Denver, Manual, Cole and their feeder elementary schools were often disregarded in the
eyes of the school board and middle-class white parents. In some opinions, these schools
were the least desirable to all members of the city. Many board members failed to
recognize that black and Chicano Denverites were proud of their schools in Five Points.
Because of this, teachers assigned to Manual High, Cole Junior High, and area
elementary schools usually lacked experience, and were therefore hired at the lowest
salaries. These teachers were disadvantaged and within a few years, qualified teachers
sought transfers to better paying schools in the district.143 According to a team of
researchers appointed by the school board in 1964, there was a lack of teachers with
proficiency in Spanish assigned to schools with a predominate Spanish-speaking
majority, and the few black administrators and teachers with significant training and
experiences were not hired to neighborhood schools like Cole and Manual. Therefore, the
majority of teachers assigned to black and Spanish-speaking schools were not prepared to
teach “children of varied backgrounds.”144 Even teachers who had the exact same titles,
salaries, and training lacked commonality in their daily lives at school. Denis R. Martin
and Marsha J. Hummel, who taught at Cole Junior and Hill Junior High, respectively,
142
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faced very different challenges when they arrived to work each day. At Cole, teacher
turnover was unprecedented throughout the 1960s. Martin arrived in August among
thirty-six new teachers; most were assigned to teach subjects that were very different
from their college majors. Nearly forty percent of Cole’s teachers were new hires in
1969, a trend that started in the early 1950s.145
The few black teachers assigned to predominately white schools found
themselves isolated, and far away from their own neighborhoods. Some were expected to
speak on behalf of all black students, and respond to discipline conflicts. Effie
Northgraw, a black woman, was a teacher at Hill Junior High school. Hill, located on
Colorado Boulevard and Leetsdale was in an affluent neighborhood, and was home
mostly to wealthy, Jewish children. Effie had a family of her own, but rarely talked about
her children to other teachers. In 1968, Effie mentored Judy Barnett, a young studentteacher about to graduate. Barnett remembered, “Effie was the only black teacher at
Hill.” Other teachers “came to her” with discipline problems, “because she was black, she
would know how to handle the situation.” Effie’s colleagues often requested suggestions
from her, regarding all discipline problems, regardless of the student’s race, though the
few black students were sent to Effie often. “And that broke her heart.”146
Meanwhile, Effie’s white colleagues experienced low turn-over, as most teachers
assigned to predominately white schools tended to stay put.147 Cole and Manual were
physical embodiments of these disadvantages, as parents often pointed out. By 1970, both
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schools were in desperate need of renovation; the buildings were overcrowded and could
not accommodate the yearly increase in pupils, books and equipment were outdated, and
the schools lacked modern upgrades to keep them in competition with others in the
district. Concerns mounted throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with blacks in particular
criticizing the school board for ignoring the needs of these schools and ignoring the need
to compensate for the “massive growth of school age children.” In 1962, for example,
parents petitioned the school board to build a new school and shut down the seventy-nine
year old Whittier school, as well as build more classrooms for Wyatt, Harrington, and
Mitchell schools in Five Points.148

Turning the Tide: Black Boycotts and Protests, Denver in 1960s
In 1961, The Denver Blade pronounced segregation “dead” in Denver but worried
“what will it cost to bury it?” Denver blacks faced realities in “housing, employment,”
and education that defied Colorado’s liberal reputation.149 Just one month later, The
Blade published a letter to the editor that demonstrated perhaps segregation wasn’t dead
after all, despite the recently passed Colorado fair housing act. “Mr. O.C.,” a retired
Army Master Sergeant and his wife moved to Denver in November, 1961. The first day
they arrived, the couple was “refused the right to rent space.” Every “trailer court we
went to” told them they did not “take Negroes.” Finally, Mr. and Mrs. O.C. were invited
to stay with “kind people” who lived on a rural lot until they could make “permanent
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arrangements.”150 Thankful for the isolated hospitality but angered by the “direct
violation of the Colorado fair housing act” they experienced at the trailer courts, the
couple “filed a complaint” with the state against each offending trailer park. Mr. O.C.
explained that while the court owners knew they were in violation of state law, they
believed they could discriminate openly, because many blacks in town did not retaliate.
Mr. O.C. and his wife sought the additional help of CORE. Two white CORE
representatives posed as a “test” couple and applied to rent spaces at each of the trailer
courts where Mr. and Mrs. O.C. had been denied. “In every case where the test couple
was welcome to move in, we were refused,” Mr. O.C. summarized. The next day, Mr.
and Mrs. O.C., and the CORE test couple were joined by additional CORE
representatives. The group approached managers at each of the tested trailer courts. The
activists “politely reminded the managers of the fair housing law and told them
something of CORE direct action methods.” Mr. O.C. noticed that when faced with
complaints filed to the state, the managers did not seem concerned with the potential
consequences. On the other hand, when faced with a CORE-initiated protest, they “of
course choose to comply with the law.”151 In the early 1960s, CORE and direct action
protests like those they coordinated at Denver Dry Goods and the trailer parks helped to
turn the tide of activism in Denver. Denver Post reporter Charles Roos explained this
shift in 1963 when he wrote, “The Negro is no longer satisfied merely to extend what he
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calls his ‘ghetto’… he wants something more than civil rights filed away in a dusty
volume of Colorado statutes.”152

152

Newsum, “Cold War Colorado,” 198, quoted from Charles Roos, “Racial Bias Subtle but
Real,” Denver Post October 17, 1963.

69

CHAPTER 3
“Something Big is Happening in Denver”: The Seeds of an Early Movement, 1947-1967
New Manual, Old Problems
On an early summer morning in 1953, twelve-year-old George Lane abandoned
his paper route. He and his friends had heard news of a big fire in Five Points. They
pedaled furiously to Franklin Street to see what the commotion was. George and his
buddies ditched their bikes a block away from the three-alarm fire, and stood in awe as
Manual High School was engulfed in flames.153 The fire started early on July 23rd and
destroyed “Old Manual,” a symbolic and beautiful structure in the middle of Five
Points.154 George Lane, who later graduated from “New Manual” and went on to work as
a Denver Post reporter never forgot that day. “The tear-stained faces” of the crowd
watching, “not the physical destruction,” remained cemented in Lane’s memory. “The
burned-out hulk of the old red-brick building” represented “so much in their lives. No
emotion could have been more genuine.”155 Through the smoke and their tears,
bystanders caught glimpses of “New Manual,” which was slated to open just blocks from
the burning building in September 1953. In 1950, the school board announced that
Manual High was overcrowded. They dropped the word “training” from the school’s
name and began planning to build a new location across the street. Once Old Manual
went up in blazes, remembered George Lane more than four decades later, “many of the
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people who offered tearful goodbyes” eventually came to appreciate the new location, but
not without hesitation.156
Prior to the 1953 fire, organizations and individuals alike pressured the school
board to improve conditions in Five Points schools, which were predominately black and
Chicano. In 1950, the school board announced plans to close down Manual High School,
citing parental demands and concerns regarding over-crowding and aging buildings.
However, parents also complained that the school’s racial makeup was becoming
alarmingly homogenous, with new black students arriving every year and more white
students leaving for East High, West High, or suburban schools. The school board
disregarded this concern and chose to build “New Manual” directly in the shadow of its
namesake. Promising “vocational education” which, they argued, would attract
intellectual students from all over the city, the school board sought to convince Denver
parents that the New Manual would be the best school in the district. However new the
building might be, Manual nonetheless was left wanting when it opened in 1953. Denver
Public Schools (DPS), instead of spending money on new furniture and materials, simply
collected used desks and books from other high schools and had them delivered to
Manual.157
The school district remained an active promoter of segregation, within specific
schools and the DPS system altogether. Students at New Manual were discouraged from
socializing in integrated groups, black students were prohibited from the prom, and
administrators were cruel to students of color. Manual in its new manifestation, failed to
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attract white students from across the city. The school board manipulated attendance
boundaries within New Manual’s first three years, by fixing the eastern border at York
Street, the line between Five Points and the more integrated community of Clayton Park.
In 1956, the superintendent’s office released a plan to increase “optional” attendance
zones, but these new boundaries did very little to integrate the nearly all-white East High,
and the nearly all-minority Manual. 158 By drawing the boundaries this way, the
Superintendent and the school board acknowledged publicly their intentions to segregate
known black students to Manual and its feeder schools. These new boundaries were
drawn suspiciously to include the state’s only two elected officials, allowing them the
limited opportunity to choose the Five Points attendance district. Senator George Brown
assumed the school board was sending a message, “We’re going to fix it so that your
elected officials can escape from what we consider obviously a bad situation.159
When black students complained to the school board, Superintendent Kenneth
Oberholtzer scoffed that the conditions were the burden of the students. He claimed that
black students were not as interested in taking accelerated courses, nor were they likely to
attend college, thus, college preparatory courses would be a waste of money at Manual.
With this argument, Oberholtzer stated that Manual then had little need for improved
teacher training, resources, and attractive courses for college-bound students.160
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Reform and Resistance
Denver, with its tolerant reputation and record of passing liberal legislation, was
nonetheless in need of civil rights activity. In 1947, blacks and Chicanos in Denver
organized to challenge managerial racism, segregation, and the progressive mystique.
They began by confronting employment discrimination and the loopholes that allowed
private and some public employers to refuse hiring minorities. Next, activists organized
to challenge housing inequality, and the contradictions that existed in Colorado’s
milestone fair housing policy. Whites and middle-class blacks also opposed the threat of
white flight in some of Denver’s most desirable neighborhoods, as blacks began taking
advantage of the few opportunities they had for fair housing, many white residents
threatened to leave the city and head for the suburbs. Finally, resisting neighborhood
segregation led many blacks and Chicanos to fight the school board to make adequate
changes to their public school system. As the school board continued to avoid meeting
their demands, different groups of activists and parents chose varying methods of
response. Some black middle-class parents and their white neighbors, experimenting with
the methods that were previously successful in integrating neighborhoods and warding
off white flight, devised a plan to effectively desegregate Denver’s schools.
Activists in Denver had a long history of civil rights organizing. Typically, these
groups researched and investigated problems in the city, with the intention of making
suggestions in order to create change. In 1943, whites and blacks from varying
professions and groups in the city formed the Denver Unity Council (DUC). Using Cold
War rhetoric to warn Denverites about the evils of “Hitlerism,” “discrimination,” and
“bigotry,” the DUC co-founders sought to create and “interracial, interethnic, and
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interfaith” organization.161 For example, in its first pamphlet the DUC criticized racism in
Denver, stating that the evils of oppression “were not trademarks of Hitler’s world
alone.”162 Leading the charge was co-founder Dean Paul Roberts, reverend at Denver’s
St. John’s Episcopal Cathedral.163 DUC membership spiked almost immediately, as over
eight-hundred individuals joined within the DUC’s first three years and ninety-five
offices were created within the organization. Arguably its most influential professional
member was the local Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “originally a Jewish self-defense
organization” that later blossomed under its national leadership into a “full-throttle…
American intergroup relations movement.” The Tri-State ADL was based in Denver, but
considered Wyoming, New Mexico, and Colorado within its sphere of influence. The
ADL worked with DUC to create meaningful relationships with local political and
business leaders, as well as Denver clergy. The ADL helped to establish the DUC as a
self-sustaining agency with its eye on civil rights research and activism.164
However committed the DUC may have seemed to its interethnic ideal, its
leadership was nonetheless dominated by “educated, middle-class white professional
business men and women.”165 This was common among other agencies in Denver.
Founded in 1946, Denver’s Urban League (UL) was controlled by a board of mostly
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white professional men.166 Both the DUC and the ADL had significant influence over the
UL, its formation, and its daily activities. While the national organization, established in
1910, was dedicated to acclimating blacks to their new urban lifestyles following
migration from the rural South, Denver’s UL embraced the “intergroup” attitude in the
city, a tone set by the DUC.167
The DUC helped campaign for Quigg Newton, and when he was sworn in in
1947, Newton made good on his promises to the council. The new mayor appointed an
inaugural committee to analyze discrimination in Denver’s governmental agencies and
businesses.168 Made up of eight interim members, this council conducted studies of
neighborhoods, schools, and services in order to research discrimination in Denver and
educate their local community. The DUC, like many organizations in Denver focused on
local change, but found ways to reach out to national agencies for assistance. In a 1947
letter to the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, DUC Executive Secretary Louise
Evans cited seven areas of concern faced by Denver minorities, and made suggestions for
federal involvement. Educational inequality, housing and employment discrimination,
and the need for a civil rights act were among the important suggestions made by the
DUC in 1947. Evans wrote, “Employment discrimination is unquestionably the first on
the list of critical problems.”169 Fair employment, as evidenced by the DUC report, was a
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myth in Denver, as blacks in particular were victims of discrimination. Denver blacks
later pointed this out during the Denver Dry Goods boycott, arguing that employment
discrimination took many forms. Blacks had to fight to be considered for jobs outside of
domestic and janitorial work, despite the fact that they were admitted as patrons at the
same stores that refused to hire them. Secondly, blacks were denied housing opportunities
outside of Five Points and Capitol Hill. Evans and the DUC urged the President to
consider federal investment in nation-wide legislation to end housing discrimination.
Finally, the DUC cited education among their top concerns. As evidenced in the letter,
the DUC recognized that housing, employment, and education were interrelated in
Denver, as they were in many urban communities. Segregated employment and housing
led to segregated education, which perpetuated the longevity of discrimination and racism
for generations. Evans wrote, “Federal action against segregated schools should be
taken.”170 In 1951, the interim committee to study discrimination for Mayor Newton was
made permanent when the Denver City Council established the Denver Commission on
Human Relations. This was one of the only committees like it in the West, but across the
nation, city councils were busy appointing citizens to study “intergroup” relations.171 For
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the most part, the black community seemed pleased with the DUC, the Mayor’s
Commission, and Newton himself.172
As Denver expanded during the 1950s, housing developments began to reflect
trends across the West. Historians generally agree that “one of the greatest migrations of
the twentieth century was the movement of whites from central cities to the suburbs.”173
Denver whites joined this migration en masse, despite the reputation the state had for
racially tolerant housing policies. Instead, when new laws passed, like Colorado’s oftbragged about fair housing legislation, the subsequent reactions among white
homeowners were often more telling than the regulations themselves. Historian Albert M.
Camarillo writes that as people of color moved into western cities, “…the combination of
federal laws, blockbusting real estate practices, and fear led to the wholesale departure of
whites from many formerly segregated communities…”174 By the late 1950s, “white
flight” seemed very real to Denverites, who considered the outcomes of this threat in
Detroit, Boston, and Chicago to be warning signs of what not to do. While few white
residents sought integration in their segregated communities, many paid lip service to
housing equality, while privately working to manage the actual threat of change. Whites
in the Park Hill neighborhood in particular, worried that if too many blacks purchased
homes in their neighborhood, white homeowners would then fall victim to “panic
172
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selling.”175 This fear of black neighbors was common in white America, as soon as black
migrants arrived. At first, urban whites identified blacks “as a threat and began to defend
themselves using force and threats of violence”176 However, when cities like Denver
banned restrictive covenants and passed fair housing legislation, locals turned to
neighborhood associations combat integration, educate locals, and prioritize white
homeownership over black “invasion.”177 Perhaps most telling in Denver was the rise of
two neighborhood associations, the first that organized outside of city limits to educate
Denver on civil rights issues, and the second, the Park Hill Action Committee, which in
its origins was devised by white homeowners to limit desegregation, but ultimately and
unexpectedly became a vocal civil rights force.
In 1958, on the eve of Colorado’s passage of the country’s first Fair Housing Act,
a group of white homeowners gathered to create the Littleton Council for Human
Relations. Founding members included Dr. Charles Fraser and his wife, author Virginia,
as well as Ellie Miller Greenberg, a speech pathologist and educator, and social worker
Libby Bortz. All of the founding members were recent residents of Colorado, born on the
east coast, and college-educated in the Midwest. “People in Denver didn’t think we
necessarily had a problem,” recalled Fred Brown, a retired Denver Post journalist who
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covered the Council’s work in the 1960s.178 Virginia Fraser and her husband moved to
Denver in 1957, where she began studying for her Master’s Degree. Having worked with
the American Friends Service Committee, Fraser helped to integrate neighborhood
playgrounds in Washington D.C., and upon arriving in Denver, she began looking for
similar opportunities. She joined the League of Women Voters to advocate for fair
housing issues and civil rights, and in doing so was motivated to start the Littleton
Council on Human Relations.179 The organization emphasized fairness in housing
practices, creating and lobbying for fair housing legislation throughout the 1960s. The
council organized interracial social events and gatherings at a time when suburbanization
and white flight to Littleton might have seemed the norm.180 Founder Libby Bortz said of
the council, “We wanted to make this a community that was more representative of the
country.”181 Bortz and the committee, made up primarily of white middle-class
suburbanites, nonetheless attempted to research and create programs to improve race
relations, and halt white flight.

The Evolution of the Park Hill Action Committee
Perhaps more noticeably, a small group of self-proclaimed white “progressives”
began organizing to promote liberal race relations, and to steer racial integration in their
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neighborhood. Beginning in 1958, the community of Park Hill had experienced slow and
steady desegregation, as middle-class blacks purchased homes in the slightly more
upscale neighborhood. At the time, Denver whites feared “ghettoization,” and thought
that white flight created the decline of historic central urban neighborhoods. In 1960,
eight Denver churches, seven of them white, sponsored the founding of an
interdenominational collaborative of Park Hill residents.182 The group was made up by all
white founders, led by chairman Ed Lupberger, a white professional and member of
Montview Presbyterian Church, who recruited Art Branscombe of the Denver Post to
serve as publicity chairman.183 Additional founders included Art’s wife Bea, Gladys and
John Bates, and Fred and Myrtle Thomas, all white neighbors and members of different
neighborhood churches. Hoping to influence the future of the community, these white
liberal homeowners organized the Park Hill Action Committee (PHAC) “to keep Park
Hill a top notch neighborhood in every way.”184 Their founding documents indicated that
this was, “A church-sponsored group organized last spring to reverse any down-hill
trends in Park Hill, and to make it instead an even better place in which to live.”185 Their
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original focus was to maintain the elitist environment in Park Hill. Likening their
“Quality Hill” to Washington D.C.’s Georgetown, the PHAC sought to make and keep
Park Hill “one of the most desirable residential areas… due to its distinctive character
and great convenience to downtown.”186 Attempting to halt the potential threat of white
flight, this group of whites sought to combat ghettoization.187 In 1960, Park Hill was 97%
white and 3% black, with only one black family owning a home in the community. By
the end of the 1960s, the figure shifted to nearly 50% white and 50% black, but the
income level was maintained at “affluent and middle-class.”188
From their early beginnings, PHAC identified a set of guidelines to selectively
recruit desirable middle-class black neighbors, while encouraging affluent whites to stay
in the community and embrace managerial racism. Their founding documents
acknowledged, “We know that the glamour of the suburbs is near…,” but these same
documents encouraged whites to stay near downtown as Park Hill will “come into its
own.”189 They developed a survey for potential black homeowners that requested
biographical information, racial statistics on the buyers’ agent, the buyers’ plans to stay
in the community. Additionally, PHAC created a questionnaire for white residents. The
questions included “Would you contemplate moving out… if this neighborhood… was
entered by another Negro family?”190 PHAC identified many goals within their first few
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years. They hoped that by integrating the neighborhood slowly and intentionally, they
would create cohesion in the community, develop a sense of concern for the
neighborhood and its schools, identify local leaders, and resolve problems with effective
communication.191 In part due to these varied strategies, many Denver locals found
PHAC and its mission to be confusing. Park Hill residents seemed divided on the purpose
of the organization. Nearly half of all Park Hill neighbors thought PHAC was organized
to integrate the community. The other half believed the organization existed to halt the
invasion of black homebuyers.192
This identity crisis continued as families remained segregated, within Park Hill.
The few blacks that did move in occupied houses closest to the western boundary of the
neighborhood. Residents living closest to this area were the most informed when it came
to PHAC and integrated housing. One study completed in 1962 demonstrated that less
than half of the Park Hill community was “aware of” PHAC. The study, which compiled
data from nearly every resident in Park Hill, demonstrated that the only people who knew
of PHAC and approved of their work were either; 1.) members of PHAC or.; 2.) black or
white residents who lived in proximity to members of another race.193 PHAC awareness
and membership was equally driven by the congregations of the eight sponsoring
churches. At first, PHAC seemed bound to its church sponsorship, as most members and
organizers, as well as neighbors recognized the association based on the churches that
supported it. This trend continued for PHAC’s first five years, but by the mid-1960s,
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however, the organization had moved away from its affiliation with the churches and
took a decidedly political turn.
This shift occurred over the fate of Denver schools. When PHAC formed in 1960,
founders Ed Lupberger and Art Branscombe wrote that one of their goals included
protecting Park Hill and other elementary schools such as Smith, Stedman, Hallett, and
Phillips. Nearly all of these schools enjoyed significant white majorities in 1960.194
Following elementary, students went to Hill or Smiley Middle Schools in Park Hill and
then East or Manual High. Worried that black homeownership might cause white
neighbors to assume the community would go downhill, Lupberger and Branscombe
planned to convince PHAC members that the Park Hill’s assigned public schools were
top of the line. They urged the school board to “keep their standards high” throughout the
system. Cole and Manual, though they were in Five Points, were among PHAC’s biggest
concerns. The two schools lost white students consistently, and black and Chicano
students made up the majority of the student body, with this figure growing every year.
However, it was the new construction of Barrett Elementary in 1960 and proposed
construction of another new school in 1962 that inspired PHAC to take more action in
Denver’s education equality movement.
Rachel and Edmund Noel were among the country’s black “pioneers” who moved
into predominately white neighborhoods from black enclaves in the 1940s and 1950s

194

In 1960, Park Hill Elementary was comprised of nearly 100% white students. Smith
Elementary recorded a black population of less than 3%. Stedman and Hallett were 99% and 99% white,
respectively. Figures are taken from George Bardwell, Park Hill Areas of Denver 1950-1966: An updating
of the 1960 census, A study of population movement and property value (Denver: Commission on
Community Relations, 1966): 4-15. For a general overview of these numbers and the role they played in the
Keyes case, see Watson, “Removing the Barricades,” 52-53.

83

when they purchased a home in Park Hill.195 Rachel Louise Bassette was born to civil
rights lawyers in Hampton, Virginia in 1918. She spent her life watching her parents
advocate for African Americans’ rights to education, voting, and equal access, and she
acquired a blend of legal knowledge and grassroots experiences that anchored her
education and passions. Bassette graduated with a bachelor’s degree from Hampton
Institute and earned a Master’s from Fisk University before marrying Edmond Noel, a
surgeon, and relocating the Denver in 1949. Though the two came from privileged
educational backgrounds, Rachel and Edmund shared a passion for public education.
Rachel began her career as a school teacher, but because she was an inspired leader,
politics seemed to call her.196 Within her first few years in Denver, Rachel became an
active community member. She joined church groups and ladies social clubs, establishing
herself as an organizer and leader, but it was her daughter Angie who motivated Rachel
to take her first political action. Rachel and Edmond enjoyed a quiet notoriety in Denver,
and as members of the black professional class, they paired their upbringing and training
with their leadership skills and civil rights knowledge to combat Denver’s managerial
racism and historic roadblocks facing middle class and poor blacks.197 The Noels seemed
an ideal couple when it came to PHAC, who hoped to maintain an elite, professional
atmosphere in their community. In PHAC monthly newsletters, the organization often
listed prominent black and white community members, which they hoped would
demonstrate the panache and prestige of Park Hill. Yet Edmund and Rachel did not make
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the list. At first, Rachel Noel was not active in PHAC, though she was among the first
few black residents in Park Hill. However, the Park Hill Action Committee and Rachel
Noel would eventually work together to put Denver front-and-center in the nation’s battle
over education equality.
On an early fall day in September 1960, Angie Noel crossed the street, leaving
Park Hill to attend Barrett Elementary School in Five Points. This seemingly
commonplace act set in motion a series of events that led to Rachel Noel’s political
career and a major fight over education in the Mile High City. The community of Park
Hill lies directly east of Five Points, but the two neighborhoods are separated by
Colorado Boulevard, a four-lane major highway. When black families first began moving
into Park Hill, many of them were consolidated on the west-most street backing up to
Colorado Boulevard. Noticing this trend, DPS drew school variance boundaries to
include the western corridor of Park Hill in the Five Points schools attendance zones, and
in 1959, approved construction of a new public elementary school on the west side of
Colorado Boulevard. When Barrett Elementary opened in 1960, 98% of the students
attending were black. Most lived in Five Points, but some, like Angie Noel, were among
the black children living in the western section of Park Hill, who had to cross Colorado
Boulevard to go to school.198
When the school board announced intentions to build Barrett in 1959, black
parents like the Noels were concerned. Prior to this announcement, Angie was among the
black and white children who were bussed to Park Hill Elementary, which was
predominately white. When white parents complained about an increasing black
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presence, the school board began to draft plans for a new school. Barrett was “built
small,” and it became clear that the board intended to accommodate only the black
community that straddled Colorado Boulevard.199 When parents raised concerns about
the location, school board members blamed overcrowding at Park Hill Elementary and
many of the Five Points schools. Parents pointed out attendance lines were drawn to
encircle black families and leave out white families, and Park Hill Elementary would
remain overcrowded, even once Barrett opened. The school board ignored these
concerns. Though she was displeased with the new construction, Rachel Noel sent Angie
to attend fifth grade at Barrett Elementary. When Angie bemoaned that she was bored in
classes, Noel researched the conditions at Barrett. She was incensed to find out that
Angie was nearly a year behind her peers at Park Hill Elementary. She discovered that
the teachers at Barrett were within the first few years of their teaching careers, and lacked
experience working with minority children. Unhappy with the conditions at Barrett, Noel
began to recruit others in the community to find a solution.
As the 1961-1962 school year was winding down, the board approved plans for a
new junior high school in northeast Denver. They identified an ideal building location on
the “border of the black and white community,” near Park Hill, but within the boundaries
of the black neighborhood of Five Points.200 The recent construction of Barrett
Elementary was still fresh in many parents’ memories. Barrett, as black community
members predicted, was nearly all-black from the day it opened. This new junior high,
like Barrett, would back up to Colorado Boulevard, which meant it would receive most of
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Barrett’s students, and would feed into Manual High School.201 PHAC’s worst fears were
coming true; as black families moved into Park Hill, the schools were becoming
increasingly black, and with the school board doing little to improve conditions at
predominately black schools, it seemed that white homeowners would look elsewhere in
order to find better education options for their children. The Park Hill Action Committee
was at a crossroads. Though they originally took on a decidedly neutral tone, neither
publicly for nor against integration, by 1962, they were forced to take a side.
The board cited overcrowding at Cole Junior as a reason for a new school on
Colorado Boulevard, but PHAC was not convinced. The Park Hill Action Committee’s
first feat was to start from where they were comfortable. They recruited the support the
black congregations that were members of PHAC, as well as some that did not affiliate
with PHAC. The church leaders then sought help from the local NAACP, CORE, Urban
League, and ADL activists to organize a protest. With Zion Baptist, Shorter AME, Park
Hill Methodist and PHAC at the helm, black parents joined in to protest the plan and hold
the board back from building yet another segregated school.202 On April 4, 1962, activists
and parents who opposed the plan for new construction flooded into the school board
meeting. The school board balked. Rather than incite a round of protests and bad press,
the board decided to simply postpone the plans for the proposed junior high until
frustrations died down. They promised to conduct considerable research on schools in the
Park Hill and Five Points area, rethink the proposed construction site, and assess
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community concerns before breaking ground. Among those at that April 4th school board
meeting was Rachel Noel. Noel, an educator and a researcher, wanted the school board to
take action beyond postponing proposed construction. When the school board voted to
appoint community members to a Special Study Committee (SSC) in order to research
race, segregation, and educational equality in DPS, Rachel Noel raised her hand.

National Investment in Denver’s Movement
Along with PHAC, national groups were invested in Denver’s educational
equality movement. The NAACP, CORE, the Urban League (UL), and the Black Panther
Party (BPP) all had local influence in the struggle for education equality in the Mile High
City. The Denver NAACP chapter began in 1915, when Dr. Clarence Holmes established
a Colorado-Wyoming branch. Holmes was a Denver native. He was born in the Mile
High City in 1892 and graduated from Manual High School in 1913. He began
organizing a local NAACP branch just two years after leaving high school, while he was
a full-time college student. At first, the Denver NAACP remained focused on local
political and business endeavors. Led by Holmes, the NAACP was instrumental in
opening the Glenarm YMCA, the only location that was open to black Denverites.203
Throughout the 1940s, the NAACP focused on politics and educating voters, and it
continued a long partnership with the Glenarm YMCA.204
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Nearly thirty years after he helped to establish the Denver NAACP, Dr. Clarence
Holmes started another civil rights organization. The Denver Urban League (UL) was
founded in 1946, making it one of the first in the American West. The Denver branch’s
mission was to assist blacks in finding and securing productive employment in Denver,
but the UL eventually also shifted its focus to education.205 In 1949, Denver University
hosted the first Urban League conference in a western city. Lester Blackwell Granger,
executive director of the national organization complimented Mayor Quigg Newton, the
Commission on Human Relations, and Denver, arguing that the city was a model
example for other cities. This “new America,” he believed was exemplified in Denver,
with its forward thinking and racial progress.206 Yet, despite these examples of progress,
the UL and Denver citizens recognized that all was not well. During the 1949 convention,
UL speakers pointed out racism, discrimination, and obstacles that African Americans
faced in the Mile High City. The message at the UL convention was clear: prejudice and
segregation existed in Denver. Almost as evil as Communism itself, these social ills were
the exact opposite of America’s promise.207 Colorado, with its potential for progress, was
in a visible and ideal position.
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In 1961, the NAACP met in Denver for its sixty-third annual conference. At this
conference, the Denver branch was charged with continuing the NAACP’s push for
northern and western school desegregation.208 In 1962 Denver’s NAACP educational
chairman, James Atkins, presented findings from an organizational study of managerial
racism within DPS and Atkins made clear his intention of eventually taking the school
district to court.209 His report, titled “Integration: A Necessary Component of Equality in
Educational Opportunity,” began in 1961, indicated that black students in Denver
received substandard education. One of the most important measures Atkins suggested
the school board take was desegregating teachers. The study found that of the fifteen
black teachers employed by DPS, ten of them were assigned to Manual High School.210
Atkins, like many of the desegregationist parents in Denver and the NAACP who
supported them, felt that researching DPS practices and statistics would poise them for
success in the courtroom. With these facts and figures, they believed they could implore
the school board to be “color conscious,” instead of “color blind.”211 This belief created a
culture of investigation which would perpetuate itself throughout the desegregationist
movement in Denver.
Atkins and the NAACP empowered members of the Denver branch, as well as the
Western regional branch to educate themselves about de facto segregation in schools,
along with the impact the housing discrimination ultimately had on educational equality.
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At a 1962 meeting involving all Denverites “that had anything to do with civil rights in
Denver, Colorado,” local NAACP officer Irving Andrews and Denver branch president
William Pinkett joined local religious leaders to discuss issues facing Denver’s black
community. Andrews, whose daughter attended Barrett, gave blacks the impression that
“something big” was going to happen soon in Denver.212 Andrews and Pinkett were
likely referring to a growing sense of consciousness and impatience that was influencing
blacks in Denver, and across the country. Five months prior, Pinkett hosted a special
meeting of the Denver NAACP branch. At the meeting, national Membership Secretary
Mildred Bond spoke to Denver blacks, attempting to inspire increased participation,
voting, and activism. Pinkett also introduced regional Field Secretary Leonard H. Carter,
who pointed out specific problems in Denver and the West. “I think,” Carter said, “we are
at many times just a little too complacent.” He added, “We hide behind the miniature
liberal policies that we have in Denver, or we are just too afraid…” By 1962, Andrews
and Pinkett agreed that housing, employment, and education segregation were areas that
needed “immediate attention” from local and national leaders.213
The Denver Black Panther Party (BPP) was less formally organized than CORE,
the NAACP, or the Denver Urban League, but they had local influence on the educational
equality movement. Much like early accounts of many local chapters, the details of
Denver’s BPP origins remain mythologized and complicated. A historian attempting to
uncover the Denver BPP foundations is forced to use the limited information available in
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the pages of the Black Panther, and local news reports. Historian David Garrow noted in
2007, “…Court cases involving BPP members… supplement the archival material,” and
these records tend to be light and problematic.214 Denver’s BPP story is no exception.
The Denver chapter’s history is hazy at best, since most foundational materials were
destroyed in a 1968 police raid of the Denver BPP headquarters.215 Likewise, the
branch’s origins are ultimately tied to the fate of the local radical who opened the chapter,
Lauren Watson. Watson was the star of four widely-publicized court cases between 1968
and 1995. His time in court included his 1970 criminal trial which was documented and
aired on national television.216 While he established prominence as a local leader in
Denver, Watson’s relationship with the national BPP organization was complicated and
at times, frosty. In the late 1960s, Watson met with Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, who
“urged him to found a Denver chapter of the Black Panther Party.”217 Right away,
Watson and the Denver BPP became inextricably linked. “He was the leadership [in
Denver]” remembered Black Panther defense lawyer, Leonard Davies of Watson. He was
“the Huey Newton, Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver all in one. He was big, articulate,
fearless.”218 The majority of Watson’s communication with the national BPP consisted of
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reports describing problematic interactions with the Denver police, which continued to
plague Watson and his associates for the remainder of his life.219 By 1970, the national
BPP leaders had tired of Watson’s constant arrests. That year, they removed him from
their ranks. In an interview about his time with the BPP, Watson said, “In 1970 the guys
from Oakland came and said I was not giving them appropriate political leadership.” His
wife Mary Lou added, “They took him off somewhere in the mountains. When he came
back, he said he had been removed.”220
Though Watson started the Denver branch with the national BPP leadership’s
support, like other community leaders across the country, he operated with some degree
of independence until his removal.221 Recognizing that their community, though part of a
national movement, had its own set of local issues and potential solutions, the Denver
BPP established itself as an autonomous change maker. They focused particularly on
neighborhood safety and interactions with the police. In 2007, Denver journalist Billy
Baker recalled of the BPP, “I was afraid of them, but more afraid of the Denver
police.”222 Lauren Watson originally applauded CORE’s efforts with the Denver Dry
Goods boycott. He remembered, “People in L.A. were standing up to the cops and I

219

“Black Panther Party Pieces of History: 1966-1969,” The Black Panther Party,
http://www.itsabouttimebpp.com/chapter_history/bpp_pieces_of_history.html. Last accessed 29 September
2013.
220

Dexheimer, Denver Westword News 20 September 1995.

221

For more scholarship on BPP local chapters organizing, as Joe Street puts it, “independently of
the BPP’s central leadership,” see Yohuru Williams, Black Politics/White Power: Civil Rights, Black
Power, and the Black Panthers in New Haven (St. James, NY: Brandywine Press, 2000); Jon Rice, “The
World of the Illinois Panthers,” in Jeanne Theoharris and Komozi Woodward, Freedom North: Black
Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980 (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2003): 41-63.; Joe
Street, “The Historiography of the Black Panther Party” Journal of American Studies 44 (2010): 2, 351372.
222

Alweis and Saunders, Rebels Remembered, 2007.

93

thought we should be doing this back home. I came back to Denver with a serious
attitude. I joined CORE and started hanging out with SDS and the Young Socialist
Alliance.”223 Watson’s association with CORE did not last long. He became frustrated
with the group’s nonviolent strategies. Instead, he began organizing younger radicals who
would soon come to make up the Denver BPP. Watson educated them and trained these
youths to resist employment discrimination and threatening police behaviors with more
aggressive techniques. He stated, “There’s gotta [sic] be a better way than sitting out
front of Dry Goods and getting spit on.”224 Upon disassociating with CORE and moving
to start the Denver BPP, Watson, like other young blacks in western cities demonstrated
disillusionment with nonviolent protests, and embraced the central tenants of black
power. Watson was a part of a national trend responding to calls for self-determination.
For example, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), had previously
been an interracial community for “idealistic activists, whites as well as blacks,” but over
time the leaders of this organization began to turn inward and separatist and by 1966 was
setting the example for black power among teens and young people.225 Likewise, across
the country, youths began embracing black power strategies by experimenting with their
clothing and hairstyles, protests, and defensive reactions to local police.226
Though Denver’s BPP embodied the spirit and employed techniques that had
been useful in other urban settings, it was the national organization’s reputation that
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helped Watson and his comrades to create change in the Mile High City. In the 1960s, the
Denver BPP was instrumental in desegregating the city’s central swimming pool. For
decades, the pool had practiced segregation by denying access to Mexican Americans and
blacks except on specific days of the week, despite anti-discrimination laws. City
Councilman Elvin Caldwell, the first black man elected to public office in Colorado,
struggled for years to integrate the Curtis Park swimming pool. He recalled, “It was
difficult. You talk and talk and talk and never seem like you’re makin [sic] any, getting
any success.” The Denver BPP, he believed, helped to make swift change. “You got
success when the Panthers are organizing!” He laughed, “Come on! Boy, they couldn’t
get that door open fast enough! Come in, now! Come in! Come in!” Caldwell continued,
“They didn’t open those swimming pools up because they particularly liked me; they
opened ‘em up because people raising a lot of h—cane.”227 The BPP, however, rarely
advocated for desegregation. Much like their national organization, Denver Panthers
preferred community control of schools and resources. As their efforts for educational
equality became more radically isolated in the late 1960s, other black activists began
distancing themselves from the Panthers’ approach. However, Mexican Americans in
Denver used similar techniques and in fact, saw the benefits of community control in the
same areas of the city.228
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Reactions and Resistance: A School District Running on Racism
By 1962, things had changed radically for the Denver school board. Prior to the
end of the 1950s, the board operated as an elite fraternity. Many of the members
belonged to the same social communities, and pleasing Superintendent Oberholtzer was
their primary responsibility. The first sign that winds were shifting was the election of
Palmer Burch in 1959 to the board. Burch, a State Representative, had previously
criticized the board for operating as a rubber-stamping good-old-boys’ network. With his
arrival, the nature of the board shifted, as did its administrative character. Burch attended
standing legislature meetings that conflicted with school board meetings, which were
held in the afternoon. Upon his election in 1959 to the board, members agreed to change
meetings from afternoon to evening, and an unintended consequence was that now more
community members could frequent board meetings.229
Burch regularly disagreed with Oberholtzer, specifically regarding budgetary
issues, but avoided public confrontations with The Czar of DPS. Yet his readiness to
argue with Oberholtzer, however privately, signaled a change in the status-quo. Burch
was the first of a new class of board members who were controversial and at times
resistant. When Burch and fellow newcomer Jackson Fuller joined the seven-person
board in 1959, the meeting time was changed, as was the election process. Prior to 1959,
Denver school board elections had always taken place separately from other municipal
elections, and were governed by the board. The year that Burch and Fuller joined
however, the school board became increasingly politicized, as elections were merged
with city municipal elections. Until 1959, Denver locals had to take a particular interest
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in school board elections and therefore vote on separate dates, but upon Burch’s arrival to
the school board, members and hopefuls focused on campaigning, party recognition, local
politics, and moving into more public roles after their time on the board.230
New members continued to join the board until 1964, and their arrivals
challenged business as usual in ways that were maddening and exhausting for
Oberholtzer. In 1961, white liberal A. Edgar Benton was appointed to the board. The next
year, moderate Allegra Saunders joined, and in 1964, the first black board member,
Rachel Noel was elected to an open position. By 1964, the board no longer resembled a
gentlemen’s club of agreeable, like-minded elitists. Instead, a new decidedly diverse,
vocal, and challenging group oversaw the public schools.231 They also struggled to agree
with each other, with blocs forming among Noel, Saunders, and Benton, who generally
opposed the viewpoints of President Palmer Burch, and James Voorhees, Jackson Fuller,
and Frank Amasse all of whom had served for multiple terms prior to 1964.232
When the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, Denver citizens saw what Heather
Ann Thompson called “not the conclusion but the beginning of their struggle for true
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equality.”233 Denver’s story demonstrates that important legislative changes like Brown v.
Board and the Civil Rights Act were merely twists in a long stream of civil rights
activism. Denver parents recognized that the national act, however symbolic though it
was, did not establish change in the city. Merely, it provided them with another tool for
creating social change in their city. As Jacqueline Dowd Hall explained in her seminal
essay on civil rights scholarship, “...The story of a ‘long civil rights movement’ that took
root in the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was intimately tied to the ‘rise and
fall of the New Deal Order,’ accelerated during World War II, stretched far beyond the
South, was continuously and ferociously contested, and in the late 1960s and 1970s
inspired a ‘movement of movements’…” is evident in the voices and events that make up
Denver’s educational, political, urban, and cultural history.234 Discrimination in Denver
had always been hard to pinpoint, difficult to identify, and stubbornly pervasive. In 1964,
civil rights organizing was just gaining attention in the city, but blacks were already
engrossed in their strategies and networks of resistance that ebbed and flowed with the
contemporary issues they faced. African Americans who preferred desegregation saw an
opportunity to use legal recourse to demand the school board take radical action to
integrate the schools. These parents and agitators believed that the federal government’s
ability to withdraw funds from segregated school districts would be enough of a threat
and a catalyst for change. Denver leaders and organizations acted quickly to take
advantage of new resources available to them because of the passage of the Civil Rights
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Act. At the same time, the Colorado State Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights
Commission began investigating the problems faced by Spanish-speaking residents in
Colorado.235
The school board first complied minimally in 1962 with Brown v. Board.
Responding to community concerns, they appointed a Special Study Committee (SSC).
President Palmer Burch charged the SSC with researching demographics and the
educational wellbeing of DPS students and the school board hoped that the results from
the SSC study would ensure that Denver schools could remain operating at the status quo.
The SSC was made up of board members and community parents. Burch appointed six
school employees, and twenty-six parents, and he felt the SSC then represented “every
geographic area of the city”.236 Board member James Voorhees, a white parent, and
supporter of desegregation chaired the committee.237 Rachel Noel, the black mother from
Park Hill—and unbeknownst to the board, future school board member—was appointed
to this committee along with Bernard “Bernie” Valdez of the Congress of Hispanic
Educators (CHE) and James Atkins, the chairman the Denver NAACP Education
Committee, who had vocally protested the proposed junior high.238 Both Noel and
Valdez benefited greatly from their work with the SSC, and from her position as a
committee member, Noel became a groundbreaking leader on the school board and in the
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city of Denver. The SSC spent sixteen months conducting research on the school board’s
behalf and presented their findings in the spring of 1964.
To Burch’s dismay, the SSC presented damning evidence that proved decades of
racist management. First, the board was responsible for gerrymandering schools within
the district to maintain racial segregation, despite with they called “color-blinded”
strategies. The SSC argued that the school board took advantage of the fact that “no
written or… established policy governing school boundary lines” existed.239 For
example, in the late 1950s, the board manipulated boundaries in an east neighborhood
near integrated Smiley Junior High School. White students at the farthest north sections
of town were to be bused past Smiley to the all-white Gove Junior High. Similarly, the
board made a racist decision regarding the central Clayton Park neighborhood, once
considered an “optional area” where students could choose from any nearby elementary,
junior, or high schools. In early 1960, the board proposed that this optional area was
likely to be “filled with Negroes,” so they considered splitting up the Clayton area to
direct black students to Cole Junior and Manual High, instead of Smiley Junior and East
High. In general, the SSC found that Denver parents voiced concerns about their
neighborhood schools if they were in black or Chicano neighborhoods. Largely, the
interviewed parents complained that the conditions of Five Points school buildings
including Barrett, Whittier, Cole and Manual were not up to par, and that black and
Hispanic students were herded into these schools.240
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Second, the SSC found that the DPS was racist in hiring and transferring teachers.
The SSC provided seven points of concern regarding discriminatory hiring practices.
School personnel fell short by being poorly trained and not prepared. The few black and
Mexicano teachers employed by DPS were assigned to schools in areas with high poverty
rates, overcrowding, and significant minority populations. “With few exceptions,” the
statement read, “teachers employed by the Denver school system have had no preemployment training in human relations and teaching children of varied backgrounds.”
Furthermore, the SSC pointed out that the schools with the highest numbers of black or
Chicano students had “no Principals with minority backgrounds.” Finally, the SSC
lambasted the school board DPS for employing “No Negroes and few members of other
minority groups among the personnel of the administrative staff in school headquarters.”
The committee argued that after a year of interviewing teachers and administrators, it
seemed that black and Chicano teachers faced a difficult conundrum. They were often
hired only for schools with large Mexican-American or black populations, and though
their leadership was necessary and valued at these schools, they were nonetheless
exploited and segregated. The committee suggested that the board “insure further
integration of the races,” by creating a specific policy to hire “qualified teachers of
minority backgrounds” and distribute their talents “throughout the system.”241 The SSC
agreed that the Denver school board was practicing de facto segregation, but that the
practice was nonetheless in violation of the Civil Rights Act and Brown v. Board. The
SSC and its recommendations were in full support of desegregating the schools, because
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in inactively allowing schools to remain segregated, the school board nonetheless was
guilty of racial discrimination.242
In a map provided to the Rocky Mountain News, (below) the SSC indicated the
racial distribution of students in Denver’s Public Schools. The SSC labeled each school
within its assigned neighborhood, and included the percentage of each race, by labeling
the figure with an “N stands for Negro and S for Spanish-Surnamed.” As demonstrated
on the map, the schools with the highest concentration of black or Mexicano students
tended to be in the northeast corner of the city, near Five Points, or close to Park Hill.

Figure 1. Racial distribution at DPS schools. Map 1965

Denver’s First “Choice School” Attempt: Limited Open Enrollment, 1964
Despite the SSC’s report, the school board implemented few measures to remedy
the damning findings. Instead, the board chose to focus on small-scale attempts that they
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hoped would appease the SSC without disrupting the racial balance in their schools. In
response to the SSC report in 1964, the school board announced plans to permit limited
open enrollment (LOE) at George Washington High School, south of Park Hill, and
twenty-nine elementary schools within the district’s one hundred and thirteen schools.
1,809 spaces were created for LOE, but this number only accounted for 2% of Denver’s
enrollment.243 LOE allowed for high school students to choose to attend either George
Washington or their already assigned schools. The elementary schools chosen were done
so strategically because they were already almost to capacity. Once a school was filled,
no more students could request to attend through LOE. The schools selected were either
far out of the way from students in Park Hill or Five Points, or they were the same
schools that parents hoped their students could leave. For example, the school board
considering making Manual High School an LOE school, which would have
accomplished very little, since many parents felt that Manual was in itself the problem.244
LOE was only open for enrollment until the beginning of the 1964 school year. Because
of this, the SSC’s underwhelmed response to LOE, and the fact that many of the schools
that were declared open faced similar problems, parents were disillusioned by this option.
Only 365 students participated, despite the nearly two-thousand open seats available.
Denver parents were unsatisfied but not surprised. A year earlier, the Oakland
Public Schools had attempted to institute a similar resolution in the Bay Area. At the start
of the 1963 school year, 1,100 black public school pupils participated in a parallel version
of LOE. Though the school board created over two thousand open spaces in less-crowded
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high schools, only half of those seats were filled. Black students in the California
community deemed LOE unnecessary, and not enough to create educational equality.
Parents in Oakland boycotted LOE, believing it was “… really not open enrollment at
all.” Too few students were benefiting from this menial change, and believed that this
was a small measure to avoid solving segregation in Oakland.245 Denver parents took
note of Oakland’s experiment, as well as a likeminded program in Seattle. In 1963, the
Seattle school board announced a Voluntary Racial Transfer Program (VRT) that
redistributed black pupils out of the core urban neighborhood into outlying schools with
larger percentages of white students. The school board planned on 1,400 students
participating in the project, but could only convince 238 students to agree to the crossdistrict transfers.246
From 1964 to 1968, LOE remained unsuccessful in Denver, as well. Very few
students participated, and those who did felt alienated at their new schools. Rachel Noel
explained, “In too many schools, the only Negro you find is the janitor.”247 Black
students who left their neighborhood schools were few in numbers, and therefore
isolated. Most of them were shuttled into remedial programs, removed from the general
white populous in the schools, and it was assumed they would eventually drop out. “The
problem,” stated Manual’s James Ward, one of only two black principals in Denver,
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“starts in elementary schools with psychological drop-outs.”248 Furthermore, LOE did
little to resolve the inadequacies discovered by the SSC. Within three years, students
participating in LOE were disproportionately white, and the schools that suffered were
inner city black schools, like Manual High in Five Points. In the 1967 school year, John
F. Kennedy High School in the southern corner of the city and ninety-nine percent white,
was included in the LOE program. Within months, Kennedy was filled to capacity with
twenty-nine white students taking every open seat available. Similarly, Manual High
School reached seventy percent black and twenty percent Hispanic at the end of the 19661967 school year. When Manual was announced an LOE school, thirty-nine black
students and eight Chicanos enrolled. Cole Junior High, neighbor and feeder to Manual
was fifty-nine percent black, and received twenty-seven new black students in 1967.
Elementary schools recorded similar numbers, with the almost all-white schools enrolling
white students from out of variance.249 Parents in Denver, particularly white and black
parents who advocated for desegregation found these numbers alarming. With each year,
it seemed the racial makeup of each school became more and more saturated with one
type of race. Even with LOE, desegregation was not happening normally and students
were not seeing any benefits to their education.250 Lauren Watson observed, “White kids,
who were even poorer… were getting on Student Council, being placed in advanced
classes.” White teachers he stated, “had very low expectations” of black students.251 In a
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pamphlet meant to educate Denver parents on the perils of segregation, PHAC blamed
LOE for being a disguise for white flight. LOE, they stated was a way for “white parents
to move their children freely to the nearest all-white school” as soon as black children
enrolled.252
By the late 1960s, schools across the nation were experiencing disruptions. The
reasons for this were complex and interwoven. In some cases, black and white students
struggled to get along in new environments, as school desegregation became a trend
across the country. In others, black and Chicano students began to explore resistance
strategies as they were unconvinced of the benefits of desegregation. At a high school in
New Jersey, white students boycotted for days claiming that they were victims of
hostility, harassment, abuse, from the more than one thousand black students who
attended their Trenton school. At the same time, black students at another school in New
Jersey boycotted to protest the replacement of a faculty advisor for their black student
union. Meanwhile, Boston’s busing crisis was a central topic in Denver newspapers
throughout the 1960s, and during the LOE era, as white policymakers attempted to warn
the community about the potential conflicts that might result from cross-district busing.253
Denver students participating in LOE felt this disillusionment. Those requesting
transfers through the LOE system were required to fill out an application, and though
their requests were usually met, pupils experienced anxiety over where they might be
placed. Those students who were granted admittance to schools outside of their
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neighborhood faced the burden of transportation. Relying on parents and public
transportation, LOE students found that their commute to and from school each day could
be disruptive.254 Woodie Smith was a black high school student in Denver in the mid1960s. He attended Mullen High School, a selective private white school that opened its
doors only to talented athletes, but considered itself a participant in LOE. Woodie was a
four-letter athlete who grew up in Denver’s all-black Lincoln Park housing project. He
remembered, “We were sort of that first group of kids that were being brought in from all
parts of the city. But, yeah. The kids that were, the majority of the kids were white and
upper-class.” Woodie’s mother had arranged for him to attend Mullen after he completed
ninth grade at a Catholic school. “All of my friends from Saint Elizabeth’s were heading
to West High School. I thought for sure that’s where I am going to be, and my mother
said “absolutely not. You’re not going to West High School.” He continued, “We had not
really talked about this, but somehow, she finagled a way for me to go to Mullen High
School.” When the school year began in 1964, Woodie found himself in a unique
conflict. His mother worked two jobs, leaving him to get to school, but he lacked a
driver’s license and car, and as the oldest child he did not have a sibling to rely on for
transportation. Under LOE, Woodie could attend any school with open availability, but
he was responsible for his own transportation. Woodie found ways to get to Mullen,
which was too far away to walk. Many days he took the public bus, leaving hours before
the school day began and returning after dinner. Once he established himself at Mullen
and made friends, Woodie realized that people were willing to help him get to school. “I
was fortunate because there were some other kids at Mullen, Hispanic kids that took me
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under their wings. Sometimes they’d drive me to and from school.”255 The Chicano
students who befriended Woodie lived near him in the West Denver neighborhood, and
were equally out of place at the elite, predominately white Mullen. By making
connections with each other based on neighborhood association, these students of color
and early participants in desegregation found ways to resist prejudice and hostility at their
new school.
Students who did not have neighbors or coaches to take them underwing faced
public scrutiny, especially when it came to their commutes. In the years of LOE,
newspaper coverage about student activity on public transportation became increasingly
negative. Incidents that did not even involve students, but that occurred in proximity to
some of Denver’s schools were covered as though student transfers were the culprit. In
1968, a series of conflicts involving black and white students occurred at George
Washington High School (GWHS). Following an incident involving a white George
Washington student and a black former student that occurred off campus, the high school
and a public bus became scenes of two more related altercations. Police were unable to
explain the reason for what they termed a “critical situation,” but George Washington
nonetheless became a site of activism for black youths in Denver during this time, and its
position as a LOE school helped to establish this.256 Black students attending George
Washington came from one of two perspectives. Either they already attended prior to the
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LOE program and felt a sense of ownership of GWHS, or they chose to attend and felt
out of place upon arrival at their new school.
At the time, the school board used national census language. They lumped all
students of Asian or Mexican descent into the “nonwhite” or “other” category and, when
convenient, categorizing them as “white”. Preoccupied for the time being with black
students, the board primarily ignored Denver’s Hispanic population. For the most part,
however, few Chicano students participated in LOE at this time. In 1963, Alex Martinez
attended Cole Junior High. He took the bus from the Elyria barrio, a predominately
Hispanic neighborhood north of the Denver Coliseum. Alex, who had grown up walking
just a few blocks to school until seventh grade, found the bus commonplace, but
nonetheless intimidating. “They provided the bus,” he remembered, but “a few years
later, Denver went into mandatory busing.”257 Mexicano students like Alex, who did
elect to attend schools across district shared similar experiences to those of the black
students who were bused to GWHS. In the first three years of LOE, the Hispanic
population within DPS grew 21.1 percent. Though Chicanos originally made up a smaller
fraction of the school district’s demographic than blacks, their numbers grew at a faster
rate. Just as specific elementary and secondary schools had large proportions of black
students, certain schools in Denver were dominated by Hispanic students. Baker Junior
High School, for example, had the largest population of “Spanish-surnamed” students in
1967, with eighty-three percent of the students Chicano. Likewise, West High School and
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Manual High School had substantial Mexican-American numbers, with thirty-six percent
and twenty percent Hispanic, respectively.258
The few Chicano students who took part in LOE did so in ways similar to black
students. They typically requested transfers to schools with already significant
proportions of Chicano students. In 1967, eight Hispanic students were granted
enrollment at Manual, and twenty-one were moved to George Washington. Fourteen
Chicanos moved to West High under LOE. At the elementary level, many statistics
demonstrated that it was even more common for Hispanic students to transfer to schools
with large Hispanic populations. Crofton Elementary with over half its population
Hispanic approved nineteen Chicano transfers. These numbers, alongside the similar facts
about black transfers led the school board and SSC to consider LOE a failure. school
board vice president A. Edgar Benton stated that the practice “had limited success in
alleviating segregation,” as it seemed that students mostly requested transfers to schools
that already had racial imbalances.259 Alex, for example, chose to attend Cole Junior High
School, even though the school was proven to be overcrowded and underfunded. Most
Mexicano students from his neighborhood chose Cole, despite their opportunities to go to
other schools participating in LOE. By 1969, it seemed that LOE had only helped to
facilitate segregation, instead of distributing pupils throughout DPS, particularly
regarding Chicano students. “At all levels,” the DPS ethnic census indicated, “the
district’s 19,821 Hispano pupils are in majority-Hispano schools.” The report
summarized that when black and Hispanic students were combined in significant
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numbers at schools like Barrett Elementary, Park Hill Elementary, Smiley Junior High,
Cole Junior High, and Manual High, those schools were then “less than half Anglo.”260
LOE was a common attempt throughout the Southwest, as school boards
responded to parent concern and mounting pressure from the community to equalize
education. It was, however, not successful for any of the parties involved. Mexican
Americans in particular found many problems with LOE, and school transfers in
general.261 Mexicano students often cited a “cultural distance” at school, sensing that they
were removed from their support systems when attending public schools, since there was
little interaction between teachers and family members. Sometimes well-meaning
teachers and administrators attempted to respond to this concern, but the impact was
often “condescending” and hurtful to Chicano students and parents.262 Furthermore, LOE
did not eradicate the language and cultural barriers that Mexicano students faced.
Throughout school districts, teachers were untrained and ill-prepared to teach and
evaluate Spanish-speaking students. In fact, these are two reasons why so many Hispanic
students participating in LOE chose to attend schools with significant preexisting
Mexicano populations. A closer proximity to other Hispanic students helped some to feel
a connection to school, and the few Spanish-speaking teachers who were employed by
DPS tended to be assigned to schools like Cole and Manual High.263
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Regardless, the discussion about educational equality, LOE, and the future of
Denver schools created tensions among Chicano students and parents over the course of
the early 1960s. Since the conversation tended to be about black students, white students,
and the racial makeup of black and white schools, Denver’s population of Hispanic
students were often ignored. However, Chicano parents and students identified their own
set of issues regarding education and the future of DPS. Though Mexicanos did not
necessarily face the same kind of housing and employment discrimination that blacks did
in the 1960s, they nonetheless were less educated and employed at lower rates than
Denver’s blacks.264 Like blacks, Mexicanos faced segregation in all aspects of their lives.
They recognized nationally that they were denied access to housing, education, and
employment opportunities, and that all three were interrelated. In Denver, as in other
northern and western cities, Mexicanos and blacks both faced this “multiplicity of
structural forces” that denied them access and perpetuated a cycle of inequality.265 As
blacks and Chicanos continued to develop strategies within the freedom struggle,
education maintained a central project for both groups.
Yet Mexicanos felt differently about how to achieve educational equality. They
referred to their neighborhoods in central and north Denver as “the barrio,” though they
shared much of the space with blacks, who most often referred to the specific
neighborhood, Five Points. Even though they shared space and lived within a few blocks
of each other, communities of kids remained isolated for the most part, until junior high.
When Alex Martinez got on the bus to Cole in 1963, he knew the kids from his street, but
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at the next stop, a group of strangers boarded. “It was a very small neighborhood. He
added, “At our [elementary] school, 5th and 6th grade were combined. There were
probably 30 or 40 kids, maybe, in that combined. So there was [sic] just a handful of us,
really.” The bus stop was a few streets down, in the Swansea neighborhood, where black
children, new to Alex and his friends, waited for the bus as well. “I think we knew some
of those kids, but not really,” he remembered.266 Mexicanos recognized that their barrio
schools were among the oldest, many had been built before 1900 and lacked cafeterias,
gymnasiums, and other amenities. They experienced what the SSC report had pointed
out; their neighborhood schools like Elyria Elementary where Alex had attended, had the
highest teacher turnover rates and therefore the most inexperienced faculty and staff.267
Finally, Mexicanos in Denver moved around the city, though not as dramatically as
Mexican Americans moved in other western cities. Denver Chicanos moved “not to the
suburbs or to the middle class areas.” They moved to what professor Daniel T. Valdes
called the “grey areas of the city” in far west and north Denver. These “pockets” of
communities formed in isolation from other groups, causing Hispanic children to be
segregated within the schools they attended, to an extreme effect.268 Therefore, Mexicano
students only participated in LOE if it meant attending schools with a higher
concentration of like-minded Hispanic students.
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Chicanos in Denver ultimately did not believe that desegregation would be
enough. They recognized that desegregation brought about some benefits, as DPS began
to provide better resources for Chicano students in the mid-1960s, including reference
materials on Mexican American peoples. Yet LOE only represented one potential option
without many benefits to the Chicano population in Denver. Ultimately, desegregation in
general did not win them over. Valdes argued that the assumption that integration was the
answer simply went “against the overwhelming evidence that shows that no one racial or
ethnic group is innately superior to another.” Many Mexicanos believed that large-scale,
structural change was necessary and would not be accomplished through pupil
distribution. Valdes wrote, “There must be a conscious policy, backed by the citizens of
Denver, backed by brains and money to bring the ghetto and barrio school to a level
above that of the best schools.” Valdes believed that the barrio schools must become the
most competitive among DPS schools in order to give poor, Chicano, and black children
a chance to make significant change beyond school age.269 LOE was simply not the
answer.
To add further complication, LOE students were not always greeted warmly at
their new schools. White parents in particularly feared that LOE was a symbolic root for
the future of “forced busing.” Busing to them represented a loss of local neighborhood
control, and the threat of intruding black and Mexicano students. These parents tended to
assume that barrio and ghetto schools failed because of the large populations of minority
students. They did not acknowledge the disproportionate resources allocated to majority
white schools, and refused to consider that racism played a part. The great speed at which
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Denver schools’ demographics shifted added a sense of urgency for these parents. LOE
then signaled another encroachment of black and Chicano students, which caused white
parents to react in dramatic ways.270 White parents and researchers alike blamed blacks
for creating a climate of de facto segregation that ultimately impacted all racial
minorities. In a report to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, a Denver committee
submitted a claim that “even though schools and colleges are integrated, there is de facto
segregation because of a high concentration of Negroes in certain neighborhoods.”271
Spanish-surnamed students, the report indicated, were merely caught up in this trend.
Mainstream news outlets, like The Rocky Mountain News and The Denver Post
took pains to categorize conservative white parents into a neutral, homogenous mass.
Parents who resisted LOE and the threat of busing tended to so anonymously or with the
support of a large group simply identified as “white parents” in the press. Whites were
uncomfortable with openly aligning themselves with overt racist strategies and
organizations. More common, instead, was an underlying and covert approach to white
supremacy in the Mile High City. Conservative white parents and activists for
neighborhood schools resisted LOE and the threat of school desegregation. These parents
denounced the SSC’s findings, claiming that all of their suggestions created a system of
“special treatment” for minority students. “Ironically,” scoffed one critic, these were the
same people who once wanted the school board to stop tracking race demographics.272
Fearing busing, white parents began to mobilize in the mid-1960s in order to create an
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organized response to desegregation. These parents, many of whom moved away from
the east Denver neighborhoods only a few years prior, felt it was their right to maintain
racial imbalances in the schools their children attended.
Meanwhile, white progressives publicly boasted friendly race relations, but
powerful politicians and personalities worked together to create a management system
that benefited whites and limited opportunities for blacks and Chicanos. Members of the
school board made administrative decisions influencing the public schools using this very
strategy throughout the 1960s. Therefore, blacks and Chicanos faced racist strategies
from multiple angles. As racism and intimidation persisted, and Denver’s demographics
shifted by 1965, black and Chicano families began to voice concerns about the benefits of
desegregation. LOE was never, in the opinions of many, a solution to the systematic and
structural racism that permeated the Denver Public School system.

Manual, Old, New, and Under Attack
The fire that destroyed Old Manual in 1953 symbolized the end of an era for
Denver blacks and Chicanos, but it was just the beginning of Manual’s significance. The
first students to attend New Manual were among some of the most politically active and
vocal blacks and Mexicanos. In 1958, Wilma Gerdine became her sophomore class’s
student council president. She worked closely with “head boy” Norman Rice. Manual’s
“head boy” and “head girl” were considered co-presidents of the school and thus were
visible leaders during their year-long appointment. Norman and Wilma recognized that
New Manual lacked the resources that other schools had, but they felt a “sense of pride”
that only came from attending Manual High. After they graduated, both Norman and
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Wilma attributed their leadership training to the early foundations set at Manual High.
Norman went on to break racial barriers, becoming the Seattle’s first black mayor in
1989. Wilma was among the few blacks elected to the Colorado House of
Representatives, and in 1991 she was renamed the Mile High City’s first lady when her
husband became Denver’s first black mayor.273
Norman and Wilma attended New Manual just a few years after it opened, and
they helped to reestablish a sense of pride and leadership among the school’s black and
Chicano students. However, Manual remained a problematic school for DPS. Students
and parents both noticed that their school lacked highly trained teachers in many subjects,
and though it was a fairly new building, Manual’s resources left much to be desired.
Much like Cole Junior High, Manual received hand-me-down books and desks from
other schools, and it was obvious that students of color were channeled into the school,
while white students attended East High more readily. The community was ready for a
change.
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CHAPTER 4
“Born of a Revolution”: Community Control Efforts, 1966-1974
Blacks for Community Control, 1966
Some of the most vocal black leaders in Denver believed that problems in the
school system could be resolved with community control. Hiawatha Davis Jr. was among
those not convinced that desegregation was the answer. He was born April 30th, 1944 and
attended Denver Public Schools in the Five Points neighborhood. He graduated from
Manual High School in 1962, and was a proud alumnus of the city’s second oldest high
school. Davis saw from a young age the benefits of black-led education within the black
community. Because of this, Davis chose to remain in Denver, where he served his city
for his entire adult life.274
While attending college at the University of Colorado (CU) in nearby Boulder,
Hiawatha began to consider and embrace the central concepts of black power and the
New Left. Davis studied economics at CU from 1962-1966, and this was era of campus
unrest in Boulder. Many college students at the university participated in New Left
demonstrations, antiwar protests, and consciousness-raising events. It was at CU where
Davis first learned of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and its
belief in racial separatism.275 Like SNCC and Stokely Carmicheal, whom he admired,
Hiawatha also aligned with the New Left, and took a decidedly antiwar stance, as the
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Vietnam War continued to preoccupy conversations on campus.276 Before he graduated
from CU, Davis dropped out and moved to San Francisco to work with the AfroAmerican Unity organization. Within the year, Davis was drafted to the Vietnam War.
His friends remembered this was a turning point for Hiawatha. This, they believed, was
the moment he became an activist. Instead of reporting for duty, Hiawatha refused. Many
expected him to flee to Canada, but he chose to remain in San Francisco and fight the
draft.277 He was convicted in 1967 and sentenced to two years in prison. After he was
released from prison, Hiawatha moved back to Denver in 1971. He had become critical of
the Denver black community’s lack of progress and the failed attempts to resolve poverty
and crime among blacks in his hometown. Denver welcomed him back, and he remained
a political figure until his death in 2000.278
Though his draft resistance was a public indication of his new radicalism,
Hiawatha had experimented with activism long before be moved to San Francisco. When
he was still a college sophomore, formed the Committee for an Educational Plan for East
Denver (CEPED). He created the group, inspired by the national progress of black power,
racial separation, and community control strategies.279 Over the course of the early 1960s,
black and white parents in Denver discussed how to create an equitable education system
in the city, but Davis took issue with the concepts of desegregation. Davis recruited Jerry
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Campbell, fellow Manual High School alum to serve as the committee’s spokesperson
while Hiawatha was in Boulder. Jerry and Hiawatha chose first to use the Denver media
to their advantage. They crafted a statement to the Denver press, indicating that black
parents planned to seek community control of the Five Points schools. Knowing that this
radical language would generate heat, the two devised a vague plan and refused to offer
too much information at first. However cloudy and distorted their solution might have
been, the CEPED’s list of problems within the Denver Public Schools (DPS) were made
clear in the statement. Campbell, who spoke to the Denver Post cited “teacher turnover,”
school board “indifference” to black children, “old and inadequate” resources, and a
system that has “left the crumbs to the kids” in the Five Points neighborhood, including
Manual High School, Cole Junior High School, and many of the feeder elementary
schools like Barrett and Traylor.280
Hiawatha Davis, Jerry Campbell, and the CEPED struck a chord with Denver’s
blacks, but also white liberals who viewed desegregation as the only manageable solution
to a city with shifting demographics. The CEPED’s controversial albeit shrouded plan
garnered press attention from 1967-1969. Moreover, these strategies became a significant
part of the educational equality model for both blacks and Chicanos in Denver, despite
the attention afforded to desegregation efforts.

Youth Activism, and Alternatives to Desegregation
In 1968, some of the loudest voices in Denver’s educational equality movements
were arguing the merits of desegregation, or “mandated busing.” However, black students
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and parents alike considered the benefits of community control in education. By this
point, the school board already faced criticism from the NAACP, the Urban League, and
local committees for creating and managing a segregated school system. Some of the
parents and students involved believed that integration was “fine,” but not enough to
create longstanding change. At a school board meeting on September 19th, 1968, twohundred parents and students demanded a variety of solutions, some of which included
community control. Joel Polk, the president of Cole Junior High’s Parent Teacher
Association (PTA) presented a list of demands to the school board regarding the
wellbeing of Cole students. Polk, on behalf of the PTA admonished the board for taking
too long to make decisions. “If these demands are to be studied for another twenty
years… we, the parents and teachers are asking that Cole Junior High be closed.” Polk
and the Cole PTA preferred, however, that the school board invest a significant amount
of money into Cole to develop teaching training, to eliminate fees, and to improve the
physical conditions of the junior high. Cole, according to Polk, was twenty years behind
in curriculum, but improved education could be achieved at the historically black school,
without needing to turn to busing as the solution. Cole teachers believed that the school
would “grow and improve,” with school board support. The PTA thought solutions could
be made with community investment in Cole, without the involvement of outside
students and teachers. A group of Manual High School students agreed. These students
advocated for Cole and Manual both, arguing that “they prefer segregation under present
conditions” to desegregation of schools.281 These students saw busing as a “band aid
where radical surgery is necessary” and believed they would benefit most from a
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community controlled system where black leaders, teachers, and parents could oversee
their own schools.282
Black parents also considered the responses from white parents throughout the
desegregation discussion from 1968-1970. In addition, the school board had a record of
ignoring black demands to be involved, and this legacy of exclusion served only to make
parents more skeptical. They had only past experience from which to draw. As evidenced
by the failure of LOE, the NAACP 1962 report, and the SSC’s report in 1964, DPS could
not be trusted to create equality in the city’s schools. When parents pointed out
systematic failures and examples of racism, DPS made false promises. Even when
national and local groups researched the history of these failures, DPS hid behind new
construction, adjusted boundaries, and finally LOE. In the failure of LOE, black parents
in particular recognized concerning features of desegregation. To them, it seemed too
good to be true. “I didn’t see teachers reaching out to them,” remembered Judy Barnett,
who was a student teacher at Hill Middle School in Park Hill. Black students who
participated in LOE, recalled Barnett, were expected to catch up, since it was a voluntary
opportunity. “It was like, ‘OK! You wanted to be here.’ That was their thinking,” though
the teachers knew the students were “forced to come” by their parents. Barnett added,
“They were like, ‘Get on board, even though you’re four years behind in your reading
scores.” Barnett remembered that the climate at Hill was either “sink or swim.” She
ended, that black students participating in LOE were not given the attention or tools to
succeed. “Because it became a self-fulfilling prophecy, you know? ‘If they can’t keep up,
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they don’t belong here.’”283 The students who had participated in early LOE efforts
learned from experience that desegregation was more work than it was worth, and that
black students shouldered the burden more than anyone else in the city.
Organizations of black parents publicized the sacrifices they would make in the
name of desegregation. Jerry Campbell and the CEPED voiced these concerns in a school
board meeting on October 16, 1969. Campbell stated that “white America is a racist
society,” and he argued that white teachers within the public education system were
direct examples of this institutionalized racism. Busing, Campbell argued, would only
allocate more funds to a system that has already failed. In addition, the parents who
belonged to the CEPED refused to encourage desegregation, which would only remove
black students from their community and “local interests.”284
Not all black parents in Denver believed that the school system was tragically
flawed with racism. Those who remained skeptical of integration, however, explained
their rationale using descriptions of individual, vague examples of discrimination. These
parents referred to a “lack of understanding” among whites about black children, and a
“feeling” of not being wanted. Mrs. George Williams, a black mother whose son was
bused to Hill Junior High in 1969 described this sense. “It wasn’t something that was
expressed,” she stated, explaining that Denver’s openly hostile whites were not the only
problem. Instead, Williams and others believed that “patronizers and hypocrites” were
equally threatening to their black students. Williams continued, “You don’t have to be hit
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over the head to know you’re not wanted.”285 Parents worried less about the quality of
education and more about how white parents in particular would respond to the presence
of black students. Social implications of integrated schools seemed the most
controversial, in the eyes of these black parents. Though white parents who favored
neighborhood schools often used logistics, finances, and location as their talking points,
they nonetheless remained cautious regarding interracial friendships and dating. A black
parent who supported integration stated that white parents “see themselves threatened by
integration in more ways than one. They’re afraid it just might work. Now that’s ugly.”286
“The white community always had neighborhood schools; now the black
community wants its own schools,” Campbell stated. Campbell and CEPED, which was
made up mostly of black parents from the Five Points area were “tired of waiting” for the
school board to begrudgingly come to a decision about Cole, as well as Barrett and
Whittier Elementary Schools in East Denver. CEPED demanded a law that distributed tax
dollars equally across the city, so that blacks could create their own school board and hire
a local black superintendent. “We want to control the entire system in our area,”
Campbell stated. The CEPED plan promised not to interfere with voluntary busing, but
indicated that black students would ultimately choose to attend their own neighborhood
schools; much like white students preferred their home schools.287
A few months later, CEPED invited members of the school board to attend a
special session meeting to hear a plan for community control. The board refused for a few
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days, but eventually responded to “heavy pressure from the black community” to hear the
CEPED’s message. Jerry Campbell again assumed spokesman responsibility at the
meeting, held at Manual High School on October 16, 1969. Campbell outlined the
CEPED’s demands after first rehashing his widely heard disdain for mandatory busing.
Campbell had been a vocal critic of desegregation for months, arguing that school
integration would only further disenfranchise black children. In contrast, the CEPED plan
included the fates of Manual High, Cole Junior, Barrett, and Whittier Elementary
Schools, and began with an election of a nine-member all black community school board,
elected by Five Points residents. This board, Campbell explained, would be held to
contractual guidelines established by the black community of parents and students, and
their primary responsibility would be hiring, transferring, reviewing, and approving the
selection of teachers. Since this board was run by residents, black parents and children
affiliated with the schools would also have influence in the selection of teachers. The
CEPED’s plan included an outline for how the community board would solicit funds,
oversee development of school facilities, and interactions with the Denver Public School
Board. If the CEPED plan were implemented, DPS would collect taxes from all Denver
residents, and equally distribute them “to all schools in the city on a per pupil basis.”
Thus, CEPED would manage a substantial amount of money, since Manual, Cole,
Whittier, and Barrett had large populations of students.288 Ultimately, the school board
ignored CEPED’s call for a response and by November 1969 it seemed the call was
forgotten.
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From its early history, Five Points gave rise to voices of nonconformity, as black
leaders, parents and children preferred instead to develop plans for community control in
Denver. Community entities like churches and social organizations embraced self-help as
central to their missions. The Shorter AME church was home to many of Denver’s black
leaders. “Shorter,” as they called it, was organized in 1868 and maintained omnipresence
in the black community over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
church changed locations five times from its first site in a log cabin on 19th and what is
now Market Street. Having survived white opposition, vandalism, a fire set by the Ku
Klux Klan in 1925, and interference from the Denver Urban Renewal Authority,
Shorter’s congregation remained dedicated to self-help and community involvement.289
The Shorter congregation and leadership, from as early as 1868, was an authority for
black community in Denver, and its efforts increased throughout the postwar period. In
1962, the church successfully financed and oversaw the construction of forty-two
affordable housing apartments for Denver’s blacks.290
This desire for community influence stretched from Shorter to local groups of
parents who wanted to establish control in their neighborhood schools. Cole Junior High
remained an ideological battleground as desegregationists and community control
advocates used the school as its site for potential solutions. Cole’s disproportionate black
population, its centrality in the Five Points neighborhood, as well as the overcrowded
conditions and outdated resources provided parents with a unique pet project. While
many advocated for desegregation, others argued that community control would be the
289
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best way to go. M.C. Davis, who taught at Cole believed that the school would “grow and
improve” with improved programs directed toward black and Hispanic students.291
Community control, however, went beyond strategies and plans presented in
official school board meetings. Both black and Hispanic groups managed to create
effective educational community control. Blacks, in particular, had the successes of the
Black Panther Party (BPP) as inspiration. Lauren Watson was born in 1940 and grew up
in San Francisco, California. When he was ten years old, Watson and his family moved to
Denver. Watson’s family background and his emotional connection to the burgeoning
black power organization forming in Oakland combined to make him a radical at an early
age. Watson first spoke out against racial discrimination when he was still in school,
earning him the reputation of “troublemaker” before he graduated from Manual in 1957.
After high school, Watson became a full-time activist, organizing anti-war protests and
coordinating for the “Poor People’s Campaign” in 1967. Though he was a polarizing
force in Denver, Watson was respected for his sometimes effective efforts to collaborate
with the NAACP, CORE, the Urban League, and other national offices in the city.292
During the late 1960s, however, Watson struggled to set roots. He traveled back and forth
to California, often claiming he was visiting BPP headquarters. Furthermore, Watson was
in and out of jail throughout the 1960s and 1970s, so most of his local and national legacy
is tied to arrests and trials. His relationship to the national organization remains
ambiguous, yet Watson contributed a commentary about community control of schools in
Denver to the Black Panther, the BPP’s newspaper in 1969. In his brief article Watson
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described the “racist school board elections” that occurred in May 1969, and eluded to
the Denver BPP plan to “decentralize the school system and to institute community
control in our area.” Watson echoed Panther vernacular writing that community control
would create a sense of freedom by returning school control to “the hands of the people,”
since “black people can never realize this freedom and power by attempting to integrate
themselves into a decadent capitalistic and racist society.”293 Using the examles of
community control successes in Oakland, Watson developed a list of requirements for
Denver’s black-dominated schools. This list included community-led black history
courses and free and reduced lunches.
Implementing this plan, however, proved to be difficult for Watson. Instead of
waiting for the school board to respond to CEPED proposals, Watson and members of the
Denver BPP attempted to create community control through force at Cole and Manual for
the 1968-1969 school year. Their first action was to picket the entrance to Cole Junior
High during the first few weeks of classes in 1968. As they were approaching Cole on the
first day, black students were met by black men in their late teens and early twenties who
urged them to turn around and head home. Though historian Frederick Watson writes in
his dissertation on Denver’s school desegregation movement, “There was never a large
organized opposition to school desegregation within the black community,” nearly two
hundred students joined the Panther’s boycott which lasted for more than two weeks of
the school year.294 When the boycott ended, the Panthers had established influence over
Cole’s administration and student body.
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Youth protesting reached an apex a year later, when on January 9th 1969, four
black Cole students and one from Manual attacked a teacher’s car in the parking lot. The
students, who were loosely affiliated with the Denver BPP were arrested, and as a result,
the administration hired an undercover police officer to patrol the halls of Cole Junior
High.295 Parents and students were outraged by the principal’s reaction, and the BPP
organized another boycott in response. From January 16th to January 26th, seven hundred
students refused to enter the school and some picketed the Cole entrance alongside the
Black Panthers and Lauren Watson. Two events on January 26th signaled the end of the
boycott. First, the school board succumbed to BPP pressure and fired Philip Sarafini, the
white principal of Cole Junior High. In his place, the board appointed George Morrison
Jr., a local black teacher who was well respected and connected in the Five Points
community. Morrison hired Maceo Broadnax, who was also a longtime Five Points
resident, as his assistant principal. Together, the two men had nearly thirty-five years of
experience teaching in the black community and both felt connected to Cole’s students
and parents.296 Almost immediately, Morrison and Broadnax embraced some of the
BPP’s original plans, though they were reluctant to publicly state support for anything
other than desegregation. The two black principals encouraged community involvement,
inviting parents to personal conferences and requiring students who had discipline
problems to meet with their families and the involved teachers or students at the school.
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The most widely acknowledged change occurred under the Morrison and Broadnax
leadership, when Cole began to offer black history courses.297
These black students, who came of age in the late 1960s were members of a “new
generation of black activists” who attacked white supremacy from new perspectives.
Historian William H. Chafe writes that “young blacks seemed intent on overturning”
language and dialogue that had once been dictated by white leaders who “exerted
ultimate control” of racial relations.298 Nationwide, Black Panthers and student-led
organizations mobilized to embrace youth activism. This radicalization of students helped
to shape school reforms from the grassroots level in a multitude of cities. In Greensboro
in 1969, student protestors helped to shape a new dialogue with the Chamber of
Commerce and created a “new interracial alliance” for the first time in North Carolina.299
Likewise, in Grand Rapids, Michigan, black students organized to defy the school board
and their school’s dress and grooming code. In what Todd Robinson called the “mustache
saga,” black students walked out, and gained national attention when their efforts
“articulated black student concerns about school policy, [and] explained the cultural
meaning of facial hair in the black community…” Most significantly, Robinson points
out, student activism in Grand Rapids resulted in student voices finally being considered
in town and educational policy discussions.300
Though Cole, Manual, and other predominately black schools remained under the
jurisdiction of the Denver Public Schools, the legacy of community control endured as
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one triumph of educational equality in the Mile High City. Because of CEPED and Black
Panther attempts, the influence of black churches and leaders on the Five Points
neighborhood in particular, and the incorporation of community control techniques by
mainstream leaders, specific aspects became pieces of the fabric that makeup the Denver
saga. These efforts, though primarily grassroots inspired and locally influential, mirror
the national story of community control and its overarching benefits.
In many ways, community control efforts in Denver and across the country drew
on the contentious history of segregated education. In a time when desegregation was the
most widely accepted answer to education inequality, many black parents considered the
benefits of black-only education for their children. Well documented by Vanessa Siddle
Walker, the legacy of segregated schools in the rural South can be applied to Denver’s
very different system. As Walker demonstrates, black rural schools like the Caswell
County Training School (CCTS) in North Carolina successfully operated within a
network of parents, students, community leaders, and educators. The teachers and
administrators at CCTS were neighbors to their students, friends with the school’s
parents, and valuable role models for black children. These teachers were powerful
members of their Piedmont, N.C. community and helped to create a sense of respect and
prestige regarding CCTS and the power of education.301
While Denver’s school environment in 1968 differed greatly from that of
Walker’s subject in rural North Carolina prior to 1954, many of the points made in Their
Highest Potential can provide a framework with which to view the impact of community
control, even in the urban West. The elementary schools in East Denver, including
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Mitchell, Whittier, and Barrett were intentionally segregated, just as Cole and Manual
were throughout the postwar period. By 1968, when activism for community control
reached its peak in the black community, many of the benefits outlined by Walker could
be interpreted through the most publicized efforts in Denver. First, community control
advocates like Jerry Campbell and Lauren Watson valued the influence of community
collaboration in creating behavioral and academic standards for school children. Parents
and teachers sought opportunities to work together for the benefit of their children,
despite growing inertia for the promise that desegregation would resolve everything.
Secondly, the disproportionate presence of black teachers and administrators in blackdominated schools was considered a benefit to community control advocates, not a
downfall. These black community members were influential leaders, mentors to young
children and representative of the importance of education. These teachers also helped to
develop a sense of racial identity and pride among their students, which many believed
could not be accomplished in a desegregated school. This power assigned to them was
revered in Five Points and Park Hill alike, and their prominence in the community was
always valued.302
In 1971, twenty-one black teachers and administrators formed the Black
Education Advisory Committee (BEAC). The BEAC was made up of men and women,
educators and parents who planned to make recommendations to the already existing
Black Educators United (BEU) and the school board. Their mission incorporated many of
the calls made by community control advocates in the years prior. The BEAC sought to
improve education to “make it relevant” to black children, increase collaboration among
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schools and black community members, create activities that would enhance “schoolcommunity relations” and “interpret and expose the needs of the black community.” The
BEAC also planned to improve attendance and disciplinary policies, particularly
regarding black children attending desegregated schools.303
After 1968, the BEAC, teachers and administrators from Cole and Manual, as
well as the neighborhood schools, attempted to employ parent and teacher collaboration,
as emphasized in the community control efforts of both the BPP and CEDEP. Four years
prior, in 1964, Reverend L. Sylvester Odom, of Shorter AME pointed out that Denver
blacks were isolated and segregated in the schools; despite a Colorado law governing
separation. Odom stated, “There may not be laws promoting segregation in Denver, but
by dozens of other devious ways, the Negro in Denver is set apart from the rest of the
community—through inferior schools…”304 Odom joined a group of disgruntled parents,
teachers, and children to call for more black teachers to be hired in his community’s
schools. Rachel Noel, the pioneer of desegregation in Denver claimed in the same tone
that the only professional working in the schools was the janitor. Noel, Odom and others
argued that Denver black students would benefit most by learning from black teachers
and role models.305 This call for black leadership in the schools continued through the
1960s. Between the years of 1965 and 1968, the ratio of black teachers at Cole and other
predominately black schools increased. The school board claimed this decision was due
to public requests, and it was in direct opposition to the Special Study Committee’s
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(SSC) 1964 recommendation to assign “minority teachers throughout the system.”306 The
Deputy Superintendent justified this decision by stating many black parents felt “black
teachers are indispensable in black schools.”307 The school board’s stance on this,
however embraced as it may have been by the more overshadowed community control
movement, would eventually lead to legal retaliation by desegregationists.
Teachers at Cole and Manual felt a connection to parents and their students.
Parents, in turn, relied on close relationships with their neighborhood schools in order to
maintain influence over their children and their communities. Through their relationships
with teachers and school leaders, parents influenced the curriculum and behavioral
standards. In addition, teachers and administrators developed learning criteria based on
community issues and needs recognized by their specific pupils. Under the CEDEP
strategy, teachers would be directly accountable to the community, and the curriculum
would be made to reflect local interests. Though the CEDEP was not successful in their
1969 bid, Cole and Manual teachers nonetheless developed activities and lessons that
encouraged citizenship and local community involvement.
The 1969 meeting at Manual was one of the first public opportunities that black
and Hispanic activists had to identify their similar attempts at community control. After
Campbell finished outlining the CEPED plan, former state representative and Denver
local Frank Anaya stood to address the crowd and the school board. Anaya, a member of
the Platte Valley Action Center was involved in local efforts to hold the board
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accountable for their mistreatment of Mexicano students. Anaya warned the school board
that the “Hispano community is moving in the same direction and is now in the process
of developing opinions that will have impact on the schools.”308 Anaya and Campbell’s
separate statements demonstrate a larger theme that defined black and Mexicano
education equality activism in the late 1960s. While blacks and Chicanos used similar
platforms and created analogous plans for educational equality in terms of community
control, they rarely collaborated in public settings. Their strategies no doubt influenced
each other, but the information remained isolated in presentation, despite the fact that
they had comparable ideas and they were discussing the same areas and schools.309
Denver’s community control and the BPP captured national attention in 1970,
when National Educational Television broadcasted a four-part special with the intent to
inform Americans about the judicial process. The court case featured was The City and
County of Denver v. Lauren R. Watson. Watson, who faced charges of “resisting arrest”
and “interfering with a police officer,” consented to the documentation and broadcast of
his case. Watson and his defense lawyer remained confident throughout the case, and
Time magazine criticized them both for being “too cocky and slick.” Despite this, and the
obvious disdain police officers had for Watson, the case ended with all charges dropped.
Watson, in an interview following the acquittal stated, “There is no justice for blacks in
America.”310 Watson’s arrest and the subsequent publicized trial inspired a trend among
black and Chicano youths in the Denver area. These students, many of whom attended
308

“Teacher Jobs Explained,” Rocky Mountain News 20 July 1969: 3

309

Moran, Rocky Mountain News, 4.

310

“Television: Courtroom Drama.” Time Magazine in Partnership with CNN. 30 March 1970.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942249,00.html. Last accessed 27 April 2010.

135

Manual or Denver’s Metropolitan State College rallied around Watson and his message,
embracing his radical stance, and demanding improvements in the community and the
education system. In addition, these students made public their new perspectives on racial
identity, and the disenfranchisement of blacks and Mexicanos through systematic
organizations like politics and education. Though their frustration called for separation
and community control, which did not fully come to fruition for Denver blacks at this
time, they nonetheless helped to create a standard of community collaboration in the
neighborhood schools.311
In 1971, a survey of seventy-eight teachers and nearly eight hundred Manual
students uncovered that while “ghetto schools” are disadvantaged, the overwhelming
majority of pupils “were proud of school.”312 Perhaps most significantly, Manual, Cole,
and the black and Chicano network to which they belonged, influenced generations of
students to absorb pride, strength, and community outreach as aspects of their racial
identities. Blacks and Chicanos in Denver were proud that their heritage was represented
in these public schools. Those advocating for school desegregation did so without
intending to forsake the legacy of accomplishments embodied at Manual, Cole, and
Elementary. They instead anticipated that desegregation would occur both in white
schools as well as black and Chicano schools. Throughout the 1960s, their focus was on
how black, white, and Chicano students would benefit from desegregation. However, by
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1971, efforts for community control served to remind blacks and Chicanos of what was to
be lost through school desegregation.

Romanticism and Wrath: Corky Gonzales, the “West High Blowouts,” and
Chicanos for Community Control
Chicanos were equally unconvinced of the intended benefits busing promised to
provide. The assumption remained that they were ambivalent or apathetic, but instead
they purposefully withdrew from the pro-busing conversation.313 Hispanic parents
assumed busing would benefit the black community, and perhaps only nominally
improve their children’s experiences.314 Corky Gonzales, in particular defied the assumed
profits of desegregation. “The American educational system,” he stated in a speech at
Claremont College in 1969, “is a cookie-cutting machine.” He added that nationalism
was the only way for Chicanos to succeed in all aspects of life; collective economic,
political, educational, and social power, and the need was urgent.315 Corky’s message
rejected assimilation, claiming Mexicanos “don’t want to be ‘accepted’ or ‘integrated.’”
Instead, he believed, “They want to be recognized as an important, indigenous part of the
Southwest.”316 Corky’s separatist message convinced even moderate Chicano leaders
who previously had not aligned themselves with the Crusade for Justice. Bernard Valdez,
who ran for the Denver School Board in in the late 1960s on a neighborhood schools
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platform, challenged assumptions that all minorities wanted integration and those against
busing were racist white parents. Valdez’s successful bid for school board echoed
Corky’s “misgivings” about integration, agreeing that desegregation would be an
“instrument of equality for the black community.” According to Valdez, school
integration was a human relations campaign that would do little to “improve education,”
or help Hispanic students.317
The movement for community control among Denver Chicanos gained national
attention in 1968. Inspired by Sal Castro and the East L.A. blowouts, Gonzales and his
compatriots began brainstorming a district-wide walkout of Denver’s Public Schools.
Corky was a Colorado native, and a 1944 graduate of Manual High.318 From his own
memories of the Denver barrio, Corky drew inspiration for a more militant, separatist
approach to civil rights in his hometown and the American Southwest. Moreover, his
experiences at a Denver Public School provided Corky with a first-hand account of
racism that Chicano students faced daily. His time as a student taught him, “To forget
Spanish, to forget my heritage, to forget who I was.”319 In 1968, Corky believed that little
had changed in Denver’s Public Schools. Chicano students came to Corky with issues
similar to his time in the Denver schools. In 1969, Corky helped to orchestrate another
walkout of one of Denver’s High Schools when he led nearly a hundred students in a
three-day boycott of West High School, after students complained that teachers were
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racist and the administration refused to acknowledge Mexican-American history.320
Chicano students were appeased for a short time, but DPS nonetheless continued to fail
Chicanos. In 1969, the dropout rate for Chicanos was above seventy percent. The 1968
and 1969 blowouts were a response to the Chicano struggle with the Denver public
education system, and a refusal to accept high dropout rates and disappointing statistics.
Corky Gonzales and members of his Chicano rights organization, the Crusade for Justice
created a program to train and indoctrinate young Chicano students in nationalism and
self-reliance during the height of educational equality movements in Denver.
“Corky” was born Rodolfo Gonzales, the youngest of eight children who were
raised by their single father.321 Corky split his time growing up in the Denver barrio and
the Colorado sugar beet fields, giving him a unique combination of rural and urban
experiences that helped him to relate to a variety of Chicano youths. After graduating
high school and leaving college, Corky began competing as a boxer, choosing to remain
in the amateur ranks and acting as his own manager. Corky’s commitment to the more
“honorable reward of local, state, and national pride” in place of money and glory that
was affiliated with professional boxing won him the trust of Chicano men across the
country during and following his boxing career.322 His young age, and his background as
a former boxer endeared him to younger, more radical audiences while still preserving his
machismo. Corky’s unique roots “distinguished him” as an urban Chicano who related to
youths from Denver, L.A., and other cities. Additionally, Corky’s speeches and
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publications blended romanticism and wrath, which matched the moods of thousands still
searching for their voices, and made him the “leading apostle of the Chicano movement”
by 1969.323 He was fond of saying, “Five loose fingers by themselves are nothing…But
bring them together and you have a fist.”324
In 1969 Corky Gonzales became the “unofficial ideologist of the movement,”
when he and the Crusade for Justice hosted the First National Youth Liberation
Conference. Over three thousand young Chicanos traveled by “car, bus, or jalopy” to
learn about their heritage, voice their frustrations, and find their front man.325 At the time,
the youth movement was “full of energy but seemingly without direction.” Youths across
the Southwest with varying demands and personalities were in search of a leader. Corky’s
regional speaking engagements and boxing career had already earned him the adoration
of Chicanos youths, mostly due to his controversial and persuasive persona. By
demanding involvement from teens and college students, and urging Chicanos to resist
integration, Corky continued to personify el movimiento during the Conference. “The
young people were turned on by Corky,” stated nineteen-year-old Jorge Licon of Pamona
College in 1969. “Not only because he talks of revolution, but because he is beholden to
no one. Mexican American leaders talk … Corky acts.”326 Denverites likened Corky to
Cesar Chavez and Martin Luther King Jr., despite the very different approaches of these
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three men. In 1993, Sharon Vigil of Denver’s Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
remembered her relationships with the two Chicano leaders as though they were
inseparable. “Cesar Chavez and Corky Gonzales both built up my awareness of my
community as well as my understanding of how important it is to become involved.”327
However, members of the Crusade for Justice scoffed at the comparisons. “Gonzales,”
wrote Crusade member Ernesto B. Vigil, “was not guided by spiritual pacifism. He
entertained no notions of redeeming the souls of those he viewed as oppressors.” Vigil
continued that Gonzales saw Chavez as a labor organizer and King as a “martyr, but his
own nationalist politics and sentiments were closer to those of the assassinated Malcolm
X.”328
If he was once the unofficial spokesman, Corky’s publication of Yo Soy Joaquin
established him as one of the most significant leaders of el movimiento for a variety of
reasons. Most importantly, he created a name for what we now know as the Chicano
movement. Written in 1967 it was in wide circulation by 1969, and the epic poem was a
unique “blend of compassion and anger, idealism and realism,” which combined Corky’s
magnetic speaking presence with the longevity of the written word.329 Joaquin identified
the most significant issues facing Chicanos across the country, and reached an audience
of over 100,000 within four years of its publication.330 Education, language, identity,
racism, and self-hatred were among the many themes Gonzales lamented and spoke to
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Chicanos across the country from college students and professors to field workers and
teen moms.331 Joaquin asserted a name and a voice for both Corky and the movement he
helped to lead. When combined with his personal and professional background, Corky’s
public anger in the words of Joaquin about American integration related to a generation
of Chicano activists. Through the eyes of Joaquin, Corky sought to educate Chicanos
about the mistreatment and oppression that defined their existence in America. Corky
believed that no revolution could happen without Chicanos first becoming aware and
incensed about their need for change. By first identifying the common issues among all
Chicanos, Corky’s manifesto then called for a national movement that “…comes first out
of the family, then into tribalism, and then into alliances that are necessary to lift the
burden of all suppressed humanity.”332
Corky helped to convince Denver Chicanos that equality could only be achieved
if nationalism was placed at the center of Hispanic Education. The then unnamed La
Escuela Tlatelolco quickly became his pet project as it symbolized this very approach. It
would be more than just a place for Chicano students and Chicano dropouts to go to
school. Corky wrote it would be an, “applied philosophy, a Chicano creation in the
struggle to preserve and augment La Raza de Bronce and our home, Aztlán.”333 The
American education system, he argued, provided some “individual economic power for
some Chicanos,” but La Escuela Tlatelolco would create “collective or group Chicano
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power” based on familial connections to the school.334 La Escuela represented a new
venture founded on the central tenets of the Crusade for Justice and Chicano activism.
“Back then,” Corky remembered, “I couldn’t think past the next day.” As they were
developing plans and collecting money for the school, Corky remained idealistic. He
said, “Nobody can know what’s going to happen. But we’re determined to make
something happen; we can. And when we get the people involved, we can build a family
and succeed.”335
Despite his magnetic personality and compelling determination, Corky was
nonetheless a singular actor in a shared process for educational equality. La Escuela was
a both a brainchild of Corky’s and a product of collective youth activism in Denver,
following the Youth Liberation Conference in 1969.336 During the 1969 Conference,
Chicano teens and college students joined forces with the Crusade for Justice to create
three mission statements of the Chicano movement. El Plan Espiritual de Aztlan, The
Statement of the Revolutionary Caucus, and The Brotherhood of Chicano Students each
emphasized revolution, independence, and racial and ethnic solidarity among Chicanos of
varying locations and classes. El Plan Espiritual most significantly acknowledged a
rejection of Anglo ideals and a turn toward self-reliance and isolation. The Chicano
organizations of Brown Berets, Third World Liberation Front, and United Mexican
American Students (UMAS) joined with more tenuous groups like the self-named “batos
locos,” young barrio “toughs” to create this plan for ideological independence. El Plan
334
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Espiritual called for a five-state walkout of all public schools on September 16th, Mexican
Independence Day as a symbol of “ethnic nationalism” and the development of a selfsustaining educational system for Chicanos.337
Immediately following the Youth Liberation Conference in 1969, Chicanos
organized the Summer Freedom School. A hundred and fifty Mexicanos, ranging in age
from four to eighteen attended courses held at the Crusade for Justice headquarters. The
effort involved the entire Denver Chicano community, as Crusade activists recruited
certified teachers and educated parents to teach courses on history, folklore, music, and
political affairs.338 In an open forum and throughout the weeks of instruction, Mexicano
students voiced frustrations about their public school system that echoed similar
complaints at the Liberation Conference. Chicano youths felt displaced in Denver’s
schools, citing that teachers seemed unprepared and disinterested in working with
Mexicanos, who had a specific set of unique needs.339 In contrast, the Freedom School
experimented with “team teaching” and “built-in progression.” In this format, students
learned from more than one instructor in each subject, and then conducted extensive
background research to investigate controversies and nuances in the material.340 The
Freedom School was so successful that Chicano children clamored for more opportunities
to learn in this fashion. When registration opened for the second summer Freedom School
in 1970, enrollment nearly doubled to three hundred students, and the faculty expanded to
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include university professors from California and Mexico.341 It was clear from the
success of the Freedom Schools, and the issues posed by students regarding public
education in Denver, that La Escuela Tlatelolco was the solution to a list of problems
facing the Chicano in the Mile High City. The Freedom School provided a successful
model for education centered on nationalism and collective identity. Moreover, two
successful summer schools created a strong community of instructors, donors, and
attentive students who would ensure success at La Escuela in the fall of 1970.
La Escuela, Corky argued, should stand in stark contrast to DPS which seemed
unconcerned that Chicano students were “lagging behind other students.”342When
Crusade activists were successful with the Freedom School and boycotts protesting
public education in Denver, they set out to further defend their spiritual and physical
independence by opening the La Escuela. The school opened in 1970 to nearly threehundred students in the Crusade for Justice Headquarters in Denver.343 The building,
formerly the Calvary Baptist Church was purchased by Corky for $86,000 in the summer
of 1968 and used for various projects until La Escuela became the focus.344 The widely
publicized mission of La Escuela was to “liberate the mind, heart and spirit of students

341

Ibid., 173.

342

“Interview; Nita Gonzales, president and chief executive of nonprofit Escuela Tlatelolco in
Denver, A family tradition empowers kids to learn cultural pride.” Denver Post, 20 July 2008: K2.
343

Conflicting reports indicate an unclear number of students who enrolled. I chose to use the
more conservative number. In the days following Corky’s death, obituaries claimed up to three hundred
students enrolled in the first year at La Escuela Tlatelolco. Elizabeth Aguilera and Bianca Prieto, “For 35
Years, the school founded by the late Corky Gonzales has been a beacon for Chicanos: Activist’s passion
lives on.” Denver Post, 23 June 2005: B01.; “Interview: Nita Gonzales, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Nonprofit Escuela Tlatelolco in Denver: A Family Tradition Empowers Kids to Learn Cultural
Pride,” Denver Post, 20 July 2008: K2.
344

Vigil, The Crusade for Justice, 68.; Richard Vasquez, “Sandals in the Snow: Chicanos Gather
for Liberation Meeting,” Los Angeles Times 28 March 1970.

145

through cultural expression, moral courage, and honorable behavior.” Named for the
ancient Aztec center of education and fine arts, La Escuela Tlatelolco represented more
than academic proficiency. Students attending La Escuela would develop cultural pride,
confidence, leadership, and activism.345 Students were encouraged to take ownership of
their own education by being self-directed and autonomous in their learning process. The
school’s mission emphasized social justice and activism, and promoted the role education
played in liberating an oppressed people.346 By leaving public schools, Chicano students
in Denver, like those in Los Angeles., demonstrated racial solidarity and a refusal to
conform. The Denver West High blowouts in 1968 and 1969 were the first step for
Chicano youths to demand improved education. When they helped to develop the
Summer Freedom Schools, they established an ideal model, and when Chicanos opened
La Escuela in October of 1970, they set the tone for how educational equality could be
achieved on their own terms.
La Escuela was one of the first Chicanocentric schools of its kind to be founded
by leaders of the Chicano movement. Community member Pierre Jimenez remarked that
the focus was always on “…giving our kids a quality education in a setting that celebrates
who they are.” He continued, “The school was born of a revolution, and it’s going a long
way in revolutionizing the way Chicano children receive an education.”347 Much like
similar approaches, schools such as this were characterized by the common vision held
among Chicano activists to create programs alternative to historically disappointing
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public schools.348 One thing that distinguished La Escuela from the public schools was its
emphasis on community and parental involvement. Parental involvement is one of the
reasons the school was so successful and continues to perform in the 21st century. As
stated in a 1999 news report about La Escuela, “They welcome, encourage, or require
parental involvement and parents with children in successful schools respond by being
active in their children’s education.” 349 From its emerging stages, parents and teachers
worked together to establish a curriculum standards for La Escuela. These architects
valued concepts of homeland, heritage, and community control as well as an emphasis on
the Spanish language as central to the curriculum. Corky’s daughter, Nita, who went on
to become the principal and CEO of La Escuela remembered in 1999, “…Everyone was
staff whether you were a cook or a janitor. There was a concilio that you all participated
in every week… and you made decisions about plans and how the school would
evolve.”350 Parents and students worked with Corky to develop a bilingual curriculum,
intending to create cohesion between school and home. In addition, these parents
developed heritage courses to counteract what Crusade activists called “a lack of ethnic
identity” among Chicanos attending public schools. Parents exchanged Chicano Studies
in the place of American History and traditional English courses, and students
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experienced an “enlightening” change from Anglocentric instruction.351 This
commitment continued throughout the school’s history, despite physical and financial
challenges faced by the personnel. In the winter of 1972, the school’s heating system
failed, and teachers encouraged students to stay home. Instead, parents and children
returned to the school, braving the snow and cold in order to not allow their education to
be interrupted.352
Significant numbers of blacks and Chicanos in Denver predicted that
desegregation was not going to solve educational inequality. Many of them—though
silenced by outspoken integrationists—were already voicing concerns about what Derrick
Bell later called a “dangerous” and “traumatic” potential fate for minorities bused into
white schools.353 They had seen or participated in Limited Open Enrollment with
lackluster results. Many black students experienced or feared alienation and harassment
in the white schools, and desegregation promised to send black and Chicano students out
of their comfort zones and far away from home.

Community Control Perseveres: blacks and Chicanos, 1970
In the fall of 1969, Chicano and black students were constantly inundated with
images of activism. Their local leaders and a national climate of student engagement
inspired many to take action. On October 7th, 1969 North High School, the relatively
inactive campus in Denver dominated by white and Mexicano students became a new
351
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source of campus unrest. Nine students; Manual Rocky Hernandez, Daniel Manuel
Martinez, Pat Ulibarri, Frank Luevana, Ronnie Freyta, Dan Pedraza, Louis A. Martinez,
Juan “Jerry” Trujillo, and Bill Cordova were suspended from school for protesting the
dress code. The nine boys “intentionally” disrupted North High School when they arrived
at school wearing black berets.354 They chose the berets as a “symbol of power,” but the
North High administration considered it an “invasion on the rights of others.”355 Teachers
notified Principal Pete Shannon that the Hispanic teens were “talking in loud voices and
from time to time shouting ‘Chicano Power’ during passing periods.” Shannon heard that
the boys were blocking students in the hallways, intimidating teachers, and attempting to
create a climate of fear in his school.356 Without consulting their parents, Shannon
suspended all nine boys for a total of twenty days.357 The boys sought legal assistance
from attorney Ed Kahn, who filed suit against the school board and Pete Shannon. Kahn
claimed that twenty days was an unreasonably long period to suspend the students, and
that it was an infringement on the students’ constitutional rights for free speech. Kahn
also argued that in 1969 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that students had the protected
right to demonstrate a “political belief.”358 In a short hearing in which the judge only
heard testimony from Principal Shannon, the U.S. District court upheld the suspension,
stating that twenty days was “not unreasonable,” and that the students did not have
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constitutional rights if their behaviors challenged the “welfare, safety, or morals of other
pupils.”359
Though the boys lost their appeal, they made an impact at North High. A year
after the controversy of their suspension died down, a group of Hispanic athletes at North
High boycotted the school’s football team. The students formed their own Chicano-only
football team, called “The Challengers.” While North High’s administration quickly
squashed the team, they nonetheless embraced a spirit of isolation and competition within
their public schools. These Chicano youths, like those who attended La Escuela or the
black student at Manual who boycotted school, advocated for community control despite
the fervor surrounding their district regarding desegregation.360
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CHAPTER 5
By Means “No Less Effective”: Fighting Segregation in Denver’s Schools, 1966-1974
Manual’s Contested Legacy
In the words of the Denver Post, the Manual High school of the late 1960s was a
haven for criminals and deadbeats. “More students could be found wandering the halls
than in the classrooms,” an article recalled in 1975.361 “The smell of marijuana grew
stronger and stronger as the day wore on,” the school struggled with attendance and
discipline problems, and despite the “ambitious” teachers and students, the high school
was in trouble. The general consensus seemed that Manual was a wasteland, but to hear
students and teachers tell it, the papers got it wrong. In 1970, researchers from the
American Association of School Administrators conducted a survey of Manual’s parents,
teachers, and educators that only added to the school’s declining reputation. Researchers
found that students at Manual felt they were pigeon-holed into the “ghetto school” and
that the rest of the district hoped they would eventually become depressed and commit
“psychological suicide.” Despite this assumption, the nearly 800 students surveyed
indicated they were “proud of their school” and they were determined to succeed and
prove DPS wrong.362
Manual’s teachers and students revered the community and heritage that was the
lifeblood of their school, but that didn’t stop the rest of the city from turning their noses
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down at what they called a “ghetto school.” In the middle of a cold February night in
1969, vandals broke into the DPS bus barn” and detonated two bombs. The explosions
damaged twenty-three school buses, sending a message that some Denverites would
vandalize school property, create thousands of dollars of damage to buses bought with
tax-payer money, and risk injury rather than support district busing of white children to
black schools, like Manual.363 Less than a year later, another fifteen buses were
demolished in a likeminded incident at the bus barn. Years of parent complaints, protests
and boycotts, community control efforts, and research on race in DPS culminated at the
turn of the decade as parents, teachers, administrators, politicians, activists, and students
struggled to define and create education equality in Denver. The 1960s started with the
opening of Barrett Elementary, and ended with the anonymous destruction of school
property. In the years leading up to the Keyes v. Denver Public school District No. 1, the
school board and the district, as well as the community, went under substantial changes
that would alter the city of Denver forever.

Controversies and Compromises: The Denver School Board, 1960s
In 1963, a seat on the school board became available when board member Frank
Taylor died unexpectedly. Faced with the unanticipated opening, the board considered
potential Denver locals to appoint in Taylor’s stead. Rachel Noel was one of the first
suggestions they considered. Noel was heavily involved in board activity, having taken
the lead on many of the Special Study Committee’s responsibilities. She was invested in
the wellbeing of the district’s schools, and she enjoyed considerable support from her
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neighbors. However in 1963, Superintendent Oberholtzer and the more conservative
board members were not in favor of making history by selecting the city’s first black
person to serve on the school board. The seat remained vacant for nearly six months
while the board debated. Without a seventh member, they continually deadlocked in a 3-3
vote over the future of the open seat. Eventually, the board chose tradition over
innovation when they appointed Robert McCollum, a businessman, former city
councilman, and the vice-chancellor of the University of Denver to the seventh seat.364
Rachel Noel did not have to wait long to make history. In 1965, Noel’s
community elected her to the school board. She was the first black person on the school
board, and the first black woman elected to public office in Colorado. Noel, an advocate
of desegregation, was elected alongside James Voorhees and Dr. John Amasse, both
labeled as “sympathetic” to minority students. Along with A. Edgar Benton who
previously called himself the “lone civil rights liberal,” this new class of school board
members revolutionized the board in ways that reverberated throughout the twentieth
century in Denver.365
Within her first months in office, Noel began making plans to hasten the school
board’s slow response to desegregation. DPS had just initiated limited open enrollment
(LOE), and Noel criticized the still unbalanced demographics in the city’s schools. Park
Hill Elementary was 63% white and 37% black, while nearby Stedman was nearly 90%
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black and Barrett was still 98% black.366 Noel spent her first two years on the school
board visiting every DPS site and diligently tracking pupil demographics. She
collaborated with teachers, parents, and administrators to survey the status of educational
equality in the Mile High City. With this research, she then initiated a series of reforms
for the public schools, particularly elementary schools in and near Park Hill. Her
experience with the school board and the Special Study Committee (SSC) as well as the
months she spent studying school demographics provided Noel with the research
necessary to substantiate her proposals.
Noel’s first order of business was to propose that Policy 5100, which passed in
1964 on the advice of her SSC, not only established limited open enrollment (LOE), but
also included a board-approved desire to decrease segregation. Policy 5100 recognized
the “concentration of some minority racial and ethnic groups in some schools” due to the
“continuation of neighborhood schools” as a district-wide practice.367 Noel indicated that
by passing Policy 5100, the school board admitted the need for a plan to eliminate racial
segregation. In response, the board reinstated the SSC, and appointed new researchers to
what they titled “The Berge Study Committee.” Attorney William Berge served as the
chairman, and previous SSC member Bernie Valdez was the vice-chairman. After
conducting a year of research practically identical to the original SSC’s work, the Berge
Study presented a final report in 1967 that mimicked the 1964 report.368 However,
William Berge did not support busing. Instead, he declared in his 1967 report that DPS
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should simply stop construction on new developments until a consensus could be met, but
avoid “mandatory desegregation” and honor the traditions of neighborhood schools. Yet
Noel and her liberal allies now had two school board sponsored reports that called for a
“plan… to reduce the concentrations of minority pupils.”369 She got to work writing such
a plan.
On an anti-busing platform and backed by “Republican money,” William Berge
was elected to the school board in 1967. He and fellow newcomer Stephen Knight
claimed they were dissatisfied with the liberal directions the board was taking and hoped
to put an end to efforts to fully desegregate DPS.370 That same year, the school board
made an unconvincing show of requesting tax payer support for a bond issue that would
implement chosen aspects of the 1964 and 1967 study committee reports. When citizens
voted against the measure in a three two one margin, it was the first time a public schools
bond issue had failed since 1938. Voters indicated that lack of board investment, and also
the fear “over integration aspects” within the school board’s recommendations had
dissuaded them from supporting the measure.371
Amid the heated elections and the failed bond measure, Superintendent
Oberholtzer announced he would not renew his contract in July 1967. Publicly he simply
stated he was ready for retirement, but critics and some of his confidantes indicated that
he was pessimistic about the future of Denver’s schools. In twenty years, he had watched
the school board transform from a comfortable cocoon of trusted colleagues and friends
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to a politicized, volatile collection of frustrated strangers.372 In a discussion of
Oberholtzer’s leadership style, historian Patricia Ann Shikes writes of his decision to
retire, “Finally, several of his colleagues recall feeling, at the time, that Oberholtzer was
astute enough to realize there were going to be rough times ahead.”373 When he retired,
Oberholtzer left the decision regarding his replacement to a board now dominated by
anti-desegregationist conservatives. They selected Dr. Robert Gilberts, a “young
superintendent of the Madison, Wisconsin Public Schools.” Gilberts was optimistic,
relatively inexperienced, and unlike Oberholtzer, willing to step aside and let the board
make major decisions without interfering.374
Rachel Noel recognized an opportunity when it presented itself. Gilberts was
fairly green; he had little experience with desegregation and multiethnic school districts,
and he was willing to take direction from the school board. In 1968, Noel introduced
what is now called the “Noel Resolutions,” a series of demands instructing Gilberts to
develop a plan for integration by the fall semester in 1968. Resolution 1490, or the “Noel
Resolutions” called for a decrease in minority pupils at inner-city schools, an “equality of
educational program” in all city schools, system-wide acceptance of diversity and
integration, “human relations and sensitivity training” for all school personnel, and active
community involvement.375
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Conservative white parents were quick to protest “busing” or “reversed busing,”
and Noel believed that the school board had been too attentive to these “undefined fears.”
She blamed the school board for creating a culture of distrust by first enacting racist
measures (she cited “the approval of a major high school construction…” in an all-black
neighborhood) along with the board’s “voluntary support” of racist parents and their
complaints.376 Thus 1490 included eleven potential strategies that the Superintendent
should use when considering his plan. The first was the highly controversial method of
busing, which Noel wrote should be “voluntary or mandatory,” depending on the
neighborhood in question. However, the following ten points included propositions that
had little to do with busing. Noel suggested the “development of ‘magnet’ or ‘laboratory’
schools,” as well as a “form of extended school year,” improved facilities and materials,
and courses in minority “…cultural, historical, social and economic contributions to our
society…”377
The biggest deterrents to the Noel Resolutions proved to be her fellow school
board members. Her colleagues on the board remained dedicated to stalling on any calls
for desegregation. They ignored the SSC’s findings and attempted to postpone voting on
the Noel Resolutions. Other issues provided timely distractions. The board instead
became entrapped in another local bond issue that determined the fate of fifteen schools
that would be incorporated into the city. Meanwhile, white parents grew increasingly
frustrated with the potential consequences of the Noel Resolutions. Immediately after
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Noel proposed 1490, various organizations of parents began planning protests.378 These
protests came from multiple perspectives. The first to resist were white school board
members who avoided making a decision upon Noel’s submission. Initially, the school
board postponed voting on the Noel Resolutions, and parents mobilized to agitate. The
school board rescheduled immediately following Noel’s April, 1968 presentation. If
passed, the Noel Resolutions would require that Superintendent Gilberts create a
comprehensive integration plan that would take effect by the start of the 1968 school
year. In the face of this potential quick action, the school board voted on April 25, 1968
to table the Noel’s Resolutions. They needed more time, the motion indicated, to review,
as well as the definitions and benefits of integration.379 White conservative parents took
advantage of this delay.
Conservative white parents were not the only voices of dissent, but they made the
loudest impact with their protests. Immediately following the April 25th board vote, white
parents in Denver mobilized to show their disdain for a district desegregation program.
At first, most of these protestors focused on issues like costs and logistics associated with
busing. “We felt our students were being used,” stated one mother who worried that
desegregation was more of a problem than a solution.380 These parents preferred
neighborhood schools because, according to them, their children were easily accessible
and within walking distance of home. “Forced busing,” they argued, would create
unnecessary costs for Denver tax payers, and would ultimately not benefit any
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students.381 These arguments laid the foundation for what would later infiltrate the
educational equality movement in Denver. Though resistant white parents argued using
the language of cost and location in order to protest against desegregation, their thinly
veiled racist claims were revealed later as the discussion became more intense.
Despite the distractions, the school board voted on the Noel Resolutions on May
16, 1968. The Resolutions passed with five in favor and two against. Noel and fellow
liberal A. Edgar Benton were joined by three moderate board members, while two vocal
opponents William Berge and Stephen Knight voted “nay.”382 In passing the Resolutions,
however, the school board did not necessarily support “forced busing.” Instead, their vote
indicated that Superintendent Gilberts was now responsible for creating a plan that would
integrate Denver’s students without creating too much controversy or cost for Denver’s
parents.
Berge and Knight were more committed to preserving segregation and advancing
opportunities for white students than they were complying with the Noel Resolutions.
Hoping for a scapegoat, they assumed Gilberts would draft a plan that would address all
measures in the Noel Resolutions without including busing in the plan. Gilberts spent the
summer creating his strategy, which he presented to the Denver school board and tax
payers in September, 1968. He titled the giant document Planning Quality Education: A
Proposal for Integrating the Denver schools, but it was quickly nicknamed “Gilbert’s
Plan” or “the cluster plan.” 383 To the disgust of white conservative parents including
381

Denver Post, 16 May 1968.

382

Watson, “Removing the Barricades,” 99.

383

Robert Gilberts, Planning Quality Education: A Proposal for Integrating the Denver Public
Schools (Denver, Colorado: 1968).

159

William Berge and Stephen Knight, Gilberts proposed busing nearly 3,000 black and
Hispanic pupils from “inner city elementary, junior high, and high schools” to
predominately white neighborhood schools under proposals 1520, 1521, and 1534. 384
Gilbert’s proposals took into consideration similar attempts in America’s cities, and
followed a 1967 suggestion made by the school board’s hired consultant on education.
Dr. Thomas F. Pettigrew’s report to the board indicated DPS should implement
“educational parks,” drawing students from all urban areas and ethnic backgrounds.385
Gilberts, using this design, sought to appease both desegregationists and proponents for
neighborhood schools by extending voluntary open enrollment and developing programs
that would attract white and black students to the same schools. Under the Gilberts Plan,
predominately black elementary and junior high schools would host special reading,
counseling, and academic programs, as well as adult-education classes after hours. The
cluster plan also sought to adjust junior high sub-district boundaries, to redistribute black
students from Hill Junior High to Smiley Junior High. Manual High school would
become Denver’s first public college preparatory academy, working in connection with
Denver University to benefit students bound for higher education, and increase
opportunities for Five Points youths. LOE would continue to serve as the main
integrating agent for black and white children, but Gilberts believed that the advanced
programs in Five Points and Park Hill schools would interest whites enough to send their
students to Cole, Manual, and other predominately black schools. Denver parents on all
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sides of the debate were displeased. By attempting to strike a balance and avoid
alienating any group, Gilberts had made everyone unhappy with his neutral approach.386
White conservative parents for neighborhood schools were vocal in their
complaints. Remaining proponents of neighborhood schools, these Denverites attempted
to squelch any suggestions for integration by first arguing about the costs of busing,
suggesting improvements at all neighborhood schools, and finally threatening to impeach
members of the school board. A loosely organized group who called themselves members
of the “silent majority” founded the Coalition Steering Committee (CSC). They
organized petitions that demanded the school board stop any busing plans. These parents
blamed the school board for “selling out” and refusing to represent the true desires of
Denver’s citizens. The CSC argued that the board was interfering with personal rights
and privileges afforded to all Americans, and made racist claims that desegregated
schools would lead to violence. In a meeting with the school board, white parents
demanded to hear plans to protect white students from bodily harm, should open
enrollment lead to a more final “forced busing” plan.387 Leading the CSC was James
Perrill, a white proponent of neighborhood schools. Perrill spoke up at this January 16th
meeting, demanding that the board focus their resources on improving neighborhood
schools “where students live,” and avoid “intolerable” busing.388 Perrill later announced
his candidacy for the 1969 school board election. The Montclair PTA joined in the
critique. Their biggest complaint regarded plans to adjust boundaries at Hill Junior High,
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which would ultimately result in their white children attending the majority black Smiley
Junior. Members of the PTA announced they would move to impeach all school board
members who voted to support the Gilberts Plan.389
The first of three cluster resolutions was passed in November, 1968. This first part
increased the number of spaces available to senior and junior high students requesting a
voluntary transfer under LOE.390 Berge, Knight, and the CSC complained that increased
busing would create a burden of cost, so the resolution was amended to include the
requirement that students requesting a transfer would need to arrange for his own
transportation. Moreover, when passed, the Gilberts Plan would take nearly two years to
be complete, since students would be bused in waves over the course of the following
two school years.391 Disdain from parents contributed greatly to the delay. The Gilberts
Plan did little to appease any of the parents and activists involved. In January, the
Representative Council of the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA) publicly
challenged the cluster program. These teachers, including president Robert Gould of
Denver, voted in favor of a “stronger integration plan.” They were supportive,
“commending Gilberts for his courage in proposing racial balance at Smiley… and East
High School…” but they were nonetheless unsatisfied.392 By March of 1969, the board
voted to partially implement the Gilberts Plan for school integration. Since the cluster

389

390

Moran, “Montclair Unit Opposes Busing Plan,” Rocky Mountain News 4 February 1969: 5.
“Meet Requirement of school Busing Program,” Denver Post 23 January 1969.

391

“Here’s how Busing would alter Schools,” Denver Post 17 January 1969: 4.; “The School Plan
for Racial Balancing” Denver Post 10 December 1968.
392

“DCTA Asks for Stronger Plan for Integration,” Denver Post 23 January 1969.

162

program did little to please parents on either side of the debate, the school board’s vote
angered nearly everyone involved.
Not all critics excused Gilberts from blame. Noel acknowledged that 1520, 1521,
and 1524 attempted to create “concrete measures to alleviate school segregation in Park
Hill…” but partial integration was not enough.393 Black and white desegregationists
joined Noel in their frustration. The plan was too slow and not radical enough. The
biggest problem they identified, along with the rate of pace the plan demanded, was the
lack of attention given to integrating children in the lower elementary grades. Though
cluster schools would create centralized spaces for white and black students to interact,
the majority of the integrating efforts under the Gilberts plan were focused on junior and
high school students. Jules Mondschein, a white parent in Park Hill offered, “The
Gilberts plan appears to be a step toward integration, but it’s ten times more important to
desegregate the grade schools.”394 Jerry Campbell, the black radical parent who
advocated for community control added to the critiques. He stated, “We don’t want any
more words. Time has run out.”395
Amid the controversy, two school board seats were up for election. Noel later
recalled that the voting lines were “obviously racial” in the 1969 election. Nine
candidates ran for two positions and in April 1969, the entire city was enraptured by the
school board election. Two of the four most significant candidates were incumbent A.
Edgar Benton and newcomer Monte Pascoe, who ran together on a pro-busing ticket, and
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publicly supported Superintendent Gilberts. Benton and Pascoe were supported by the
Democratic Party, despite the fact that Allegra Saunders ran for reelection as a Democrat.
Republicans James Perrill and Frank Southworth, who also shared a ticket were opposed
to any and all desegregationist plans, and boasted neighborhood schools programs
through their candidacy. Perrill was an active anti-busing activist, and Southworth had
previously served as a state senator. The four candidates together received over 94% of
the public vote, with the five other candidates practically ignored.396
Perrill and Southworth were elected in May, 1969. The majority of those who
voted for them were white, anti-busing parents from the same neighborhoods as the two
winners.397 Most white parents, even those in neighborhoods not affected by the
desegregation plans, tended to vote for Perrill and Southworth, so the neighborhood
schools ticket won by a landslide. Perrill and Southworth began their first meeting on
June 9th, 1969 by proposing Resolution 1533, which rescinded the entire Gilberts plan.398
The board, now heavily influenced by conservative voices, voted five to two in
agreement with 1533.399
Middle class black parents and the liberal whites who wanted desegregation were
not surprised. They were, however, impatient. Having prepared for conflict with the
school board over the course of nearly ten years, the most active blacks in Park Hill had
been working with the NAACP to put together a lawsuit against the school board. Noel
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had spent nearly ten years researching segregation in all of the schools governed by DPS,
but the best examples of racial discrimination still included Barrett Elementary, Cole
Junior High, and Manual High school, all of which were located in Five Points, but had
attendance zones that included Park Hill. Because of this, Noel knew parents and students
from both neighborhoods would have a vested interest in the outcomes of the potential
lawsuit. Looking for support, she turned to the only neighborhood association that existed
between the two communities: The Park Hill Action Committee.
When it was founded in 1960, the Park Hill Action Committee was a white-run,
interdenominational but faith-based organization committed to maintaining a certain
superior élan despite a ban on discriminatory housing policies. In its formation, PHAC
was somewhat unsophisticated and unclear in its mission, attempting to please everyone
in Park Hill. They were neither pro-integrationist, nor in support of black
homeownership. They simply wanted to keep Park Hill elite. Yet over the course of the
decade, PHAC took on a new identity and became one of the leading political
organizations in the fight for school desegregation. Black membership in PHAC went
from non-existent in 1960 to nearly half by 1969. In 1967, PHAC elected its first black
president, Fred Thomas. Suddenly, but not by accident, the Park Hill Action Committee
was front-and-center in the struggle for educational equality in Denver.

School Board Under Fire: The Keyes Trials Begin
On June 19, 1969, eight parents of DPS students filed a joint class action suit
under the name of Wilfred Keyes, a black father living in Park Hill. Wilfred Keyes was a
black father of two girls in the Park Hill neighborhood. Keyes’ daughter Christi attended
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Barrett Elementary in 1969. In late 1968, Keyes was recruited to join the Park Hill Action
Committee (PHAC), which was mobilizing on behalf of the Noel Resolutions and plans
for desegregation. When the school board elections ended with two anti-busing members
elected and the Gilberts plan rescinded, the PHAC was poised for action. Within a month,
they filed suit against the Denver Public Schools, and the Denver school board, including
every individual on the board.400 Wilfred Keyes served as the lead plaintiff for the case.
Keyes was joined by seven additional black and white families.401 The complaint
included a motion for a preliminary injunction with the U.S. District Court and requested
that the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1521, and 1534 (The Gilberts Plan) be declared a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore reversed permanently. Secondly,
the suit requested judgment that declared the schools in Park Hill were in fact segregated
in the DPS system.402
The school board was completely unprepared. There had been threats of a lawsuit
for years, but the legal team rarely took these seriously. The plaintiffs on the other hand –
who claimed to represent black, white, and Hispanic families from Park Hill – had been
working to get the case perfect for years. They selected Gordon Greiner, a relatively
young attorney to represent them.403 Greiner originally shied away from the case, having
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had little experience with civil rights law and a lack of interest in supporting a pro-busing
movement. However, when he considered Rachel Noel’s research and the arguments
made by Park Hill parents and the NAACP, and Greiner decided to join the fight after all.
He did the same in his personal life. Within a few years, Greiner relocated from the
suburbs to Park Hill and sent his son to predominately black Smiley Middle School.404
Greiner set out to prove that the school board intentionally created a dual system, and he
saw Park Hill as the perfect microcosm to demonstrate this fact.405 Greiner’s suit had
eight plaintiffs and almost as many defendants. The primary defendant was Denver
Public School District No.1, often called “DPS” or the “school district” in court
proceedings. Additional defendants included Superintendent Gilberts and all school board
members except Amasse, Voorhees, and Noel.406 The case was assigned to Justice
William Doyle, an Irish-American Denver native whose reputation included descriptions
like “moderate,” “tough,” and “liberal.” One critic considered him “one of the most
liberal of the District Court judges in the nation.”407
Proceedings:
Greiner, Noel, Keyes, and Doyle were just four of the numerous individuals who,
in June of 1969 became entrenched in a vivid and lengthy legal drama that would stretch
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into the 1990s and outlive some of them.408 In the first hearing, Gordon Greiner stated
that segregation and racism in Denver were difficult to define, but impossible to ignore.
Greiner opened with, “No one hangs a ‘for whites-only’ sign on the school house door—
the means are no less effective.”409 Dr. George E. Bardwell testified as the plaintiff’s
expert on city design and census interpretation. Bardwell demonstrated to the judge that
Barrett Elementary had been positioned in order to segregate black children. Colorado
Boulevard, separating Barrett from nearby schools was inconsistent with the other
boundaries in the district. He added that the school board was “deliberately fostering
segregation in schools.”410
Doyle found that the school board was guilty of de jure segregation, based on a
pattern of policies that discriminated against students of color, and a body of evidence
that they were made aware of these practices over the course of the years following
Brown.411 Doyle also made an observation about the differences between de facto and de
jure segregation when he said, “Consequently, I don’t see how you make the difference,
if you came out with the same segregated pattern in the one as related to the other.” He
added he could “see no difference” between “de facto and the de jure segregation.”412 In
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general, Judge Doyle ordered the school board to implement a pupil-transfer plan that
would effectively desegregate all Park Hill schools by the end of the 1969-1970 school
year. Furthermore, Doyle demanded that the school board return to the previous
arrangements made under the Gilberts Plan within ten days.413 White conservative
parents were enraged by the judge’s decision and the potential consequences they faced
as a result of the court case. Anger and frustration seemed to permeate throughout the city
as a result. Very soon after Judge Doyle’s initial ruling, Wilfred Keyes woke up to an
exploding pipe bomb on his front door step. A few days later, a still unidentified arsonist
set fire to the Denver Public schools bus barn. Nearly half of the district’s buses were
destroyed in the fire and a message was sent: Denver anti-busing activists were willing to
go to great extremes.414 Responding to these angry parents, the school board voted to
appeal the judgment. Three members, Rachel Noel, James Voorhees and John Amasse
opposed, but the motion passed.415 The appeal, filed in July also requested a stay, so that
the board could be released from immediate action upon Doyle’s ruling.

Full Trial on the merits ordered, 1969
When the school board filed their appeal to the Tenth District Court, they likely
believed that the return would be worth the cost. Having agreed to spend nearly twenty
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thousand dollars more than budgeted, the appeal was a risk. Instead, they entered into a
legal battle that lasted until 1974 and ended up influencing the entire Denver Public
school system, beyond Park Hill and Five Points. The Appeals Court granted the stay of
Doyle’s ruling on August 27th, 1969 and immediately, Greiner appealed to the Supreme
Court. Three days later, and less than a week before the start of the 1969 school year,
Justice William Brennan from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the stay and
ordered a full trial on the merits.416 Historian Frederick Watson noted, “fifteen years after
the Brown decision… the Court was impatient with the delaying tactics of communities
that opposed desegregation.”417 However, the Denver Public School Board would
continue to employ such tactics for another four years, and long after the U.S. Supreme
Court made its final ruling regarding DPS. School districts across the nation used the
courts and the appeals process to delay integration at every turn, and Denver schools fell
victim to this exact approach.

Protests, 1969
The school board had three days to redraw their attendance lines, in order to
comply with Doyle’s ruling after the stay was reversed. At the time, the only
neighborhood boundaries in question were that of Park Hill, which impacted Five Points,
so the school board arranged transfers within those neighborhoods. Even though some of
the transfers made only a difference of a few blocks, parents were angered at the lack of
notice regarding school assignments. Newspapers published the new boundaries, and
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opening day information on Monday, and the school year began the next day.418 Most of
the transfers affected the area’s junior high schools. George Mathes was the Principal at
the predominately white Hill Junior High in Park Hill in 1969. He was informed just two
days before school started that 550 students from Hill were being transferred to Smiley
Junior further west while 250 black students would leave Smiley and attend Hill. Mathes
knew there would be trouble. The parents hadn’t been given any notice, and he was
unprepared for such a dramatic change at his school. On the first day of classes, about
100 white parents of the students who were transferred to Smiley showed up at Hill,
anyway. They “forced their way” into Mathes’ office and demanded the right to register
their children at Hill. Mathes did his best to calm down the parents, despite angry
accusations that he was a “communist” and part of a “conspiracy.” He told the parents to
take their children to Smiley. Black parents were unhappy, too. Just like the students of
Hill, their children had been given no notice until the final hour. Those who were
transferred lost a connection to their neighborhood schools, just as white students did.
They found themselves in foreign surroundings, seemingly far away from home, and
unwelcome.419 Parents, both black and white picketed the district office, and the specific
schools in question. Though the pickets lasted only a few weeks into the school year, the
community was still rocked by the controversy. For months, Mathes claimed there were
fights, robberies, and “incidents,” at Hill, though he never filed a police report. In
December, the Denver Post catalogued parental concerns about busing and found, that in
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general, parents who listened to “portable police radios” or “inflated” “minor incidents
into atrocities” were motivated by rumors, not fact.420

Full Trial on the Merits ruling, March 1970
The full trial on the merits was scheduled to take place in February 1970. Judge
William Doyle heard the case again. This time, Gordon Greiner and the plaintiffs decided
to expand their claim to include the entire DPS system, beyond Park Hill and Five Points.
Greiner believed this would force Doyle to rule that de jure segregation was system-wide,
beyond selective neighborhoods that had a high concentration of black students.421 Two
witnesses for the defense were called that likely had quite an impact on Judge Doyle’s
ruling. First, James Perrill, the school board member elected in 1968 and one of the two
most vocal opponents of the Noel Resolutions took the stand. Perrill was asked if he
thought the Brown case and rulings applied to Denver. Unsurprisingly, he said no. He
didn’t believe that Brown “related to our situation in Denver” because Colorado did not
have a legal dual system. DPS, he stated was segregated because of racial housing
patterns, not laws and legislation requiring separate but equal. This was a common
argument employed by white parents and policy makers in the North and West.422 The
second witness called was retired Superintendent Kenneth Oberholtzer. Oberholtzer had
stayed out of the busing controversy since he left his post in 1967. However, when he
testified, he provided the court with a lot to consider. Greiner pointed out to the judge and
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Oberholtzer that “mandatory busing” had always existed. Anytime new territories were
annexed or population shifted, the school district had to account for new pupils. Thus,
white students were already bused constantly. Oberholtzer replied that undesirable
conditions in predominately black and Hispanic schools were the fault of the parents, the
students, and the community, not DPS.423 The trial lasted for several weeks, and expert
witnesses, school board members, and DPS teachers were consulted.

Hearings on relief and potential plans, March 21, 1970
Upon judgment on March 21st, 1970, Judge Doyle expanded his ruling to include
two additional schools to the Park Hill and Five Points schools listed in the original
petition. Doyle ruled that “minority schools were inferior and this inferiority was largely
a result of racial isolation.”424 Doyle also found the school board guilty of de jure
segregation. He explained that adopting the Noel Resolutions was a step forward, but
following the 1969 school board election the rescissions of 1520, 1524, and 1531 were
“legislative acts” that perpetuated racial segregation.425 Doyle demanded that the school
board and plaintiffs submit proposals by May 1970 to remedy the inequalities in all
fourteen of the schools listed in his judgment.426 Contrary to reputation, Doyle was not a
complete believer of busing. He stated that “busing isn’t the most desirable means of
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bettering education in the district,” and he remained skeptical of the potential
outcomes.427

Hearings on Relief
While the plaintiffs called expert witnesses from around the country to discuss the
importance of desegregated education, the defense relied on Superintendent Robert
Gilberts as their main witness.428 Both sides argued the merits of integration. On May
21st, 1970 Judge Doyle made another ruling. He concluded that de facto segregation and
de jure segregation, though DPS was guilty of both in many cases, could not be resolved
through the same means. Likewise, he stated that compensatory education programs, and
“choice enrollment” like LOE had already been ruled unconstitutional solutions and
therefore could not be the used to desegregate Denver’s schools.429 He added three more
schools to his initial “core-city” schools under review. These seventeen schools were
selected if they were attended by 70-75 percent either black or Chicano students.
Regarding these seventeen schools and the overall ruling, Doyle stated that the only way
to remedy segregation in DPS was through permanent desegregation and improvements
made to minority schools.430 Teachers and administrators, he ruled, must attend human
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resources training to learn how to “deal” with black and Hispanic students.431 Then,
Doyle made the final blow. He ruled that half of the designated schools be desegregated
by September 1971 and the other half a year later.
On June 16th, 1970, the school board appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Two weeks later, Gordon Greiner did the same, for very
different reasons. First, the plaintiffs decided to seek an increased integration program
that would involve all of DPS. Second, their appeal included an issue with the use of de
facto segregation instead of de jure. The plaintiffs believed that the school district’s
formal boundary drawing was evidence of a formal segregated system. The Appeals
Court, made up of three judges, upheld Doyle’s ruling to integrate the Park Hill schools.
However, they were not as liberal with the rest of the “core city” schools. Both the school
board and the plaintiffs had appealed those issues, so the court had a lot to consider. First,
they found that black and Hispanic teachers had not been segregated within the district,
as the plaintiffs originally cited. Second, they found that the burden of proof was the
plaintiff’s responsibility, and third, they stated that de facto segregation in DPS did not
create an unequal system, and was therefore constitutional.432 When the Court of Appeals
handed down this judgment, the plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Court Control of DPS 1972-1974
It took more than two years for the Supreme Court to rule on the Keyes case. The
hearings began on October 12th, 1972. Gordon Greiner and James M. Natrit, III from the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund argued for the plaintiffs. Attorney William K. Ris of
Denver argued for the defendants. Nearly a year later, the Supreme Court delivered a
twenty-six page ruling, divided into four parts. The first section found errors in Judge
Doyle’s designation of minority schools. They wrote that blacks and Hispanics faced
“identical” discrimination, and Doyle’s distinction between the two was unnecessary.
Secondly, the Supreme Court found that the burden of proof was unjustly assigned to the
plaintiffs. They had proven that segregation existed, primarily in Park Hill, and thus it
was the District Court’s responsibility, not the plaintiffs, to determine if segregation that
existed in Park Hill applied to the entire system. They then took this part further in their
third section, when the Supreme Court demanded that the school board was responsible
for proving that segregation was not district-wide. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that
Judge Doyle must declare the entire Denver Public Schools system a “dual system” and,
that Doyle must oversee the overall desegregation of the entire system.433 In doing so,
they returned jurisdiction to Doyle and put the burdens of proof resolution in the hands of
an angry school board.
Keyes was a landmark case for civil rights and school desegregation. It was the
first case heard by the Supreme Court regarding “northern” school desegregation. It was
also the first to take into account the nuances of de facto and de jure segregation. A
history textbook might generalize the two terms with regard to legality or intent. De jure
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segregation refers to state, federal, or local province that allows for or enforces
segregation. Usually, these laws employ language from the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson
Supreme Court case that determined “separate but equal” accommodations constitutional.
Students of history might also conflate the de jure distinction with Jim Crow laws, which
existed throughout the United States, but are particularly vivid in pre-Civil Rights
southern social customs. De facto segregation, on the other hand, tends to be lumped in
with accidental or ordinary separation of races. School boards like Denver’s following
World War II believed that blacks, whites, and Hispanics were naturally segregated into
neighborhoods by choice. It was generally argued that de jure segregation was bad; de
facto, tolerable. By 1973, the United States Supreme Court had heard quite a few school
desegregation cases regarding education in the Jim Crow South. When Denver’s case was
heard, the nuances between de facto and de jure segregation were no longer crystal clear.
More importantly, plaintiffs like those Gordon Greiner represented, were able to prove
that de facto segregation was a myth. By imposing resolutions and attendance policies
that recorded the intended segregation of black students – based on neighborhood
location or not – Greiner demonstrated that Denver’s de facto system was, in fact, a
product of de jure segregation.434
Another groundbreaking aspect of the Keyes trial was that it considered the
impacts of segregation beyond white and black race relations. For the first time, the
Supreme Court heard a case regarding a “tri-ethnic” community, since the Keyes
plaintiffs included blacks, whites, and Chicanos. By 1973, Hispanic interests in western
communities were visible. Keyes attempted to take this into account, but the conflict was
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far from over in Denver and elsewhere. In their ruling, the Supreme Court stated that
segregation was evident in schools with large majorities of black and/or Hispanic,
therefore, all of the schools in Denver needed to be remedied. This would become an
issue with the Chicano community, who were relatively disinterested in the Keyes case
and proceedings and instead, had their own axe to grind.

1973 Remand Trial
When Christi Keyes’ father volunteered as lead plaintiff for the suit against DPS,
she was in kindergarten. It was 1969. By the time Judge Doyle scheduled the remand
trials in December 1973, Christi was nine-years-old and little had changed for her and her
black classmates. While the case was under Supreme Court review, the school board was
able to stall in making permanent changes to their policies. By 1973, however, Doyle was
ready to see improvements. In the remand trial, the school board attempted to persuade
Doyle that Park Hill was unique, despite what the Supreme Court had ruled.
Notwithstanding these attempts, Doyle ordered the school board and the plaintiffs to
present plans for system-wide desegregation. The Congress of Hispanic Educators (CHE)
recruited Dr. John Cardenas to write an additional plan that would represent the interests
of Chicano students.435 Thus began a long, drawn-out period of planning, as the plaintiffs
submitted proposals for desegregating, and the school board dragged their feet with more
of the same.
In May, 1974, Doyle’s patience ran out. The plaintiffs and the board had both
presented plans, but it seemed Greiner and the Keyes parties were the only ones who took
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it seriously. School board conservatives with an eye on future political appointments did
not want to appear cooperative with Judge Doyle, and because of this did the best they
could to defy his requests. Their plan included the closing of Doyle’s original seventeen
“core-city” schools, all of which were predominately black and/or Hispanic. The upended students would then be bused to white schools.436 Doyle was much happier with
the plaintiffs’ plan, which was complex. The plaintiffs proposed making every school in
the city “50% Anglo” or more, by distributing minority and white children in a
complicated pairing system. The pairing system combined busing with the neighborhood
schools concept, so that students could spend three years at their home school, and three
years elsewhere. Student transfers would account for nearly 14,000 students in the
system. The plaintiffs also suggested that minority teachers be redistributed throughout
the system and all teachers attend human relations training. In addition, the plaintiffs
called for a rewriting of the history and social studies curriculum to include perspectives
from black and Chicano voices.437 The school board’s plan was out of the question, and
Doyle found the plaintiffs’ proposal to be expensive and unreasonable. He went looking
for another expert.

1974 Finger Plan
Three years earlier, Dr. John Finger was recruited to help in a likeminded
situation when a public school board in North Carolina had been similarly uncooperative.
In 1971, the Supreme Court ruled in Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg that a district court
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had the right to intervene when school boards dragged their feet to dismantle a dual
system.438 Dr. Finger presented a likeminded proposal for Denver that Doyle believed
could appease both sides.439 “The Finger Plan” accounted for the busing of nearly 14,000
black, white, and Hispanic elementary students, but it also allowed more than 10,000
younger students to remain in their neighborhood schools. The junior highs and high
schools would all be rezoned, thus redistributing all students throughout the system to
achieve racial balance.440 The plan was ambitious, and nearly impossible to accomplish.
Finger’s pairing program was organized on a part-time basis, and included provisions to
bus children to-and-from schools during the lunchtime. It also would have required
nearly 1,000 students to be bused in zig-zags across the city, with black students still
bearing the brunt of the longest travel time.441 Conservative white parents were obsessed
with protesting the busing provisions in the Finger Plan, but the proposal also included
many other optimistic, expensive suggestions ranging from bilingual education programs,
additional reporting, and new school construction. When Doyle ruled, accepting the
Finger Plan, he gave the school board more ammunition to appeal than he probably
realized. He also ordered the district to pay for the plaintiffs’ attorney fees for the
duration of the case since 1969, and to settle the bill for John Finger’s consulting work.442
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1974 Appeal
Disgusted, the board appealed and requested a stay of Doyle’s order, which was
denied by the District Court and the Appeals Court. The school board was not ready to
give up. Doyle was equally repulsed, blaming the board for using busing as a “political
football” and dragging their feet.443 The board filed an appeal with the U.S. States Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in August 1974. Parents in Denver were confused, angry, and
impatient. Since the stay had not been granted, the Finger Plan had to be implemented
while the appeal waited judgment. Some school board members capitalized on this
frustration. James Perrill, the conservative white school board President explained that it
was in the board’s best interest to delay and procrastinate in order to overturn Judge
Doyle’s ruling.444 In 1975 the Appeals Court confirmed much of the Finger Plan, but
rejected the pairing program and ruled that five additional schools must be included to
consider the needs of Hispanic students.445 In response, Doyle sought to include the five
“Hispanic” schools in the plans for district busing.

“Dragging their feet”: Managerial Racism and the Denver School Board, 1970-1974
Throughout the court proceedings, both the school board and DPS both underwent
changes. Robert Gilberts resigned from his position as Superintendent in 1970, and
Rachel Noel chose to leave the school board without running for reelection. Gilberts and
443

U.S. District Court Hearings, 24 April 1974.

444

Maurice Mitchell to Honorable William E. Doyle, 10 February 1975.; Community Education
Council, “A Guide for Denver Public school Monitors,” 1. August 1974.
445

Keyes v. School District No. 1 521 F. 2d. 465. 470(FN.15), 475, 479 (10 th Circuit Court, 1975).

181

Noel were likely exhausted of their work on Denver’s troubled school system, and both
moved on to other leadership roles. Gilberts moved to Eugene to serve as Dean of the
school of Education at the University of Oregon. Noel was asked to help develop the
Black Studies Department at Metropolitan State College in Denver. She continued to
champion black education and break barriers; in 1976 she became the first black person
elected to the Board of Regents for Colorado’s university system.446 In her exit, Noel left
a seat open alongside two more vacant positions on the school board. In 1971,
conservatives Bob Crider, Bert Gallegos, and Ted Hackworth were elected to the school
board. Gallegos was a lawyer and State Representative. Though when he ran, he may
have seemed like a “liberal” when it came to minority students, Gallegos was actually
against busing. He supported community control, particularly in the Hispanic community.
The school board was now effectively controlled by white, anti-busing conservatives.
The board began to vote against federal support and any involvement from outside help if
it had anything to do with desegregation.447
In 1972, Bert Gallegos accepted a position with Richard Nixon’s Administration
and the Health, Education, and Welfare Department (HEW). The board replaced Gallegos
with the ever-present Bernie Valdez, who had been affiliated with the SSC eight years
earlier, and remained an active participated in school issues. Valdez was starkly different
from Gallegos. He supported busing and voted liberally on all issues pertaining to
desegregation. Valdez, however, recognized that Chicanos and blacks had different
opinions regarding educational equality. He stated that “Hispanics as a group” were never
446
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in support of “forced integration.” In part, Valdez believed this was because they did not
experience discrimination the same way that blacks did. More importantly, Valdez agreed
with Chicano leader Corky Gonzales that Chicanos had a “different psyche,” but that
because they were in the minority, Hispanics had been used as pawns by both blacks and
whites when it came to the busing debate. Chicanos, he said, “got caught in the
middle.”448 Regardless of his nuanced perspective, Valdez was outnumbered either way.
The school board was forced to devise a means to desegregate the schools, which left no
room for Chicano community control. Conservatives dominated the conversations as
newcomers Hackworth and Crider, who were both opposed to busing, and were out to
prove their political potential. Both men eventually ran for state office, using their time
on the board as campaign material.
Dr. Howard Johnson served as Superintendent in the three years following
Gilberts’ resignation. During that time, Johnson mostly attempted to keep the peace. A
relic of Oberholtzer’s “good old boy” era, Johnson had worked his way up through DPS,
starting as a teacher and coach and eventually serving as Oberholtzer’s Assistant
Superintendent.449 Johnson retired in the middle the 1973 school board elections. Dr.
Louis Kishkunas, the former Superintendent of Pittsburgh Public Schools was hired to
replace Johnson in May.450 That same month, Omar Blair and Kay Schomp were elected
to the seats left vacant by William Berge and Stephen Knight. Previously dominated by
conservative white male voices, the board was now altered in a liberal direction.451 Blair,
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the first African American man elected to the board remembered years later that Rachel
Noel had encouraged him to run, urging him that it was his turn to step up and ensure
progress was made.
Omar Blair was born July 16, 1918 in Houston, Texas and lived in western cities
throughout his formative years. When he graduated from high school, Blair joined the Air
Force. He was assigned to the famed 99th Pursuit Squadron, also known as the “Tuskegee
Airmen” during World War II and retired from military service in 1964.452 Though he
kept a fairly low profile in Denver until his run for the school board, Blair was an avid
supporter of desegregation. He often explained that when he graduated from high school
in Albuquerque, he and his black classmates were required to sit in the back during the
commencement ceremony. The event inspired Blair to fight for integrated education
throughout his time in Denver.453
Along with Blair, Katherine “Kay” Schomp was elected to the board in 1973. Kay
was born Katherine Weaver, in Pueblo, Colorado in 1917. After she attended the
University of Colorado and earned a graduate degree from George Washington
University, Schomp and her husband Ralph moved to Denver and bought a home in the
upscale Country Club neighborhood. Schomp volunteered for many organizations, and
upon her election to the school board in 1973 had served as President of the League of
Women Voters, where she helped pen a report on the progress of school desegregation in
Denver.454
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Blair and Schomp revitalized the liberal perspective on the school board, and also
created a space for student voice. Until their elections in 1973, the board was dominated
by parent and politician voices, but Schomp helped to initiate a “Student Board of
Education” upon her arrival.455 Because they were committed to representing student
experiences, both Blair and Schomp were often at odds with Superintendent Kishkunas,
who used any stalling tactic he could to avoid desegregating the schools. Kishkunas was
also openly bigoted when it came to the fate of black students in Denver. In an interview
with The New York Times, Kishkunas stated that his biggest fear regarding court-ordered
desegregation was that the school board was going to have to send “whites to black
dominated schools.”456 Schomp and Blair were incensed, and demanded that Kishkunas
write a retraction. At the following school board meeting, Kishkunas came to as close to
an apology as he could muster, blaming the incident on high-running emotions and an
angry body of parents. But to Omar Blair, the damage was done. He vowed to spend the
rest of his term fighting for the wellbeing of black students, and ensuring that
desegregation was not their burden to bear alone.457
The evolving school board was nonetheless responsible for dismantling a history
of segregation in the Denver Public Schools. While Doyle and Dr. John Finger worked to
finalize the Finger Plan, the school board sought to prepare parents, students, teachers,
http://capitolwords.org/date/2000/12/15/E2220_tribute-to-katherine-weaver-schomp/ Last Accessed
7.1.2013. (Student board of Education)
455

Rep. Diana DeGette, “A Tribute to Katherine Weaver Schomp,”
http://capitolwords.org/date/2000/12/15/E2220_tribute-to-katherine-weaver-schomp/ Last Accessed
7.1.2013.
456

Watson, “Removing the Barricades,” 201, quoted from an interview with Gordon Greiner,
conducted by F. Watson, 17 December 1985.
457

School Board Minutes, 17 January 1974.

185

and community for what might lie ahead. When the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
adjusted Doyle’s approval of the Finger Plan to include predominately Hispanic schools,
the school board was faced with an unsettling reality: ultimately, they were responsible
for implementing what might be a million-dollar plan to bus a majority of the city’s
students.

Indian Affidavits, Boycotts, and Misinformation: “The Silent Majority” in Denver,
1974.
Beyond court proceedings and school board elections, parents and students in
Denver resisted and acted in their own interests regarding educational equality. Black
radical groups, like the Committee for an Education Plan of East Denver (CEPED) and
the Black Panther Party (BPP) organized for community control of their neighborhood
schools. The Crusade for Justice built a private alternative school in the hope of isolating
what Valdez called the certain “psyche” of the Hispanic student in a Chicanocentric
school. All the while, white conservative parents varied in their responses. Some resorted
to violence and trickery, others relocated to the suburbs. Throughout the first half of the
1970s, Denverites reacted across the board when it came to the courts’ word on school
desegregation. After Omar Blair and Kay Schomp were elected to the school board, and
before Judge Doyle ruled in favor of the Finger Plan, white conservative parents
mobilized to demonstrate their disdain for busing. William Berge and Stephen Knight
cited in 1969 that their election to the board of Education was example enough that the
“entire” community was against busing. Since this argument was eventually overruled,
white conservatives felt forced to prove their point more clearly.
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Nolan Winsett was a Denver local who graduated from South High School in
Denver in 1957. He attended the University of Denver in 1963 and married his high
school sweetheart Linda. They had three children and lived briefly in Washington D.C.
before moving back home to Denver. When the Winsett family moved back in 1969, they
had the choice to purchase a home in the newly developed suburbs, but having lived most
of their lives in the city of Denver, they chose to buy a house within the city limits. They
sent their children to Ellis Elementary, a predominately white school in south Denver,
relatively removed from the drama unfolding in Park Hill. The Winsett couple was
involved in community events and the Ellis PTA, but it was not until the Finger Plan was
approved that Nolan and Linda got involved in the fight for education equality. Nolan
believed Judge Doyle was a “dictator” who threatened the democratic process by
overstepping his authority, as well as the constitution.458
Nolan and Linda used their affiliation with Ellis Elementary to recruit other PTA
members from white schools to organize a meeting on February 4, 1974. According to
Winsett, thousands of people and representatives from “89 homeowner association”
attended the meeting. At it, Winsett and his alleged army of supporters founded the
Citizens Association for Neighborhood Schools (CANS).459 According to their founding
documents and a pamphlet circulated among Denver parents in their first month of
operation, the more than “10,000” CANS members opposed busing, desegregation, and
“court-ordered pupil distribution” based on race.460 The seventeen-page pamphlet, titled
458

South High School alumni board, http://www.classreport.org/usa/co/denver/shs/1957/ Last
accessed November 17, 2013.; Watson, “Removing the Barricades,” 205-206.;
459

Bev Bennett, “CANS backs school boycott to protest busing,” University Park and Cherry
Creek News Sentinel, Vol. 27. No. 45. (Denver, Colorado) 13 February, 1974.
460

“Education by Judicial Fiat.”

187

“Education by Judicial Fiat” provided a perplexing view of CANS’ purpose and
organization. First, the pamphlet explained in great detail the milestones in Denver’s
school board elections and the Keyes case. Coupled with brief descriptions of precedentsetting cases in other cities, the general discussion of Keyes and Denver schools
practically explained instead of discounted the need for school desegregation. Yet
throughout the pamphlet, editorial cartoons demonstrate that CANS believed busing was
an example of authoritarian rule. The most cohesive argument made in their pamphlet
against busing was the projected cost for Denver taxpayers. Mounting court fees, as well
as the actual cost of busing loomed large a threat on the horizon. “Education by Judicial
Fiat” also served to boast the egos of CANS organizers. In it, they claimed to have
initiated “massive” boycotts and rallies, attended by “thousands” of people. CANS was
also convinced of their political prowess, stating that they influenced dozens of state and
local officials, including school board members who were elected long before they were
founded in1974. Finally, as it was treated throughout the 1970s, the issue of Hispanic
needs showed up in the pamphlet, a smug afterthought. The very last line read, “About all
one can say – to be bilingual—is ‘Quien sabe?’ – who knows?” It is the only discussion
of Mexicanos in the Denver school system throughout CANS’ twelve-page pamphlet.461
For all their posturing, CANS did not have the widespread support they claimed
to enjoy. School board members Frank Southworth and James Perrill were the only
elected officials who publicly affiliated with CANS, and only participated as guests to
CANS meetings and events. Major media outlets like The Denver Post and The Rocky
Mountain News all but disregarded CANS, lumping Winsett and others into the
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“conservative white parents” category. Winsett used this to his advantage, citing the
“silent majority” when referencing the thousands he claimed supported him.462 At one
point, the Denver Post editor urged Denver readers to “boycott” Winsett and CANS,
calling the organization’s efforts “shocking and irresponsible.”463 The only publication
that gave Winsett substantial coverage was his local neighborhood weekly, The
University Park and Cherry Creek Sentinel. On June 5th, 1974, the Sentinel devoted a
two-page spread to Winsett and CANS. In it Winsett claimed that Judge Doyle, choice
members of the school board, the League of Women Voters, and anyone affiliated with
“the Democrats” were part of a “dark conspiracy.” Winsett came to this conclusion after
taking nearly five months off from his “regular job” to conduct research on anyone allied
with this perceived conspiracy.464 Even members of CANS were not so sure. One
member who chose not to identify herself for the article provided a rebuttal. “You can’t
take all of this too seriously,” she stated. She offered that Winsett had perhaps recruited
people to CANS “who don’t have much education or who are kind of naïve about
political action.”465 Winsett himself admitted that he lacked the support he claimed to
have. “I was wrong,” he said regarding a CANS petition that took five months longer
than expected. “Maybe the people don’t want a vote.”466
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In the 1970s, white conservatives across the country embraced President Richard
Nixon’s “silent majority.” Nixon publicly denounced busing, stating it was an
infringement on American choice. Using the President’s distaste for busing as a vehicle,
white conservative parents like Nolan Winsett embraced efforts like limited open
enrollment, voluntary enrollment, and “choice schools,” as a means to avoid
desegregation. Though these measures had already been proclaimed unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, elitist and upwardly aspiring white parents hoped that a new era of
conservatism had begun in America.467 Parents affiliated with CANS exploited white
fears regarding violence in the schools, as well as conservative concerns over rising costs
in the public school system to build a broader base. By doing this, they maintained a
politically-charged message, while dispelling accusations that they were racist.
Though CANS was not always taken seriously, the organization had considerable
momentum in their first months. In “Education by Judicial Fiat,” Winsett stated that
CANS initiated a boycott just weeks after they were founded. Indeed, on February 22nd
1974, nearly 48,000 Denver students stayed home from school to demonstrate their anger
for DPS and desegregation.468 CANS exploited white fear, exploiting any issue that
occurred at an integrated school to demonstrate the problems with desegregation. CANS
also succeeded in getting an Anti-Busing Amendment election ballot initiative added to
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the November 1974 election. The initiative passed, but had no bearing on the Denver
desegregation process, since DPS was under court control.469 When the Appeals Court
upheld Doyle’s approval of the Finger Plan in September 1974, CANS was prepared.
Winsett issued a statement inviting all white parents in the “silent majority” to boycott
DPS on a weekly basis.470 Winsett instructed parents to demonstrate consolidation with
white parents in Boston, who were also boycotting their public schools once a week. The
Denver Post encouraged parents to take the high road and ignore Winsett. “The problem
in Boston” was different, the Post editorial reminded parents because “citizens of Denver
have been responsible,” unlike Boston who couldn’t “handle” their own problem.471
Ultimately, more people heeded the Post’s suggestions than Winsett’s. In October, less
than 5% of all DPS students participated in the protest. The Rocky Mountain News
reported that the school boycott “fizzle[d].” The report cited only seventy-five protestors,
but pointed out that “seven students were injured,” many of them white. As a response,
principals, parents, and members of the school board urged others to “ignore the
proposed boycott” planned for the next Friday. 472
Five days later, Judge Doyle, CANS’ primary nemesis, put a stop to the boycotts
altogether. On October 10th, 1974 Judge Doyle extended a temporary restraining order,
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prohibiting all members of CANS from “promoting boycotts to protest court-ordered
desegregation.” Citing the student-sustained injuries on October 4th, Doyle stated that the
boycotts created an unsafe environment for children. Winsett, who testified in Doyle’s
court on the 10th claimed he had “no intention of going out and asking people to boycott,”
despite his previous statements.473 By this point, Winsett had fallen out of any favor that
somehow remained. In September, the Denver Post exposed Winsett as a fraud, stating
the CANS leader provided false figures to the paper.474 A few weeks later, paranoid and
clinging to extremism, Nolan Winsett set fire to the only CANS membership list he
claimed existed.475 Though Winsett ran for school board in 1975, the restraining order
and disappointing boycotts served to end Winsett’s short albeit dim run in the Denver
spotlight.
One of the names listed on Winsett’s mysterious membership roster was that of
Naomi Bradford, a white mother whose children attended predominately white Johnson
Elementary school, which was paired with Park Hill’s predominately black Gilpin
Elementary for the 1974 school year.476 Bradford, unlike Winsett, was able to use her
leadership with CANS to catapult into local politics, where she remained a fixture for two
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decades. A month after Judge Doyle terminated CANS’ protest plans, Art Branscombe
and The Denver Post exposed Bradford and other CANS parents for defrauding DPS.
Branscombe quoted a report presented to the school board that stated Bradford “has
openly refused to participate in pairing and has urged others to evade the law.”
Branscrombe continued that the school board was requesting additional information.477
What they found was a scheme involving Bradford and a large group of Johnson
Elementary parents.
The 1974 Finger Plan, recently endorsed by Judge Doyle, accounted for tribal
sovereignty among Denver’s Native American pupils. Those registered as American
Indian could choose to be exempt from participating in any desegregation programs. In
1974, Bradford and other white parents filed false Indian Affidavits identifying their
children as Native American, and therefore exempt as well. Bradford claimed that she
was an unaffiliated member of the Navajo tribe, but nonetheless joined the dozens of
other parents at Johnson who resubmitted correct paperwork upon Doyle’s demand.478
This was one of the first times, but not the last that Bradford attempted to dishonestly
identify within a minority group, while also actively working against the interests of
black and Chicano students. It was also the beginning of a long and controversial career
for Naomi Bradford and the Denver schools.
Bradford was born Naomi Llewella Taylor in 1940 to suburban parents in Los
Angeles, California. She attended private schools and earned a Master’s Degree from
Colorado Christian University. When she joined CANS, she was an active member of
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Johnson’s PTA, married to Regional Transportation District (RTD) driver, Ron
Bradford.479 In 1974, conservatives James Perrill and Frank Southworth both decided not
to run again for the school board and Naomi Bradford jumped at the opportunity. Her
Indian Affidavit controversy served as a springboard, as Bradford campaigned as an antibusing radical who believed that breaking the law was sometimes necessary if it was for
the right reasons. In 1975, Bradford and pro-busing integrationist Virginia Rockwell were
elected to the board, continuing the proverbial tennis match that had been plaguing the
school board since 1965. Ten years later, the board was still oscillating between liberal
and conservative dominance. In 1975, Bernie Valdez, Omar Blair, Kay Schomp and
newcomer Rockwell had majority, but Bradford did her best to interfere with any
decisions that would help “see that busing works.”480 In 1980, Bradford ran for state
office against incumbent and longtime Colorado Congresswoman Pat Schroeder.
Bradford, who vowed to “pin Schroeder to the wall” lost miserably but maintained her
prominence in Denver by staying on the school board and eventually serving as its
President.481
When attorney Gordon Greiner moved from the suburbs to Park Hill, he bucked
convention and did the opposite of what many white parents were doing in Denver and
across the country. Since the late 1950s, cities in the West preoccupied with the threat of
“white flight,” and the school integration battle seemed the prime offender in the
479
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movement to halt white flight. In 1973, the year the Supreme Court ruled that Denver had
a dual system, DPS lost white students, as well as a few black and Hispanic children as
well.482 A movement of middle-class families, most of them white started from the core
city of Denver and reached to suburbs like Wheatridge, Lakewood, Westminster,
Littleton, and further. Most blamed busing, calling it a “self-defeating” initiative.483 By
1975, national researchers were blaming the courts and public schools for being too quick
to bus. Perhaps, considered writer and Park Hill Action Committee founder Art
Brancombe, proper equality had more to do with socioeconomic factors than racial
desegregation.484 Branscombe’s observation notwithstanding, middle-class white parents
feared that desegregation would follow them to the suburbs. To stop Denver from
aggressively taking over nearby suburbs, they passed the Poundstone Amendment, named
for lobbyist Freda Poundstone. The Amendment provided that neither the city nor county
of Denver could annex adjacent land without a majority vote from all people living in the
county of the area in question. The Amendment was a “suburban assault” on Denver and
an attempt to keep “integrated busing” isolated downtown.485 Because the court’s
jurisdiction over DPS applied only to schools within the Keyes case, the Poundstone
Amendment “effectively sealed off Denver” from the nearby suburbs and “severely
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curtailed” the city’s reach, thereby nearly guaranteeing that desegregation would not have
a “lasting” and “stable” future.486

The Legacy Continues: Manual in 1974
Of all the schools affected by Judge Doyle’s Finger Plan, Manual High School
would undergo the most dramatic change in 1974. Manual, the most significantly
overcrowded in the district and overwhelmingly attended by black and Chicano students,
lost more than half of its students when 1,065 were assigned to other high schools. 838
white students from West, South, East, Washington, Jefferson, and Kennedy High were
paired with Manual. Likewise, The Finger Plan ignored a near 70-year-old rivalry and
attempted to form the “East-Manual Complex,” by merging the two oldest high schools.
The plan added to the frustration and confusion among black, white, and Chicano
parents.487 Students on the other hand, seemed more prepared. Tim Slaughter, an “A
student” was one of the black teenagers reassigned to South High School under the
Finger Plan. Slaughter believed he would be “better qualified” at South to maintain an
above-average GPA because of what he learned at Manual. “Here, when they educate
you, you have to do a little more,” he said of Denver’s second-oldest high school.488
Chicanos were not so optimistic. Irene Munoz, one of Manual’s Chicano educators said
of the Mexicano students, “We have no control over what’s going on.” Another Chicano
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teacher added, “The system controls us. We’re being controlled now.”489 Like their
diverse students, Mexicano and black educators were reassigned throughout the district as
well. Manual, which was once described as the city’s “symbolic dual school,” was once
again the emblem of Denver’s educational equality movement.
White parents expressed fear that Manual High School was no place for their
more delicate children. One parent stated, “I wouldn’t go there without a guard.”490
Through violent, vocal, and political means, white conservatives attempted to “hold
crosstown busing at bay.”491 Four years after vandals destroyed the DPS bus barn,
another series of bombs exploded on Denver Public School property. The district office
and Cole Junior High were two of the school facilities targeted. Specific school board
members, including Rachel Noel and A. Edgar Benton received “letter bombs” in the
mail. Noel and her family received common death threats into the 1970s. Noel
remembered friends meeting her after school board meetings got out so she would have
someone to walk with her to her car, lest she be threatened or attacked by an angry
member of the community. In 1970, Wilfred Keyes’ daughter Christi came running from
her place at the dining room table to table to tell him she had heard a loud, threatening
noise. When Keyes went to investigate, he discovered a pipe smoldering on his front
porch. Though he attempted to suffocate the bomb with water, the device exploded near
his front door and broke several windows. Keyes and his family were unharmed, having
fled to the backyard when Wilfred realized he hadn’t put the bomb out. The police report
489
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indicated that the bomb, an amateur creation made with metal pellets, could have killed
Keyes and any of his family members if they had not made it to the backyard.492 In a
1974 symbolic demonstration of symmetry, protestors created makeshift explosives by
binding flares together and planted them under bus hoods at the same parking lot that was
the site of the first school-related bombings five years earlier.493
The Keyes trial began in the 1970s, but the aftermath stretched into the 1990s.
Over the course of these twenty-five years, parents and students attempted to implement
and avoid the realities of court ordered busing. White conservative parents lashed out,
and also got involved in the political process. Some moved to the suburbs where they
could leave the conflicts of city life behind. Black parents who wanted desegregation
sought to implement the court’s plans effectively. School board members battled to find
common ground.
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CHAPTER 6
“A Distinguished Legacy”: Aftermath, 1974-1994
The Busing Debate Wanes
Manual High School turned 100 in 1994, two decades after court-controlled
school desegregation began. It was not until a year later that the courts released authority
back to the Denver Public School Board.494 For more than two decades, students
crisscrossed all over the city, but during these years, the city and its residents changed.
Throughout this contested era, DPS enrollment plummeted from 96,634 in 1968 to
79,197 students in 1974. 495 Of these students, 42,838 (54%) were white, 20,541 (26%)
were Hispanic, and 14,608 (18%) were black. The rest were distinguished as “Asian or
other.” By 1980, the total fell to 63,414. 26,012 (41%) white, 20,373 (32%) Hispanic, and
14,328 (23%) black.496
Despite the many years that passed, the community struggled for new
conversations, and even the complaint of the “same old same old” was tired. Reporters in
the early 1970s had already noted that the “forced busing” debate was getting old. Craig
Matsuda, a graduate of East High and reporter for the University Park and Cherry Creek
Sentinel lamented in his Denver School Board coverage, “I pinched myself to make sure
that I hadn’t fallen asleep in ’69 and had just awakened.” In Matsuda’s words, nothing
had changed for DPS since 1969 when desegregation became a point of conversation.497
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Matsuda’s thoughts were echoed throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s as the
school board, parents, and the general community grew tired of the busing debate.
In his 1974 plan for desegregation, John D. Finger recognized that Manual High
School was a unique case. He wrote that “considerable attention” needed to be paid to
Manual High School in order to ensure that the city’s second oldest high school be
integrated. Success at Manual would ensure “that there would no longer be any black
high school” in Denver. Finger urged the school board to take special care of Manual, to
make the high school “equal in quality and program to all the other high schools in the
city,” including East High.498 Manual and East High were rivals from the beginning.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the two schools were often compared, and over the
years Manual became the underdog. In 1975 when the schools were paired under the
Finger Plan, parents worried that black and white students would not get along. However,
through academics, extracurricular activities and most significantly, athletics, students
found common ground. A year into the desegregation program, Manual’s principal Jim
Ward and East’s, Robert Colwell, found success in bridging the communities and schools
together. They established The East and Manuals Supporters (TEAMS), a coalition of
white and black parents to “pressure” the community into embracing desegregation.
Along with students of all races from both schools, TEAMS and the principals created
new student orientation programs, wrote newsletters, and contacted future students by
phone. Ward believed the students needed opportunities to “rap” together, and wanted to
show parents that black, white, and Chicano students could build meaningful
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relationships.499 One parent claimed that Manual High surprised her with its “loving,
caring atmosphere,” and attributed the success to Ward. She remained “not a fan of
busing,” but a new fan of Manual’s.500

“Resegregation,” 1990s
The 1981 school board election in Denver was “truly pivotal.” The courts were
expecting proposals for a new desegregation plans in 1981, and busing was still
dominating most meetings. In 1979, Omar Blair was elected to presidency, and his
publicly acknowledged feud with anti-busing member Naomi Bradford was a topic
almost as politically charged as desegregation itself. In her first year on the board,
Bradford made enemies of both Blair and Bernie Valdez by being difficult and
incendiary. In a 1976 interview with Denver Magazine, Bradford referred to Valdez as a
“wetback,” and Blair as a “black S.O.B.”501 Despite her controversial personality,
Bradford was up for reelection in 1981, as was Virginia Rockwell, who was pro-busing.
Bernie Valdez decided against running for another term. The Rocky Mountain News
acknowledged of Rockwell’s position, “If Rockwell loses the school board will for the
first time since 1975 be controlled by those who feel the desegregation order has hurt the
district more than it has helped.” Seven of the eight candidates were in favor of
neighborhood schools. Rockwell, the lone pro-busing candidate lost to Franklin Mullen,
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an anti-busing conservative and member of Denver’s business elite.502 The Rocky
Mountain News’ prediction came true: Blair, Kay Schomp and Robert Crider were
outnumbered by anti-busing majority Bradford, Mullen, Marion Hammond, and William
Schroeder.
It was no secret that Blair and Bradford did not see eye-to-eye. Bradford had a
reputation of being difficult, hard-nosed, and staunchly conservative. Yet, briefly under
Blair’s leadership, the school board reached consensus more often and effectively than
they had in the ten years prior. In an all-day retreat, the board met to discuss their
upcoming deadline to present a new proposal for desegregation to Judge Matsch. Blair
was surprised to make an unexpected ally in Frank Mullen, who helped break the board
“out of its old 4-3 split on busing issues.” When Mullen consistently voted in favor of
new desegregation plans, he helped the board find consensus, but he became Naomi
Bradford’s “new antagonist.”503
In 1974, Judge Doyle ruled that the school board had three years to implement
busing according to the Finger Plan. He stated he was “not unwilling” to consider
boundary and attendance changes, if the board had good reason and explanation. Two
years later, Doyle decided it was “time some of the blessings were passed around,” and
handed the case down to his successor, Judge Richard Matsch.504 Conservatives were
thankful to have a fresh perspective on the bench, and Matsch promised to take a
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measured approach regarding busing. He stated that while he was committed to
“upholding the law,” he was willing to consider desegregation methods that did not
include busing.505 Matsch entered the case during the three-year moratorium, but the
school board was preparing to submit a new proposal in 1981. Matsch asked the board to
submit “a ‘unitary, non-racial’ desegregation plan” to him by December, so that he could
close the Keyes lawsuit and return control of DPS to the board.506
No matter its arrangement, the school board was never really a fan of busing.
Over the course of the late twentieth century, to liberal board members, busing
represented a necessary evil to desegregate schools. In conservative members’
perspectives, busing was an authoritarian waste of money imposed upon DPS by out-oftouch courts, and a threat to white supremacy. Thus, it comes as no surprise that as soon
as Judge Matsch took up the Keyes case and its legacies, the school board and others
voiced their desires to end busing. Only four years after Doyle instituted the Finger Plan,
the school board submitted new proposals for desegregation that greatly minimized
busing.507 The board first argued that demographics had shifted in Denver so dramatically
that many schools were predominately black or Chicano, despite the intentions of
busing.508 At their September retreat, the board created “three dozen” specific decisions
to include in their 1981 proposal. The plan included new pupil assignments to
elementary, junior, and high schools throughout the district, and plans to build two new
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schools in the Montbello neighborhood. For the most part, the board was relatively
unanimous with Naomi Bradford offering the only dissenting perspective on many of the
items.509 However, only three weeks later, the school board submitted two very different
plans to Judge Matsch for consideration. The first reflected the decisions made at the
board retreat in September. The second proposal, unbeknownst to President Blair, called
for “magnet schools” that would attract integrated populations of students.510
In the last week of November, Matsch returned the plans to the board, demanding
they compromise and submit a single proposal. President Omar Blair remained “silent” at
the meeting when Naomi Bradford made a motion to approve and submit the “magnet
school” plan to Judge Matsch. Bradford justified the proposal saying, “enriched programs
or specific educational philosophies would attract students from throughout the city” to
various schools, creating natural integration. Apparently, Mullen and Bradford had
reconciled since the September retreat. Mullen, who seconded Bradford’s motion called it
“a chance to be honest,” and demanded Blair do the same. Mullen claimed that Blair was
secretly against busing, having “assured me in a private conversation that if he had his
way, he would eliminate busing.”511 Blair refused to comment during the meeting, but
later told The Rocky Mountain News he never said anything of the sort. The board voted
in favor of Bradford’s proposal 4-2.512 Later, Blair stated that he knew Matsch would
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“throw it out.” He followed, “Can you imagine the mass confusion that will reign in this
town when everyone picks a school and we have to put them on a bus?”513
New member William Schroeder fine-tuned the proposal, terming it the “Total
Access Plan” (TAP). TAP created ten “magnet” schools designed to attract children from
all over the city to varied programs on elementary, junior, and high school campuses.
Blair knew the plan had many flaws. He stated that similar programs in other states failed
to integrate children. In Houston he scoffed, “a magnet school for porters and maids is all
black.” The Denver NAACP was equally disillusioned by Schroeder’s proposal. They
called it “a cover-up” intending to resegregate DPS. The NAACP “reject[ed] the plan in
its entirety” and urged Matsch to do the same.514 TAP, they pointed out, failed to comply
with Matsch’s order to create a “unitary school district that won’t resegregate” and in fact
sought to return to a separate and unequal dual system.515 Art Branscombe, still an active
member of the Park Hill Action Committee, was concerned that TAP would “renew
school racial lines” and threaten Park Hill’s stability. He worried that giving “students a
choice of attending almost any school in the district” was a “major departure from the
current court-ordered system of busing,” without a guarantee to maintain integrated
education.516
TAP continued in the board’s trend of ignoring Chicano needs. TAP’s
designations included schools for gifted and talented children, a “university laboratory
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school,” a daycare center at historically Chicano Gilpin elementary, an “individually
guided education” school, and a “problem solving” academy. There are only two
indicators that Schroeder briefly considered Chicano needs. First was his proposal for a
“foreign language” program at Cory Elementary, at the far southern tip of the district and
across town from the predominately Hispanic neighborhoods. Secondly, TAP provided a
“multicultural heritage center” at Del Pueblo School, which was near the Chicano
community. However, TAP also proposed closing ten schools, four of which were in
Chicano neighborhoods.517
TAP was most unpopular among the Manual High School community. Under
Schroeder’s plan, the careful work conducted by Jim Ward and Manual’s students to
integrate thoughtfully was discounted. The high school would be converted into the
“Classical Academy for Advanced Studies.”518 Among his many errors, Schroeder had
not consulted any of the faculty or staff at Manual when crafting his proposal. Therefore,
when TAP was publicized, teachers across the district, but most specifically at Manual
were outraged by the unexpected potential change. Jerry McCracken, a Social Studies
teacher at Manual organized an “informal meeting” after school in the Manual High
cafeteria. McCracken was a veteran teacher. In his near twenty years working for DPS he
had won awards and recognition as an outstanding teacher. He was also a member of
Ward’s team, working to effectively integrate Manual without conflict. McCracken
admitted to the gathered teachers that TAP, “as an education plan may be good, but as an
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integration plan it ain’t.”519 When the school board approached Manual’s teachers to
“write curriculum” that would match the school’s potential new designation, many of the
teachers refused. McCracken circulated a survey to every teacher, and more than half the
faculty returned them. The surveys indicated that respondents worried that “in a few
years” Manual would become nearly 100% black and once again ignored by the school
board.520 They weren’t wrong. Researchers calculated that under TAP, Manual’s Anglo
population would drop from 50.1% to 5.6% by the start of the 1982 school year.521 To
voice their concerns, McCracken and his colleagues wrote letters to the school board and
Judge Matsch. They also continued to refuse writing potential curriculum until Matsch
ruled on the proposal. The school board dismissed Manual’s faculty and asked teachers
elsewhere to draft curriculum.522
The parents of fourteen Chicano students, all who attended Swansea Elementary,
filed suit in federal court to be exempt from DPS’ pairing program under the Finger Plan.
The Finger Plan, they claimed, left out the Hispanic demand for bilingual-bicultural
education, which had been in their 1973 proposal, submitted by the Congress of Hispanic
Educators.523 Judge Doyle heard their case in 1978, while Matsch was preparing to make
a TAP ruling. The plaintiffs presented a plan for educational opportunity that excluded
sixteen schools in the district with “a combined Negro and Hispano enrollment of 70 to
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75 percent” from the pairing program. Doyle admitted that since 1969, he had not seen “a
single Hispano” appear in the Keyes proceeding. Gordon Greiner, the lawyer who
represented the Keyes case, pointed out that Doyle had not heard a “dissenting” Chicano
voice until 1978, either.524
Three more organizations joined to voice their discontent with TAP. Sandy
Berkowitz, on behalf of the League of Women Voters attended the school board meeting
in February. Berkowitz, using examples from Dallas, Milwaukee, and San Diego, argued
that “freedom of choice” plans don’t work and were in fact, unconstitutional.525 Michale
Simmons, of the Denver Community Desegregation Project told the school board the
TAP plan was based on nostalgic notions of days gone by. TAP, he argued “will turn
back the clock to the days when everybody assumed that minority schools would be
inferior.”526 Once again, the PHAC, which had changed its name to the Greater Park Hill
Community (GPHC) made a case for desegregation. Louis Matthias, chair of GPHC’s
school’s committee blamed the School Board for attempting to “resegregate the
schools.”527
The GPHC infiltrated public perception of the school board, as writer Art
Branscombe continued to advocate for desegregation through his position with The
Denver Post. Branscombe covered every moment of the hearings, and applauded attorney
Gordon Greiner, who returned to the court room thirteen years after filing his first
injunction. Greiner was once again prepared and eloquent, with a team of experts to
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convince Matsch that TAP was inadequate. Branscombe wrote, “Voluntary desegregation
plans, like the magnet school open enrollment one proposed by the Denver School Board,
don’t work in school systems.” Branscombe referenced a study conducted by Vanderbilt
University researchers, who testified before Judge Matsch in March. The study was
conducted by Dr. Willis D. Hawley, Vanderbilt’s Dean of Education, and Mark A.
Smylie, a doctoral candidate under Hawley. The study argued that Denver’s minority
population, which was over “60% minority” in 1982 was too large for a magnet program
to be effective. Hawley and Smylie, upon conducting general research on Denver and
education equality stated that “mandatory desegregation plans are ‘at least three times
more effective’ in producing racial balance.” Furthermore, the researchers testified that
school desegregation would lead to housing desegregation. Branscombe and his GPHC
finally had legal, documented proof.528 In a follow-up article, Branscombe pointed to
successful housing integration in Riverside, California and Louisville, Kentucky.
Branscombe cited ground-breaking historian Gary Orfield, “Orfield reports that court
orders in cities such as Louisville and St. Louis have put the force of law behind school
desegregation plans which encourage housing integration.”529
Matsch – annoyed by the school board’s “cover up” and convinced by Greiner’s
presentation of experts on the merits of “mandatory desegregation” – snubbed TAP in
early March, 1982. Matsch gave the board thirty days to submit a new proposal. Robert
Crider, the newly minted board president was aware that “each member has a
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constituency with strong feelings for or against mandatory busing,” but he was also
hopeful the board could reach a consensus. He pleaded with the board to form a united
front, and “bring this district back together.”530 The school board grumbled, and voted to
“resurrect” their September plan from the year before.531 They called it the “consensus
plan.” The proposal eliminated “forced busing” to twelve schools in “already integrated”
neighborhoods. The consensus plan also closed eight schools and returned 2,600 students
to neighborhood schools. When the board voted, six were in favor. Naomi Bradford was
the only dissenting vote.532

A Rewritten Memory of Busing, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s:
Nearly ten years earlier in 1975, the Rocky Mountain Research Institute published
a report that claimed most Denverites were still not convinced that busing would do any
good. Parents complained that busing was “a hardship” on families and children, and that
“children should go to school in their neighborhood.” According to the study, parents
also worried that busing cost too much taxpayer money, and was not a productive way to
create “racial balance.” However, of the parents surveyed, only 2% indicated that “there
is no need for racial balance.”533 Ten years later, Denver residents were more frustrated
than ever. In their “12-year battle against school desegregation,” the school board was
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blamed for “costing city taxpayers almost $1.3 million so far” with projected
expenditures rising.534 In 1982, the board already faced paying all attorney fees, including
those of the plaintiffs, as well as financing the city-wide busing. Moreover, in a 1977
lawsuit, the board was found guilty for “foot-dragging” over busing logistics and a
federal judge ordered the school board to pay an additional $230,000 in restitution to the
Keyes plaintiff’s attorney, as well as two local organization complainants.535 In the 1979
school year, DPS spent $3.1 million on “busing for integration,” with about 24,000 kids
“riding the bus.”536 With Matsch still overseeing the Keyes outcomes and outliers on the
school board like controversial Naomi Bradford, Denver residents were wary. It seemed
like this battle would never end. Brown v. Board of Education was ancient history to the
generation now attending schools across town, and there was little proof that DPS had
improved since 1954. They had grown equally tired of Naomi Bradford, though they
continued to reelect her to the board. In 1983 Bradford took on the role of President,
following Crider’s short stint. Bradford remained on the board long after the other
veterans from the 1970s left for new pursuits.537
Of the students enrolled in DPS for the 1981 school year, 40 percent were Anglo,
32 percent Hispanic, 23 percent black, and 5 percent “other.” Likewise, the city of
Denver had a similar analysis. 66 percent were white, 19 percent Hispanic, and 12
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percent black.538 Nearly all DPS, despite race, were bused in 1981. Teachers, parents, and
students had differing views on the benefits of desegregation. Teachers assigned to
schools previously dominated by blacks or Hispanics saw improvements after 1974.
David Finley, who taught at Cole Junior High in the first few years of busing believed the
best improvements happened in the first few years. “I saw some miracles when we got
word some white kids were going to be bused to us,” he remembered. Before 1974, Cole
received hand-me-down desks and books, but when white children were assigned to the
Five Points school, “overnight we saw supplies, equipment,” and better teachers, Finley
recalled.539 Black students bused to white schools did not see the benefits so readily. In
1980, 600 minority students were bused to previously all-white John F. Kennedy High
(JFK). That same year, only one black student was accepted to JFK’s chapter of the
National Honor Society.540
Some students remained segregated at their schools. One report cited black
students congregating “near the front entrance, bantering among themselves while a
throng of whites occupies the school’s southwest corner” at Hill Elementary. The report
went on to explain that middle-school aged children “develop a racial consciousness”
which “inhibits meaningful mixing,” despite their environments.541 White students
expressed dissatisfaction with busing more often than black students. “It’s only at school
we’re integrated and there’s still a lot of fighting between blacks and whites,” a white 15-
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year old student who was bused commented. Another white teenager said, “It’s created a
lot of problems. I never used to be prejudiced until they started busing. It’s just that they
don’t seem to have respect for us.” Her friend added, “We feel outnumbered.”542
The students who seemed disproportionately outnumbered, however, were
Mexicanos, despite their growing numbers. Francisco Rios, a community “monitor” who
helped to oversee integration on behalf of Judge Matsch explained, “Because of the
emphasis on blacks and whites, Hispanos… have slipped through the cracks.”543 John
Archuleta, a 17-year old senior who was bused from his neighborhood near West High
School to Manual struggled to find other Chicanos, despite Manual’s historic connection
to the Hispanic community. “I had no choice,” he said of busing, since his home was one
block outside of the boundary that would have allowed him to attend his neighborhood
high school. “I just didn’t feel confident when I came here.” Archuleta added, “I live in a
mostly Chicano neighborhood, and I was used to being around Chicanos.”544
Rios, once a fan of integration, felt that busing had only served to demonstrate
why schools like the Crusade for Justice’s La Escuela Tlatelolco were perhaps better
suited for Chicanos than desegregated schools. “An all-black or all-Hispanic school
would be great if it has the resources and the parents involved,” he mused. He added that
one-race schools seemed to have better results, because busing did not help minority
students enough. Black and Hispanic parents, he said didn’t believe “that their kids will
get smarter from mingling with white kids.”545
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Judge Matsch knew students were unhappy with the TAP proposal, and he felt the
school board was still incapable of managing a desegregated district. Referring back to
language used in the 1968 Green v. School Board of New Kent County court case, Matsch
reminded the board that they were responsible for creating a “unitary” system. The 1968
case set the precedent of defining an equal school public school system based on racial
demographics, busing and transportation, sports and activities, and physical resources.
TAP did not take into account these items.546 In 1982, DPS still had not created a truly
integrated system where “all of the students have access to the opportunity for
education,” with “resources distributed equitably.” Most significantly, TAP defied court
demands to create opportunities for students “to develop fully” despite “restrictions”
based on their “racial or ethnic groups.”547
In response to Matsch’s ruling, the school board decided to take a different route.
In 1983, they voted unanimously to stop submitting new plans to create an integrated
system and instead seek court acceptance that DPS was already unitary. In late 1983,
Omar Blair, the only black school board member and a previous vocal advocate for
busing, surprised the black community when he voted in favor of the plan. “I wouldn’t
support that vote,” said Lawrence Lewis of the Denver NAACP. The Urban League
spokesperson was equally shocked. “Maybe he knows something I don’t know” offered
Lawrence Borom.548 Blair explained his vote, “I’m not naïve enough to believe there are
not hidden agendas by a lot of folks,” he said. Blair knew that the courts would not
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release control of the desegregation process “without safeguards,” but “it’s time we have
some kind of resolution.”549 The school board explained that they could work with
Matsch’s specifications for a unitary school system. “The Denver Public Schools,”
argued the board, “are as integrated as they can be, especially since white enrollment
declined from 57% in 1973… to 39%.” They followed they shouldn’t “be forced to alter
busing patterns every time the population changes in city neighborhoods.”550 The school
board spent the next year drafting a new proposal. They hoped to establish that DPS was
desegregated, operating in a unitary system, within the conditions provided in Green and
quoted by Matsch. In December, 1983, the school board submitted documents claiming
to prove that the system was integrated. In it, President Bradford likened busing to
“giving a patient the medicine for too long a time.”551
In the first weeks of 1984, the Denver Public School Board filed a formal motion
and request for an evidentiary hearing. They hoped to prove that Denver was integrated
within the guidelines provided by Green and Matsch.552 In April, Matsch began hearings.
The school board had their work cut out for them. Not only were they charged with
proving DPS was a unitary system, they were also up against the vague demands for
“bilingual/bicultural” education in the 1974 judgment and decree. Demonstrating the
city’s demographics had changed proved to be much easier than proving DPS was
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operating in a bicultural system.553 Ultimately, Matsch’s decision reflected what the
NAACP and UL noticed. Declaring DPS unitary did little to ensure that the school board
would continue to advocate for the best interests of minority children. Matsch encouraged
the school board to begin working with the Keyes attorneys to negotiate a settlement and
compromise. He followed that he wanted to release control, but the school board still
needed to prevent resegregation.554
It took two more years for the school board to appease Matsch’s requests. In an
interim decree in 1987, Judge Matsch announced he would allow the school board to
follow “general integration guidelines” instead of the “specific desegregation orders”
contained in the Finger Plan.555 Though the decision did not immediately put a stop to
busing, it did allow the district to make changes to the now thirteen-year-old plan. Board
member Judy Morton explained, “Until housing patterns change, we’ll still have busing
to integrate schools.”556 In his ruling, Matsch expected the school board “to act on their
own initiative, without prior court approval,” but he maintained that the “bilingual
program,” as well as faculty distribution requirements remained as they did under the
Finger Plan.557
Naomi Bradford was the sole member who endured on the school board from the
1970s to hear Matsch’s interim decree. By 1987, the board’s makeup had shifted once
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again. In 1985, William Schroeder’s failed TAP left a mark on his candidacy, and he was
defeated. In an undramatic election, liberals Edward Garner and Carol McCotter won.
Both were committed to putting a stop to school board spending when it came to
desegregation and court fees.558 DPS administration was changing, as well. In 1988, Dr.
Evie Dennis was hired as Deputy Superintendent. Dennis was the first black person and
the first woman appointed to the position.559
She was born Evie Garrett on September 8, 1924 in Farmhaven, Mississippi.
When she was in high school, her mother died and Evie’s father became her biggest
coach. He encouraged her saying, “You’ve got to have an education,” hoping Dennis
would defy stereotypes and rise from the poverty that plagued her large family. 560 Dennis
earned a Bachelor’s Degree from St. Louis University in 1953. In 1958, she and her
daughter Pia moved to Denver when Davis took a job with the Children’s Asthmatic
Research Institute. In 1966, Dennis became a math teacher for Denver Public Schools.561
She continued to pursue educational and leadership opportunities. Dennis earned a
Master’s Degree in 1971 from the University of Colorado and a doctorate degree in 1976
from Nova University. After earning her Master’s, Dennis moved into administration and
throughout the 1970s worked with the DPS district office to oversee court-ordered
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desegregation.562 The Denver community was anxious to see the changes Dennis
promised to bring. They hoped Dennis would establish a sense of calm to a district that
was in turmoil. She was sixth superintendent in six years to take the position. While she
promised there would be change, Dennis hoped “people will give me time to make a
difference.”563
A new era had begun in DPS history. Superintendent Dennis and the school board
were publicly committed to working together, within the guidelines provided by the
courts. Judge Matsch acknowledged that the racial balance in Denver schools was
“eroding” due to shifting demographics in the core city. The language had shifted from
“neighborhood schools” and “busing” to “quality schools” and “resegregation.” Black
and Hispanic leaders bemoaned desegregation and its lack of rewards. “Some students
were better off in black schools where they were motivated to achieve when they
competed with other black students,” observed Gwen Thomas of the newly formed
Colorado Black Roundtable. Test scores demonstrated that Denver’s black and Hispanic
students scored in the bottom third of the nation, while whites were in the top third.564
In 1989, the school board asked the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn
Matsch’s 1987 judgment and release DPS from court control permanently. They argued
that the district was in “full compliance,” and that the 1970s lawsuit was outdated and
irrelevant. Gordon Greiner, once again representing the plaintiffs disagreed. He asked,
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“What have we been doing here for the last 20 years?” Greiner stated that the district was
never in full compliance with the 1974 Finger Plan, and had no proof that they
desegregated the dual system, instead their efforts were “just a bunch of platitudes.”565
The court upheld Matsch’s definition of unitary systems, and denied the appeal in
1990.566
Dr. Evie Dennis retired in 1994, but not before she drafted the proposal that
would eventually end twenty years of court-supervised desegregation in DPS. “My last
full week,” she recalled, “I asked for release. The city had changed, the population had
changed, and the judge lifted the order.”567 In Evie Dennis’ eyes, the era of busing had
ended long ago. Over the course of Dennis’ four years as superintendent, DPS filed four
appeals to Judge Matsch, requesting to be released. On August 22, 1994, Judge Richard
Matsch held his last hearings on Denver’s school desegregation fate. DPS argued that “all
remnants of discrimination” were erased from Denver’s racist school system. They
argued that busing had “fueled” white flight to the suburbs and left DPS with a white
population of less than 30%, causing them to redraw busing lines every year. They were
joined by Hispanic and black leaders, like Evie Dennis, who claimed busing never
worked. Manual High alum, Mayor Wellington Webb publicized his readiness to end
busing in DPS. Three years earlier in his 1991 mayoral campaign, Webb promised to
“seek to integrate schools by integrating neighborhoods,” in an effort to release DPS from
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court control. Webb recognized a “great opportunity to end busing.”568 In 1992, the
newly elected Mayor joined DPS in requesting release from Judge Matsch. He offered
that the city could provide “valuable resources—political, monetary and personal—to the
case,” and asked that Matsch turn intervention over to his office.569 One study conducted
in 1983 found that, “Contrary to popular belief, things are not getting better for most
Chicanos in public education.”570 Nine years later, Denver Chicanos repeated the
statement. Ken Salazar, Colorado’s Director of Natural Resources, in the governor’s
cabinet told The Rocky Mountain News that while he believed that twenty years of
desegregation never worked, but he was unsure the school district ready to operate
autonomously.571
The district also tabulated its costs, hoping to demonstrate that court interference
was a burden to taxpayers. In 1992, it took DPS over a month to calculate the amount
they had paid to lawyers and for transportation. In twenty years, the school board spent
more than four million dollars. Attorney fees averaged two hundred dollars an hour.
“Four million is a lot of money,” groaned Richard Koeppe, the former Superintendent
who once hired Evie Dennis to teach. Koeppe pointed out that if the case continued, “that
could easily be another eight million.”572 Katherine Archuletta, a Hispanic activist and
former mayoral aide agreed. “Four million is more than enough to be spent on litigation.
568
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We should work together to settle this case as soon as possible.”573 Another Chicano
activist echoed Archuleta’s words. State representative Tony Hernandez said the
community was ready to end desegregation, if it meant spending less money on lawyers.
“It’s [the] moms and dads and kids who want out from under the court order,” he said.574
In September 1995, Manual High School turned 101. For more than one fourth of
its history, Manual was at the center of court-controlled school desegregation in Denver.
That same month, Judge Richard Matsch declared the experiment was over. “Denver
now,” wrote Matsch, “is very different from what it was when this lawsuit began.”575
Matsch cited white flight, the 1974 Poundstone Amendment, and the rise of enrollments
in private schools as the reasons for declining numbers in Denver’s schools. One
unexpected benefit of lower enrollment meant that students in DPS enjoyed a financial
reality unlike they had in 1968. Denver’s school budget amounted to “nearly half-abillion-dollars,” meaning DPS was spending an average of “$7,300 per student a year,
about the amount of tuition charged by the better private schools.”576 Reverend Aaron
Gray, the black minister from Shorter AME explained, “The difference today is that you
can step into an African-American school and you can see the same amount of resources
that are provided to a majority Anglo school.”577 Despite the dollars spent, DPS was
nonetheless dominated by minority students who hailed from poor socio-economic
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backgrounds. Furthermore, “one-fourth” of the student population lacked “proficiency in
English,” the number of diplomas awarded slipped, and dropouts increased. Wellington
Webb’s office stated that black neighborhood were “shattered by busing,” and the end of
court-control would hopefully improve community connections to the schools, therein
improving student performance.578

The End of Busing: Community Investment in Historically Black and Chicano
Schools
In 1995, DPS and the school board celebrated. Twenty years of operating under
the thumb of state and federal courts finally came to an end. But, as the Denver Post
stated in a summation of the Keyes case, it was time to face the “600-pound gorilla sitting
in the middle of the living room of American society; while everyone tiptoed around
it.”579 Art Branscombe, the Denver Post reporter who founded the Park Hill Action
Committee and chronicled DPS progress from the beginning of the Keyes era commented
that “Denver Public Schools has the potential of being the best district in the nation,” but
worried that housing segregation, overlooked for “70 years” would ultimately bring DPS
to its knees.580 Mayor Webb, ever the advocate for housing desegregation applauded the
end of court control, “The educational fate of thousands,” he said, “will no longer be
determined by an unresponsive and intransigent federal judge.” However, he added the
caveat, “The bad news is that the educational fate of thousands of Denver youngsters will
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now be determined by an unresponsive and intransigent school bureaucracy.”581 Webb
worried that the school board’s use of this new authority would mean “dumbing down the
curriculum even more, creating fifth graders who cannot multiply 12 times 8, but who
have high self-esteem and who repeat the official pieties of multicultural correctness.”582
Most Denver parents, though, hoped that the end of court control meant a return to
neighborhood schools which “encourages people to participate in their community.”583
Reverend Gray, an active leader in the black community throughout the 1990s asked the
Shorter congregation, “Judge Matsch’s decision is a gift and a challenge to the whole of
the Denver community. The question before us now is: What do we really value?”584
It was clear that both the black and Hispanic communities valued community-led
education. Parents of black students at Manual were cautious when it came to the
district’s plan for their community high school. In 1996, the school board announced new
attendance lines for Manual that would change the school’s demographic makeup in
shocking ways. From 44% white, 41% black, and 13% Hispanic, Manual would shift to
6% white, 38% black and 55% Hispanic, almost overnight.585 Under court-ordered
integration, Manual’s population was drawn mostly from the predominately upper-class
white neighborhoods of east-central and southeast Denver. Under a neighborhood
schools plan, “Manual would become an overwhelmingly poor, predominately minority
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school” if allowed to return to its neighborhood dynamics.586 Yet Manual’s “devotees,”
parents, community members, students, and politicians, were committed to “visioning” a
more certain future for the high school.587 Nancy Sutton, the new Manual principal
welcomed “nearly 200 people” who “showed up on a rainy night” to organize the
Collaborative Decision Making team (CDM) to propose a new comprehensive attendance
plan for the Five Points school. Sutton was pleased with some of the ideas generated
during the first meeting. The team brainstormed “multicultural studies, fine arts,
leadership studies, business, finance, and specialized interests programs” to combat
Manual’s bad publicity. One parent explained how such a beloved school could have a
bad reputation. “The school has often received negative press,” explained father Neil
Wiegert, “not because of problems in the building, but because it’s located in a highcrime area.”588
Students enrolled at Manual in 1996 did not always reach a consensus about the
school’s reputation. Caitlin Pierce, a black student “desperately” wanted to remain at
Manual High, though she lived in Park Hill. Meanwhile, her classmate Stephanie Darris
from Five Points thought Manual was “full of gang members.” Darris hoped she could
attend a private school if she was assigned to Manual in 1997.589 Sophomore Devon
James, who was bused across town to Manual from the Hilltop neighborhood said she
“hope[d] to graduate from Manual,” even if she was assigned to a different high
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school.590 As the 1996 school year ended, students voiced their frustrations in a widely
contested special edition of The Bolt, Manual’s student newspaper. The Bolt maintained a
“tradition” by publishing uncensored “last wills” and “testaments” from graduating
seniors. The community and school board were preoccupied and angered by the
“unacceptably foul” descriptions of drug use, sexual deviance, and the use of racial slurs.
However, some of the student confessions betray frustrations over the confusing future of
Manual High.591 One student wrote, “The faster I get outta this bullsh*t society, the
happier I’ll be.”592 Jill Lohmiller The Bolt’s editor-in-chief believed she was carrying on
a time-honored ritual. The graduating senior said, “In the past, no one’s made a big deal
about it.” She added, “It’s been the same way at Manual, and at many of the Denver
schools for a good 20 years.” Lohmiller claimed “we have files of newspapers” dating
back to “1976 and they have things in them that are ten times worse.”
Yet despite mixed student perspectives, community members voiced their support
for Manual High. When the school board published plans to return to the neighborhood
schools concept, Manual’s black community “viewed this as a blessing.” Principal Nancy
Sutton and her CDM completed their proposal in November, 1996. Their plan capped
Manual to “1,000 students, 250 below capacity.” All 1,000 students had to request
permission to attend Manual in writing, and explain their commitment to being
“competitive workers… immersed in core curriculum.” Each student enrolled would
select to participate in “one of six programs of excellence,” each directed toward student
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success in a future college environment. Sutton explained, “We can be a high-performing
school that is a school of color.”593 Sutton and the CDM attempted to cling to one of the
benefits they enjoyed during court-mandated desegregation. In the 1970s and 1980s,
Manual provided an unexpected “cocoon of accelerated classes” for the few white
middle-class students who took advanced placement coursework. With busing scheduled
to end in 1997, the students who once “nestled” for two years in Manual’s advanced
placement halls worried they would become “unwelcome outsiders” overnight.594
“Manual sophomores bused into the school to help integrate it feel like leftovers these
days,” explained Alan Gottlieb of The Denver Post. Sutton faced a unique dilemma.
“Sutton must transform Manual from an integrated school” that had a record of
graduating white, affluent students and sending them to top performing universities “to
an inner-city, heavily minority school where more than half the incoming student read far
below grade level.”595
When the 1997 school year began, Principal Sutton “vowed” that Manual High
would still “knock your socks off,” and produce “extremely educated students.” With her
guarantee, all “eyes were fixed” on Manual High. It was the dawn of a new era. Manual
High School was 103 years old. From its beginnings it was an experimental school. It
produced some of Denver’s most significant activists, and it was the battle ground upon
which the educational equality movement was fought. On August 30th, 1997, a new class
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of students, most of them black or Hispanic, walked through the doors of Manual High
School under a sign that read, “Our Future’s So Bright, We Gotta Wear Shades.”596
La Escuela Tlatelolco became a part of a cyclical process in Denver, as Chicano
students attending the school inherited and owned The Crusade for Justice’s commitment
to youth activism. Just as boycotts and Youth Conferences in Denver from 1968-1969
laid the groundwork for the formation of the alternative school for Chicanos, La Escuela
students ultimately earned an education in activism that continued into the twenty-first
century. This very legacy is exemplified in the 2007 graduation project for La Escuela
that culminated in a protest at the State Capitol. Not just a philosophy in practice, La
Escuela was also a physical space intended for young people to immerse themselves in
their own history and emerge as actors and activists on their own terms. Housed
originally in the Crusade for Justice headquarters, the school was, from the start, a site of
activism. It was decorated with political artwork, “raised-fist ‘Chicano Power’ posters
and Che Guevarra portraits” lined the walls.597 Prior to opening as a school in 1970, the
space allocated for La Escuela was used to house six hundred out-of-town students
attending the Second Chicano Youth Liberation Conference. Nearly four thousand
students came from the surrounding Southwest states, and estimates indicated that an
additional two thousand commuted to the event from the Denver area. The space was
opened up to include various activities and lessons in the building, which housed twentysix classrooms, a kitchen, an auditorium, and gymnasium. With such a large influx of
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students and press, the Crusade recruited members of the Brown Berets to act as security
guards. These young Chicano men were entrusted with the Crusade’s space, and
encouraged to frisk any media personnel who looked out of place. While the majority of
participants were Chicanos, the registration list included names that indicated “Spanish
and Indian ancestry, Spanish-speaking blacks, Anglos, and personas without obvious
Chicano decent.598 Immediately following the Second Liberation Conference, The
Crusade help the Summer Freedom School of 1970 at the old Calvary Church, and
subsequently opened La Escuela.
Even after permanently relocating to a building on Federal Boulevard in in 1994,
La Escuela continued as a site for Chicano activism, beyond its role as a school.599 In
their first year of operating the school at the Calvary Church site, the community
organized the first annual Spirit of Tlatelolco luncheon and fundraiser at the Crusade
Headquarters. This luncheon, meant to honor Chicano leaders across the region and raise
money operating costs, became the most significant and long-standing tradition in La
Escuela’s history. The Spirit Luncheon hosted prominent speakers like Rodolfo Acuña in
1997 and Roberto Rodriguez in 1998.600 In 2002, Nita Gonzales created another event,
modeled after the Spirit Luncheon. La Escuela hosted the “Champions of Change” gala,
dedicated Chicano community members who had participated in La Escuela’s success.
Denver honorees included playwright Rudolfo Añaya, state legislator Polly Baca,
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musician Ramon “Chunky” Castillo, and Bob Jackson, a Rocky Mountain News
columnist. Sal Castro, the Los Angeles educator and someone who had inspired Corky
greatly in the 1960s, was also honored. Each of the dedicatees was asked to speak, and
most took the opportunity to congratulate Corky and Nita on the success of La Escuela
and “its culturally-based curricula.”601
Awards ceremonies and fundraisers were just one example of how Crusade
leaders continued to use La Escuela as a physical and ideological space for activism. The
school became a common gathering place for meetings pertaining to Denver Chicanos.
Beginning with the Youth Liberation Conferences and continuing into the 1970s, La
Escuela and the Crusade Headquarters remained the site for important conversations
about educational equality in Denver. In the early 1990s, when national Chicano drop-out
rates were holding steady at fifty percent, Nita Gonzales held press conferences and
meetings at La Escuela to discuss potential strategies. In the 1990s, she helped to form
Denver’s Chicano Education Coalition. The organization used La Escuela’s approach to
education as an example when they collaborated with DPS to suggest improvements for
Chicanos in the public schools.602 In 1998, representatives of local and national Hispanic
groups held a conference at La Escuela Tlatelolco “to discuss their concerns about
bilingual education in Denver Public Schools.” Pam Martinez, of Padres Unidos joined
dozens of organizers who agreed that DPS was guilty of racism on the basis of language.
This meeting welcomed representatives from the National Association of Bilingual
Educators and the National Council of Latin American Research and Service Agency, all
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who felt that the bilingual program in DPS, in place since 1984, needed to be revamped
in the image of La Escuela.603
While the physical space of La Escuela embodied a spirit of activism, it was no
more prevalent than the experiences of the students who attended and graduated from the
school. La Escuela was a school that allowed for, if not demanded that, Chicano students
establish themselves as activists on their own terms. In 1970, the very act of leaving DPS
and attending La Escuela was considered revolutionary, and by 2007, this energy
remained. By taking control of their own education, Chicano students defied what Corky
called “the negative image of defeat” created by a “country that has wiped out all [our]
history.”604 Students attending La Escuela remained active in their community
throughout the twentieth century. They attended marches, rallies and meetings about
issues ranging from education and language, to sex drugs and safety. In 1997, La Escuela
students were invited to participate in a panel at a Youth Issues Conference. “Forget the
problems,” stated student speaker Hugo Baltierra, “We already know what they are. We
need some solutions.” Baltierra was one of many Escuela students attending the meeting,
and they helped to set the mood for the five hundred teens joining them from the Denver
Public Schools.605 La Escuela prepared Baliterra and other students to engage as active
participants in their community, and speak up when the opportunity presented itself.
Likewise, at the Youth Crime Prevention Conference in Denver in 1999, Escuela youths
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made another lasting impression. Ten students were selected to attend the national
conference as representatives as Denver Chicano students. Estrella Lujan, a senior at La
Escuela shared her perceived responsibility in attending the conference, which hosted
nearly five thousand students and professionals. She stated, “I came because I wanted to
learn about crime prevention and I want to share the information with others at my
school.” Lujan, along with students and administrators from La Escuela already had firsthand experience with crime prevention, as they worked with community members to
prevent violence during the 16 de Septiembre celebrations the year before. 606
In fact, students at La Escuela, educated in the tradition of protest, placed
themselves at the center of youth activism into the twenty-first century. In March, 2003,
hundreds of high schoolers in Denver and nearby Boulder faced consequences from
detention to expulsion when they participated in a state-wide anti-war protest, but
students at La Escuela were applauded for their involvement. Educator Rudy Gonzales
led the kids himself to the rally. He said, “You guys got signs? Move ‘em out, get ‘em on
the street!”607 In 2007, when La Escuela students led their Denver peers in another antiwar protest at the State Capitol, instructor Joy Stewart agreed, “They’re not missing
school; this is it.”608
Ultimately, the most significant legacy of La Escuela that remains is this: Chicano
students were more successful in the community controlled environment at La Escuela
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Tlatelolco than they were in public schools. Since graduating their first senior class in
1971, La Escuela has maintained a 90% graduation rate, in stark contrast to its
neighboring public schools.609 In her study on the factors that make a school successful
for Hispanic students, Elena McKissack explained that most Chicanos indicate that
connections are needed among parents, friends, the school, cultural history, self-identity,
and community leaders. La Escuela started with all of these factors at the center, and the
legacy continues.610 At La Escuela, negative opinions about Chicanos are not tolerated.
Racism, internal or external is explored and challenged. A connection to the community
is required. Activism is celebrated, learned, and honored. The waiting list for enrollment
is steadily at forty or more students each year. “La Escuela,” wrote McKissack, “has
never sacrificed its ideals and continues to center its curriculum on Chicano themes.”611 It
was a long time coming. Beginning with the blowouts in 1968, the Chicano Youth
Liberation Conferences in 1969 and 1970, and the publication of Yo Soy Joaquin in 1967,
La Escuela Tlatelolco is a product of interpretations of nationalism, language, and
identity in physical form. Chicanocentric education defined one of Denver’s only
effective attempts at community control, and pioneered a successful model for similar
attempts in the Southwest.
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An Established Legacy: Manual 100 Years in the Making
In 1991, Denver voters elected Wellington Webb, the hometown basketball star
from Manual High School to serve as their mayor. Webb, who ran on a platform that was
decidedly “anti-big money,” made national news when he conducted his campaign almost
exclusively on foot. Webb, his wife Wilma, and his supporters traipsed the city of
Denver, approaching private citizens in their homes to discuss politics and the future of
Denver.612 The campaign and its historic impact were equally notorious in Denver. Webb
announced his run when incumbent Federico Peña, the city’s first Hispanic mayor
announced that he wouldn’t seek reelection after his third term ended in 1991. Peña halfheartedly endorsed Donald Bain, a wealthy Republican, until Bain pulled out of the race
and threw his support behind Wellington Webb. Webb beat Norm Early, another black
man from the Denver area. Mused one political commentary, “When was the last time
any of you ever heard of a mayoral race in a major American city where a rich white man
was running third behind two black candidates? In a predominantly white city where the
black population is around 12 percent?”613 Webb followed Peña, who ran in 1983 on a
campaign meant to challenge the white elite establishment in local politics. Peña spent his
three terms advocating for more jobs and better housing opportunities for women and
minorities. Webb promised to continue the tradition, while also bringing an end to the
great busing controversy that plagued Denver since the late 1960s. 614
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Wellington Webb was born in Chicago in 1941.615 His family moved to Denver
when he was in high school, and Webb joined the Manual Thunderbolt basketball team.
When he graduated in 1958, he won a collegiate athletics scholarship and attended
Northeastern Junior College in Sterling Colorado. He then graduated with his Bachelor’s
Degree in 1964 from Colorado State College in Greeley, Colorado. Webb, a Denver
devotee, hoped to return to the city and teach for DPS. When he was consistently turned
down for teaching positions, Webb went looking for other opportunities. On the advice of
his grandmother, Webb sought a job at city hall, where he developed a love for
politics.616 Webb married Wilma in 1969, and the two became active members of the
Denver community and Colorado politics.617 In part because of their political careers, and
in part because they were proud alumni of Manual High, Wilma and Wellington became
fixtures in Manual’s community. Norman Rice, Seattle’s first black mayor, and classmate
of both Webbs explained in 1991, “People who went to Manual still have the pride
today.”618
“The pride” continued to define Manual High School, even when the end of
busing threatened to resegregate the district and return Manual to an impoverished state.
In part because of their stellar athletic programs, Manual’s success stories bombarded the
local newspapers almost as often as pieces about gangs and violence. The community
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rallied around the Thunderbolts. In 1993, Reverend Wade C. Davis of Good Shepherd
Baptist Church near Park Hill was announced the new basketball coach at Manual. Davis
won the position in a heated job search that included twenty highly qualified candidates,
and cemented another era of community investment in Manual’s future initiated by
church leadership. In 1994, Webb and the Denver community believed Manual “has
produced a very distinguished legacy of scholars, sports teams, and community leaders.”
They hoped Manual was poised for another 100 years of prominence in the Mile High
City.
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Public Historian, September 2014
“Basement Bowlers: The National Negro Bowling Association and its Legacy of Black
Leadership” For future publication in, David K. Wiggins and Ryan Swanson, eds.,
Separate Games: Sport in the African American Community During the Age of Racial
Segregation and Beyond. University of Illinois Press, December 2014
“No Body Does it Better: The Production of Whiteness and Masculinity through James
Bond, 1962-1989”, Master of Arts Thesis, May 2007
Presentations
“Will this be on the Test?: Teaching Research Strategies to Undergraduate Students”
Lilly Conference on College and University Teaching, March 2014
“Using Learning Style Assessment to Teach Research Strategies”
Lilly Conference on College and University Teaching, March 2013
“It’s More than Black and White: Remembering School Desegregation in Denver, 19781991” Southwestern Oral History Conference, April 2012
“School Desegregation in Denver: The Intersections Race Gender, and Class, 1962-1974
Western Association of Women Historians Conference, April 2011
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Teaching Experience
Courses Taught
Gateway Community College, Phoenix, AZ: HIS 104: United States 1865 to Present
August 2013-Present
Estrella Mountain Community College, Avondale, AZ: CCS 101: Introduction to
Chicano Studies, August 2014-Present
Estrella Mountain Community College, Avondale, AZ: HIS 204: African American
History, October 2014-Present
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, COLA 100E: First Year Seminar: Exploring Majors,
August-December 2012
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, PUA 230: Introduction to Leadership, January-May
2012
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, HIST 495: The History of Women’s Leadership,
January-December 2011
Northern Arizona University, EPS 499: RA Pre-service Course, 2005-2009
Northern Arizona University, WGS/ES 191: Women, Gender and Ethnicity, 2008-2009
Northern Arizona University, WST 215: Making of the Real Man: Masculinities and
Manhood, 2006
University Administration and Student Services Experience
Deputy Director for Preserve Nevada , June 2012-May 2013
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Department of History
Summer Information Literacy Fellow, May-August 2012
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, University Libraries
Graduate Assistant for Service Programs and the Center for Social Justice, January-May
2012
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Office of Civic Engagement and Diversity
Educational Outreach Coordinator and Project Manager, August 2010- December 2011
National Education for Women’s (NEW) Leadership Nevada, the Women’s Research
Institute of Nevada, UNLV
Graduate Assistant for Orientation, August 2009- August 2010
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Office of Admissions
Residence Hall Director, Mountain View Hall. May 2006-August 2009
Northern Arizona University, Office of Residence Life
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